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**Report to the Members of the
HSWP Politburo and the Government on the
Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee,
January 19-20, 1965**

At the celebrations in Moscow on November 7, 1964, the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party and the government of the German Democratic Republic proposed that a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee be convened in Warsaw at the end of November in order to formulate a common position of the Warsaw Treaty member-states regarding NATO's plans to create a multilateral nuclear force. During joint preliminary consultations on the proposal, the Romanian comrades declared that in their view the meeting should be postponed because a precipitate stance could serve to unite the participants in the Western debate on the multilateral force. Due to the brief time at our disposal, other members of the Warsaw Treaty also recommended the meeting's postponement. By mutual consent, the meeting was scheduled for January 19, 1965.

The deputy foreign ministers of the member-states convened in Warsaw on December 10, 1964, in order to facilitate preparations for the meeting. The meeting accepted the Hungarian proposal that, in order to demonstrate the unity of the socialist countries and to emphasize the importance of the issue at hand at the meeting scheduled for January, the member-states should be represented by the first secretaries of the Central Committees of the member-states, the chairmen of the councils of ministers, as well as the foreign and defense ministers. At the meeting the deputy foreign ministers proposed that representatives from the People's Republic of Albania, who had been absent from the deliberations of the Treaty's organs for the last three-and-a-half years, be invited to the meeting.

At the request of the member-states, the People's Republic of Poland presented an invitation to the session of the Political Consultative Committee on January 19 to the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers' Party and the government of the People's Republic of Albania. Albania replied to the invitation on January 16. The Albanian government refused to participate in the January 19 session and posed preconditions for its future participation in the work of the Warsaw Treaty.

I.

1. At the Warsaw meeting, the member-states were represented by delegations consisting of the previously-agreed participants.
2. The meeting discussed the agenda entitled "The position of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty regarding the various NATO proposals for a multilateral nuclear force." The participants in the meeting heard a report by Marshal Grechko, the Supreme

Commander of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty regarding NATO's armed forces and the military preparedness of the Warsaw Treaty's armed forces. The delegations approved a communiqué for the press on the meeting's proceedings.

3. During the discussion of the various proposals for a NATO multilateral nuclear force, the participants addressed various international political issues. Among these were the following:

Comrade Brezhnev asserted that the imperialists were not currently preparing for a world war, but they are supporting local wars in locations that suit their interests.

He called attention to the dangers of their tactics of subversion and penetration. We must consider the possibility that in the forthcoming period the imperialists, with their economic, technical and scientific possibilities, will seek to broaden their contacts with the socialist states in order to influence our countries' domestic development in directions favorable to them, and will strive to loosen our unity. It is therefore particularly important to prevent and thwart ideological penetration and subversion.

With regard to current international issues, Comrade Brezhnev disclosed that the danger could not be ruled out of armed intervention in Cuba's domestic affairs. There is tremendous pressure on Castro and his group. The United States is currently organizing mercenaries in Central America to be used against Cuba. The Soviet Union is extending significant aid; it is the duty of all socialist states to help Cuba.

The American attitude in South Vietnam reflects imperialist policy in general. We must expect ongoing US provocations. The Soviet Union has been providing effective aid to North Vietnam. Premier Kosygin will visit Hanoi in the near future to discuss future aid.

The imperialists are disunited on a whole series of issues. We must exploit their differences to serve our own interests. Where it is advantageous, the Soviet Union is building contacts with the imperialists.

We must think about how we can benefit from de Gaulle's conflict with the Americans. The present French leadership is ready for limited political cooperation and is seeking possibilities to establish economic links with the socialist states. Wherever this is to our advantage, we must exploit our possibilities. According to the French comrades, such contacts are useful from the perspective of the French Communist Party as well.

Soviet-West German relations are not going well. Trade is declining, and the FRG will sign a long-term cultural and trade agreement only if it applies to West Berlin as well. The Soviet side will not accept this.

It is particularly important for the socialist states to stand united in the present situation. The Soviet Union supports a regular exchange of views between all socialist countries on important foreign policy issues.

Comrade [Gheorghe Gheorghiu-] Dej asserted in his presentation that the detonation of the Chinese atomic device was a favorable factor in defending world peace because it has augmented our forces and furthered the success of our talks to relax international tensions.

Comrade Ulbricht expressed the view in his speech that the GDR requires more consistent support from the socialist states in all international political issues related to Germany.

4. The common position on Western plans for a multilateral nuclear force is contained in the published joint communiqué.

During the discussion about the aims of the Western powers, the delegations reached a consensus that the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force cannot be regarded as a given. Differences of opinion exist among the NATO member-states. The anxieties in the Western world allow us to conclude that the firm, calm and constructive position of the Warsaw Treaty member-states has had a sobering effect upon the advocates of a multilateral nuclear force, has strengthened the concerns of those with reservations about the U.S.-West German plans and has increased the uncertainty of those who are wavering.

At the same time, it was noted that despite the differences within NATO, the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force is a real danger. In the future, we must anticipate the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force based upon a modification of the current plans.

The Hungarian position regarding the main points on the agenda was as follows:

“...we agreed to examine the aggressive plans currently proposed by NATO, especially by the governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany; the steps that have been taken to establish a multilateral nuclear force, the resulting situation; and what should be done about it.

“Clearly, the planned multilateral nuclear force does not change the balance of power between the two world systems, but it still represents a threat to peace. By giving the revanchist West Germans access to atomic weapons, it significantly increases the danger of irresponsible steps that could lead to the outbreak of a new world war. Moreover, the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force in itself will lead to the dissemination of nuclear weapons, increase the number of countries possessing this dangerous weapon and increase the danger of war.

“Clearly, if NATO’s plans for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force come to fruition, beyond the immediate danger of war, this would also entail political consequences detrimental to our political interests that we must take into account. Contrary to our goals, tensions would increase as the international weight of the reactionary FRG, armed with nuclear weapons, increases, while the chances for the peaceful settlement of the German question would diminish. It is easy to see that in this scenario the Bonn government would be able to act even more aggressively in opposing diplomatic recognition of the GDR and the idea of direct talks between the two states. That the FRG would come closer in some form to possessing nuclear weapons would encourage all the reactionary forces of the world and would have a depressing and detrimental impact upon the forces fighting for progress on behalf of millions of ordinary people in all countries.

“The Hungarian people and the People’s Republic of Hungary, along with the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty, are directly and vitally affected by NATO’s aggressive plan to establish a multilateral nuclear force and the consequences that will ensue if the plan should be realized. Our delegation is therefore authorized to support at this meeting all reasonable and expedient political, diplomatic, military and other steps by the Warsaw Treaty that may help prevent the realization of NATO’s planned multilateral force, or – if it should be realized despite our efforts – that may avert the ensuing danger.”

5. In terms of the struggle against the multilateral nuclear force, the majority of the member-states agreed to accept a joint declaration against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Romanian delegation announced that although it is theoretically against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was nevertheless opposed to the inclusion of this proposal in the joint declaration based on current tactical considerations.

According to the Romanian party, the fight against nuclear weapons should not focus on preventing nuclear proliferation, but instead on getting the nuclear powers to solemnly undertake never to employ nuclear weapons.

6. The meeting discussed the issue of making the permanent organs of the Warsaw Treaty – the Political Consultative Committee and the command of the Unified Armed Forces – more organized and regular, along with the establishment of a new organ, the Council of Foreign Ministers.

At the Warsaw session, practically all the delegations discussed the need to resolve this important issue. Since there were previously-approved proposals on the matter and the session was unable to formulate a solution acceptable to all, it was agreed to return to the matter at a future date.

The Hungarian position regarding the issue was as follows:

“Under the current circumstances, in which we face such aggressive imperialist moves as the armed aggression against the people of South Vietnam and Congo and the plan to create a multilateral nuclear force, it is necessary to strengthen our unity and cooperation through more regular, more organized and more frequent discussions of pressing international questions. This is required all the more given the multifaceted and quite concerted activities of the imperialists against our socialist system and our unity under the pretext of peaceful coexistence in the political, economic and cultural fields.

“The Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the Government of the People’s Republic of Hungary consider its most important obligation at all times – but especially in the current situation – to be the consolidation of the unity of our countries and the intensification of our joint efforts in all important questions of international life.

“The Hungarian side has repeatedly recommended that, in order to better organize our work and to improve the availability of information and consultation, we should establish, in addition to the already functioning organs of the Warsaw Treaty, a Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which would meet at specified, regular intervals.

“A long time has elapsed since the last meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. The Central Committee of our Party and our Government think that there are numerous other questions of common interest about which we could and possibly should hold consultations. Nevertheless, our delegation is of the opinion that at the present meeting we should devote our attention to measures designed to foil the establishment of the multilateral force planned by NATO. Then we should focus on the second issue and, if possible, take concrete steps toward facilitating more regular consultations.”

7. The majority of the delegations voiced their position on the Albanian delegation's absence from the session. Albania's position, it was asserted, indicates neither a readiness on the part of Albania's leaders to improve their relations with the other European socialist states nor a seeming desire to participate in the work of the Warsaw Treaty. Nevertheless, the member-states concluded that the future participation of representatives of the People's Republic of Albania in the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee will depend exclusively upon the position of the Albanian Workers' Party and the Albanian government.

The Hungarian view of the Albanian question was as follows:

“Successful work has preconditions. During the preparatory work, we supported, as did the other member-states, the position that the People's Republic of Albania should be invited [to participate] free of any discrimination. From the Albanian response we received, it is clear that they unfortunately declined to participate and attached various conditions to their participation in the meeting. There is no time here to discuss their position or to properly assess it. Our delegation suggests that we should affirm that no party, including the Albanian one, has the right to set preconditions for the fulfillment of its contractual obligations. We should communicate this in the appropriate way to the government of the People's Republic of Albania and continue with our own work.”

At the request of the member-states, the Polish government will communicate the response of the Political Consultative Committee response to Albania.

8. The outcome of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee can be assessed as positive.

The joint communiqué contains the common position of all the member-states regarding the main issue on the agenda—NATO's reactionary plan to create a multilateral nuclear force. The meeting

elicited great interest in the West. The West thinks that the Warsaw Treaty is a more solid, more unified organization than NATO. After the meeting, various forms of resistance to the multilateral nuclear force increased.

II.

1. After the session, the Hungarian delegation paid a courtesy call on Comrades Gomułka and Cyrankiewicz.
 - a. The talks addressed in a good, comradely spirit issues of Polish-Hungarian cooperation, which was assessed as positive and evolving. With regard to economic cooperation, Comrades Kádár and Gomułka agreed that within the framework of cooperative production the best solution for the participating countries was to produce spare parts.

Comrade Gomułka recommended that we join forces to purchase more patents from the West since patents allow the acquisition of state-of-the-art technology. The Polish comrades attach great significance to the joint Polish-Hungarian purchase of automobile engines. They are expecting a concrete proposal from us.

- b. Comrade Gomułka agreed with the expediency of Comrade Kádár's proposal to convene the officials responsible for the foreign affairs of the socialist states in order to discuss how to concentrate more on the work and less on the protocol for the meetings of the leaders of the socialist countries. Comrade Kosygin, who held talks with the Polish leaders about this matter, has also agreed to reduce the number of protocol events and to simplify the protocol.
2. During the Hungarian delegation's stay in Warsaw, Comrade Rapacki paid a courtesy call to Comrade Péter's quarters. At their extremely cordial meeting, they exchanged information on current issues of their governments' foreign policies. Comrade Rapacki informed Comrade Péter about his trip to Mexico; his meeting with Rusk, Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Walker; his impending visits to Rome, Iran and Brussels, and French-Polish relations. Comrade Péter informed Comrade Rapacki about his visit to Paris, Hungarian-Austrian relations and his negotiations with Rusk.

III.

1. In addition to the plenary session, the heads of delegations, the first secretaries of the fraternal parties and the chairmen of the councils of ministers met to discuss the issues on the agenda. The discussion, which was characterized by a frank and open exchange of views, contributed to the successful conclusion of the session.
2. The leaders of several delegations of the fraternal parties, making use of their stay in Warsaw, met with each other and held useful, comradely talks about current issues of the international workers' movement.
3. During his stay in Warsaw, Comrade János Kádár paid a friendly visit to Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin, the leaders of the Soviet delegation. They held informal talks in a cordial atmosphere.

Budapest, January 25, 1965

Compiled by Károly Erdélyi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Approved by János Kádár

**Minutes of Meeting of the
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Politburo**

**Report to the Politburo on the Meeting of the Six
Fraternal Parties after the PCC Meeting in Warsaw on
January 20, 1965**

On the evening of January 20, 1965, after the session of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee had ended and the Romanian delegation had left, the remaining first secretaries and prime ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries met in the headquarters of the Polish United Workers' Party to discuss the convening of the meeting of the Editorial Committee scheduled for March 1. At the beginning of the meeting, Comrade Brezhnev in the name of the CPSU Central Committee called on the comrades to express their views on the Editorial Committee meeting scheduled for March 1.

Comrade Gomulka proposed that instead of calling it a session of the Editorial Committee, we should refer to it as a consultative session. He thought it would be expedient for the five parties—the Polish, the GDR, the Czechoslovak, the French, and the Italian—to make a proposal to this effect in a letter addressed to the CPSU Central Committee. It was a mistake, he said, to call the meeting of the 26 parties an Editorial Committee. This organ will not actually edit anything.

He proposed that after the session is convened, it should discuss in what form the international meeting should be prepared. For example, regional meetings are needed to deliberate on various topics, including the issue of nuclear weapons.

The Polish comrades believe that we need more flexible working methods than before. In their view, it is very important, for example, that the international journal published in Prague, which may be said to be stillborn and which nobody reads, should fulfill its function. Let it be an open forum in which each party can present its own position under the sole condition that it does not attack other parties, insult them, or attach labels to them.

Comrade Ulbricht agreed that the session should be consultative and that the five parties should address the CPSU.

Comrade Novotný also agreed with the consultative form, but recommended that the date be postponed. He recalled that, to his knowledge, the twenty Latin American parties that had recently sent their representatives to Moscow and Beijing intended to address a similar proposal to the CPSU. This could serve as the necessary pretext for the postponement while at the same time taking their position into account.

Comrade Zhivkov agreed with the consultative form and the need for regional meetings. Whether the meeting convenes on March 1, he thought, did not matter; it could do so any time in March.

Comrade Kádár stated in his presentation that beyond the organizational issues we should also consider the matter of content. At present, each communist and workers' party refers to the Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960, but the interpretation of these is not unanimous; there are now two opposing camps in the world [movement]. Moreover, for many pressing issues, no correct Marxist-Leninist position has been adopted. For this reason, the March meeting, about whose consultative nature we are agreed, should address not only the convening of an international conference but other timely matters as well. For beyond the international conference, we also need a common platform, a program for struggle, and unity of action.

We agree that the five parties should turn to the CPSU. We also agree that the journal, *Questions of Peace and Socialism*, should be of a different character and permit each party to freely express and air its views, but not to insult other parties. We also agree with the need to hold regional meetings. We must definitely stick to March 1. It is very important that we do not attach any labels to each other in the debate. Labeling one another "Marxist or non-Marxist party" will not lead anywhere. This is a tactical matter, and we should see what results can be achieved.

Comrade Brezhnev spelled out the CPSU's position -- namely, that nothing about the meeting should be changed and that the Editorial Committee should convene on March 1 under that name. Since sixty-one parties agreed to hold the meeting, the CPSU alone or a few other parties should not change it. Perhaps in addition to the 18 parties a few others could participate (the Danish, the Finnish) that have already raised this issue and could perhaps send a letter to the CPSU.

According to the CPSU, the Editorial Committee will meet and pass a resolution on the first day declaring to all the other parties that they should participate in preparations for the larger international conference in various forms: by submitting letters and recommendations, holding regional meetings, and sending their representatives to Moscow. We could thus nullify the Chinese argument that 26 is an illegal number and that the whole idea of the conference is a *diktat* by the CPSU (Khrushchev).

In the end, Comrade Brezhnev's proposal seemed to be the most acceptable and the participating comrades -- after some comments concerning the details -- agreed with him.

Budapest, January 25, 1965
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