

\* \* \*

**Memorandum, Polish Foreign Ministry, “Regarding the Poss[ible] Accession of the  
Mongolian  
People’s Republic to the Warsaw Treaty,” 20 July 1963, marked, “Secret, Special  
Significance,  
Copy No. 1.” Stamped: “On the Orders of Comrade Rapacki, sent to the members of the P.B.  
[Politburo] and Secr.[etariat] on 20.VII.1963” and “With a request to return to the  
Chancellory of  
the Secretariat of the CC.”**

Secret, Special Significance

Copy No. 1

Beyond the letters of Cde. Tsedenbal and Cde. Khrushchev, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not possess any information further clarifying the arguments to be made at the current stage of this measure.

In this situation, it is difficult to accept as politically warranted the proposal regarding the MNR’s accession to the Warsaw Treaty.

The military significance of such a decision for the security of Mongolia and the interests of the Warsaw Pact seem to be practically indiscernible. The political consequences for the short and the long term are dubious and risky.

1. From the point of view of the interests of the socialist camp:

a/ The acceptance of Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact at this time will of course be discerned both in the socialist states of Asia and in the West as a step whose thrust is directed against the PRC [People’s Republic of China].

In a situation in which the PRC, continuing its policy of deepening divisions, is making attempts to push the responsibility onto the USSR and the other states supporting its stance, an initiative with regard to Mongolia might in a certain sense play into the hands of the PRC and be used to blame our side for carrying the dispute into the area of military alliances and moving along the path of dividing the [socialist] camp along military lines.

Imperialist propaganda on the other hand will try to exploit this fact with the goal of bringing into further relief the divergence within the [socialist] camp and questioning the superiority of socialism over capitalism by telling the masses all the more that such is the peaceful substance and internationalist policy of the socialist states.

b/ Cde. Tsedenbal’s letter underlines the point of the imperialist threat to Mongolia.

Even if we could count on the fact that the Chinese comrades would accept this assertion with good will, it would also become a real basis for harmful interpretations: “The Warsaw Pact represents for Mongolia an additional security guarantee in the event of imperialist aggression, but at the same time it [the Warsaw Pact] is not giving such an additional guarantee to Vietnam, Korea, and the PRC, which are even more directly exposed to the danger of American/Japanese aggression.”

c/ The Warsaw Pact is a pact of the European socialist states directed against imperialist activities in Europe ([see] the preamble — attached) and providing for an automatic military reaction by the participants in the event of aggression in Europe (art. 4).

These provisions of the Treaty would have to be changed. The very political scope and character of the Treaty would have to be changed.

Such a basic change of the Warsaw Pact would have an unmistakable and serious meaning, because it would lead to an actual transformation of the alliance into a general security pact for the socialist camp with the participation of all the states of the camp. Against the

backdrop of the particular policy of the PRC, such a solution is unrealistic. If it is, such a change in the character of the Treaty would be more likely to weaken the anti-imperialist activity of the Treaty in Europe than to strengthen it in Asia.

d/ It can be counted on that the problem of Albania in the Warsaw Pact will be brought to a sharp climax. The acceptance of a new member and a change in the contents of the Treaty requires the unanimous acceptance of the participants.

A change in the Treaty would require the acceptance of a relevant Protocol, which would have to be ratified by every signatory to the Treaty in order to come into force. Albania, which has in fact disassociated itself from the Treaty, remains nominally a member of it. Its opposition would thus have a legal basis.

e/ The possibility of a negative stance on the part of Romania regarding Mongolia's accession should also seriously be counted on, and a discussion on this issue might further inflame existing differences.

f/ In terms of the international effects of Mongolia's accession to the Warsaw Pact, it should also be taken into consideration that Mongolia has established a [certain] position for itself among the Afro-Asiatic states (it participates in the Afro-Asiatic group at the UN). It should be considered whether Mongolia, by participating in a military pact, would not diminish the political credibility that it possesses in this group and its possibilities [for influence], which well serve the [socialist] camp as a whole.

2. From the viewpoint of Mongolia's interests:

Mongolia's security is guaranteed by an alliance with the Soviet Union from 1946.

It would thus be an abstraction to conceive of a situation in which — in the case of aggression against Mongolia — the other socialist states would remain disengaged.

If, on the other hand, certain technical-military interests on the part of the Warsaw Pact are established with regard to the territory of Mongolia, or if [there is] a desire on the part of Mongolia to exercise influence over the activities of the Pact, an agreement of a secret nature — based on the principle of consultation between the Warsaw Pact and Mongolia — could be supported.

It could also be that the main motivation behind the Mongolian comrades' proposal is their assessment of their internal situation. We do not know of such an assessment, and we do not have any information that would permit us to form our own opinion on the subject. Such an assessment could be found out in direct talks.

The issue is fundamental and will of course be discussed in Moscow with the Mongolian comrades.

In any event, from this point of view, the risk arising from an eventual further sharpening of the conflict in the socialist camp should also be taken into consideration. The accession of Mongolia to the Warsaw Pact might very well represent a stepping stone for various moves by the PRC with regard to Mongolia — moves that would not have a military character and would have practically no significance in terms of Mongolia's membership in the Warsaw Pact. If there are internal difficulties, other methods for granting and demonstrating assistance and support for Mongolia should be weighed.

For example, all the CMEA's planned economic assistance to date for Mongolia and [other] possible assistance that could still be initiated could be harnessed in a special action program for the sake of Mongolia's development as the economically least-developed country within the CMEA. This would also have a broader political sense for the world.

Master copies produced at the MSZ [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

MR/KM

*[Translation by Douglas Selvage]*

