
**Report on the Sixth PCC Meeting (26 July 1963) by First Secretary of the
MDP/MSzMP (János Kádár) to the Hungarian Politburo**

Although the editing committee had been in session by midnight, an agreement was still not forthcoming in the morning, and so it was finally agreed that the two debated points were to be deleted. I would like to make a request here: all things considered, the whole thing seems to have turned out for the better. Although the crux of the problem is far from being resolved, I consider it a fortunate and a positive development that the situation did not aggravate. With the cooperation being as it is, nothing will depend on whether points 13 and 5 are accepted. We, the rest of us, shall continue working, making as much progress as possible. The good thing is that the situation did not aggravate. Of course, it made a bad impression all around and was most unpleasant. It is not customary between comrades to talk as if we were diplomats.

I don't quite know what to do with the material of the discussion. The speeches revealed some interesting points. If we want to do something, we can do it only later, and only in an organized form, as the notes are to be released only at the Central Committee's request. At the meeting the Soviet delegation had the most effective argument. Instead of mincing words, they argued as follows: You should invest in the Soviet production of grain, cotton, copper, electricity, etc. Strange as it may be, building a power plant in Siberia could solve the problems of the GDR's power supply. Naturally, this would not mean importing electricity directly from Siberia; rather, by building a power plant in Siberia, it would be possible to free some capacity at the power plants in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and these in turn can supply the GDR.

On the session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Council: There was something on the agenda, in the matter of which our delegation had had a mandate by the appropriate official bodies: i.e. Mongolia's application for admission. The Council of Ministers voted in support and the Presidential Council also instructed us to support Mongolia's admission. The only negative reaction to it was by the Romanians. Every delegation said something, but the Romanians gave a vague and useless reply. Essentially they said that they were not against it, but... Who is threatening Mongolia? Why is their admission necessary, etc.? But then it was raised that the nuclear test-ban treaty had just been signed. The Soviet comrades said that there was some contradiction here. No matter how small the treaty was, its significance was still great. It is just not possible that in the same our, or on the next day, we react by admitting a new member to the Warsaw Pact - that would contradict the fact that the treaty had just been signed, so here is the contradiction. We would be hard put to explain to the public why Mongolia had joined. One argument cancels the other. Also, at the moment it is still impossible to foresee which way the debate would go, as the preliminary reactions were mixed. Comrade Cendebal also spoke, suggesting that we postpone the decision. I said that we concurred with him. Finally, no decision was made, as we agreed not to discuss the matter of admission. I have a question here: What am I to say about this to the Central Committee? Here, too, we need a certain amount of discretion. It is quite possible that after Mongolia's admission we'll get all the disadvantages but none of the advantages. This was the reason why the meeting decided not to discuss the question. So how much of it should we tell the Central Committee? I think that we have no choice but to tell the whole truth to the Central Committee. The other point is that we also have to tell the truth at the council of ministers, as they voted to support the admission. I think the best thing would be to say

that we have not voted on the question and that we have not made a decision.

In giving his report at the meeting, Comrade Grechko said encouraging things about the progress. - I would like to mention something here in brackets. The delegation should have been made up by the prime minister, the defense minister and the foreign minister. This was why we had to call in Erdélyi halfway through the conference. In his report, Comrade Grechko said that further opportunities had to be explored. He also moved a draft resolution that went far beyond all previous resolutions. His proposal went substantially further than the minutes of the February meeting.

We are continuously informed about the Soviet-Chinese negotiations, the details of which I do not wish to go into now. The essential thing is that both sides kept to their own guns. The Chinese negotiated on the basis of their letter dated June 14, and the Soviet comrades on the basis of their letter of June 14. The Soviet side was the first to explain its position for an entire day, then the Chinese followed suit. The reason why this took so long was that the Chinese rejected the idea of simultaneous translation, insisting on the old method. Finally, it was the Chinese side that proposed to suspend the negotiations. They are to be resumed only when the two Central Committees have come to an agreement. It was interesting to see that the Chinese side criticized what they had earlier demanded: the publication of the document was bad, it did not help; of course, now it was not in their interest, yet earlier they were the ones who demanded that the documents be published. Deng Xiaoping said the following in his first speech: "... our differences began with the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. That congress introduced new ideas that were in contradiction with Marxism on the issue of war and peace, on peaceful coexistence, and on the issue of peaceful transition... in connection with the Polish events of 1956 the Soviet comrades assumed the chauvinistic position of power politics, wishing to intervene militarily, while on the Hungarian issue they were ready to capitulate as they wanted to abandon the Hungarian People's Republic... Since 1958 the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party, and Comrade Khrushchev in particular, have continuously attacked the domestic politics of the Chinese Communist Party. In June 1959 the Soviet Union stopped supporting the development of China's nuclear industry. In September 1959, in connection with the border dispute between China and India, the Soviet news agency TASS came down on India's side... after his visit of the United States in 1959, Comrade Khrushchev declared that the nature of imperialism had changed and the Marxist-Leninist theory had already been outdated... After June 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally recalled its experts from China... At the 1957 conference, just as in 1956, the Chinese party was willing to make certain compromises regarding the mistakes committed by the Soviet Communist Party so as to protect the Soviet Communist Party's prestige... At the second Moscow meeting Comrade Khrushchev referred to Yugoslavia as a socialist country, when it was clearly not, while breaking off all relations with Albania... The program adopted by the Soviet Communist Party's 22nd congress is in contradiction with Marxism-Leninism ... and so on. There is something else, too: the only reason the Soviet Union wanted to sign the nuclear test-ban treaty with the United States was to tie up China's hands... The Soviet Union moved its rockets to Cuba in order to bring that country under its control... Ever since its 22nd Congress, the Soviet Communist Party has been trying to break up the international communist movement... The Soviet Communist Party supports Dange's clique in India... Since the election of President Kennedy, the Soviet Union has supported imperialism in the United States, comparing Kennedy to President Roosevelt... In its rare comments on the national liberation movements, the Soviet Union uses empty phraseology... The Soviet Communist Party's attacks are

directed against the sister parties... The Soviet leadership makes friends with Kennedy, Nehru, the Pope and Tito... As a consequence of the damaging political line, a number of our sister parties in capitalist countries, such as the Communist parties in Cuba, India and Iraq, have committed blunder after blunder. The line followed by the Italian Central Committee is also wrong... Naturally, the Chinese received appropriate answers to these questions. Once again, I would like to know how much of this we should disclose to the Central Committee. By way of information handout, I have a rather rudimentary memorandum, which members of the Secretariat could study. There is another document on investment policy. I suggest that these should be studied by members of the Secretariat, as well as by comrades Apró and Fock.

[...]

I have been trying to make up my mind what to say about the Political Council at the meeting. Something must be said. We have our Marxist-Leninist principles, our political movement is there, and there is our economic foundations and our defense capability. Still, it is quite feasible that we would link this topic, too, to the fight for disarmament.

I have one or two comments on the draft proposal. At the end of the first paragraph the topic is defined. This does not correspond with the real topic. I want to expand this, either with or without concrete references. This is what I have in mind: actual problems of domestic and foreign politics; here only the party and government delegations are mentioned by name.

On the first page we have the following: "The leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Hungarian Revolutionary Government of Workers and Peasants can now study directly the results that the Soviet people led by its party and government has achieved in the past six years." I would leave this out. Then we have the expression "international movement of workers" mentioned several times in the draft proposal. I would be inclined to use the expression "international Communist movement" instead. This would be more precise here. International Communist movement. Or international revolutionary workers' movement.

On page 3 it says that the relations between the sovereign states taking part in COMECON are based on the principles of proletarian internationalism. This should be made more complete. I mean, the sovereignty is there, but I would refer to mutual brotherly assistance, rather than proletarian internationalism. I would prefer that.

This draft resolution makes no reference to the Warsaw Pact and by no means do I suggest that it should necessarily do so. Nevertheless, I could easily envisage a reference to it, although not necessarily here. But if we do not mention it here, we should insert a sentence somewhere about general disarmament being a fight for peace, etc. And we can also say something about military alertness forming part of that struggle. And then the reference to the Warsaw Pact will no be longer necessary.

On page 4 one of the paragraphs starts with the expression "our Party's press, etc." I respect the

press, but here, instead of using this expression, we should say that our party has made it public, etc.