

## MEETING

### OF THE FIRST SECRETARIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES AND OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE COUNCILS OF MINISTERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER-COUNTRIES

Headquarters of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP),  
Morning of January 20, 1965

## MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION

**Participants:** Comrades Todor Zhivkov, Antonín Novotný and Josef Lenart, Walter Ulbricht and Willi Stoph, Władysław Gomułka and Josef Cyrankiewicz, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin.

At the outset of the meeting, Cde. Gomułka welcomed the first secretaries of the fraternal parties and the presidents of the Councils of Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member-countries to the headquarters of the PUWP Central Committee.

Cde. Gomułka said that the convocation of this session had been proposed by a number of states attending the meeting. No agenda had been established for the meeting, but an exchange of opinions would take place on the following issues:

1. Issues that the Editorial Commission could not agree on and had forwarded to our meeting for consideration and decision. The first issue to be considered in terms of importance is the issue of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons since the Romanian delegation did not agree to its inclusion in the meeting's communiqué.

2. Issues requiring the adoption of internal decisions at the meeting, as well as issues emerging from the speeches made by the delegates yesterday. One decision foreseen for adoption in the form of a recommendation is that the ministers of foreign affairs of the respective governments should meet periodically, but at least twice a year.

3. Issues that were not discussed by the Editorial Commission by the evening of January 19, namely:

- a) The appointment of the Deputy Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty;

- b) The issue of creating a General Staff for the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty;
- c) A reply to the letter addressed to the meeting by the Albanian government. The reply should consist of only two sentences pointing out that the Albanian government was invited to the meeting and refused to participate, along with the fact that the further participation of the People's Republic of Albania in the Treaty will solely depend upon the decision of the Albanian government.

Cde. Gomulka proceeded to ask Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer to kindly re-examine the position of the Romanian side on the nonproliferation issue and to agree to the inclusion of the passage in the communiqué that all the other delegations had accepted.

Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej:

In our speech, we presented Romania's position on the issues for which we assembled here, namely: to declare our opposition to the creation of NATO's multilateral nuclear forces (MLF) and, above all else, to deny the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons. As soon as we arrived, we told Cde. Władysław Gomułka and Cde. Walter Ulbricht in our conversations with them about our fear that it is not expedient from a tactical point of view to raise the issue of nuclear nonproliferation at the present moment. We want to avoid an unpleasant situation; if we raise this issue at the UN, then some other countries – for example, India – might use it to obtain a condemnation of the People's Republic of China at that international forum. It is advisable that, when we take an action of such great international importance, we can count on the agreement and support of the other socialist countries: China, Korea, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia -- in fact, all the socialist countries. This is the only way to ensure the desired efficacy of the proposed action.

Currently, we cannot comment upon the draft treaty since we received it only 24 hours before our delegation left for Warsaw. Such actions that commit our country in the international arena must be deliberated and decided upon by the competent organs of our party and government.

In our view, it would be good to concentrate all our efforts on the issue that is the subject of our session: condemnation of the creation of the MLF in any form, so that the Federal Republic of Germany will not be permitted access to nuclear weapons. These are our fears about which we have told you and, in our opinion, deserve consideration. I am asking the comrades to have understanding for our point here and agree that the nonproliferation issue not be included in the communiqué.

Cde. Walter Ulbricht:

The main danger engendered by the creation of the MLF is the establishment of a USA-FRG atomic bloc. The plans for creating the MLF or the ANF represent a real danger for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. This has to do first of all with the FRG, the rest of the NATO countries, as well as to other countries such as India, Indonesia, Sweden, and Israel.

It is a known fact that China already has nuclear weapons.

The treaty proposed by the GDR is worded in such a manner that it cannot be used in any way against the PRC. The GDR delegation, taking into account the new situation created after the session of the NATO Council in December 1964, made these proposals. At that time, a series of new, previously unknown aspects of NATO's strategy and tactics for war preparations against the Warsaw Treaty member-states -- first of all, the GDR -- were disclosed. It was because of these aspects that the GDR decided to put forward its new proposals and insist that the nonproliferation issue be discussed without fail at the current session of the UN General Assembly. The GDR delegation feels that the moment is favorable since, for the time being, there is no well-established agenda for the UN General Assembly. At the same time, this would permit the socialist states to take the initiative and prevent other states from taking the initiative in such a way as to direct it against China.

Cde. Ion Gh. Maurer:

The main issue that we gathered to discuss here is the prevention of West Germany's armament with or access to nuclear weapons, as stipulated by the agreements concluded after the Second World War. This is the crucial issue at the moment, and we must take a stand on it.

Cde. W. Ulbricht:

Not seeing the danger that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons entails is tantamount to permitting the danger of nuclear war to come closer instead of chasing it off. Not including the nonproliferation issue in our meeting's communiqué is bound to sow severe confusion among the adversaries to nuclear armament. To restrict the peril of proliferation only to the FRG, or even only to the NATO countries, would mean diminishing the efficacy of our position in terms of propaganda. That is why we ask the Romanian comrades to kindly agree to the inclusion of the article on nonproliferation in the communiqué.

Cde. W. Gomułka:

The creation of the MLF means, in fact, proliferation. For me, they are synonymous. Consequently, by declaring ourselves against the creation of the MLF, we actually declare ourselves against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, to limit nonproliferation only to the FRG would mean reducing the scope of the issue. This question concerns not only FRG, but also the other NATO states, which could come to possess nuclear weapons.

However, if we limit this issue only to NATO, public opinion will accuse us of being two-faced politically. We cannot be *against* the creation of the MLF within NATO without implicitly being, in general, *for* the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Our countries previously adopted a series of decisions regarding this issue; this means we are not saying anything new. Does this mean that you no longer consider these previously-adopted decisions valid?

Cde. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej:

We are of the opinion that there is no point in our currently repeating these decisions, when – according to the information in our possession – their use is intended to condemn the PR China in a strong and resounding way.

Cde. W. Gomułka:

In terms of presenting the issue at the UN, this has already been done. We have just received information today that apparently Ireland – together with Sweden, Norway, the U.S., and some other countries – are making such a proposal and have submitted it to the UN for consideration and discussion. Therefore, the issue has already been raised. Nevertheless, the following question must be asked: What are the interests of the U.S. in backing such a nonproliferation proposal? It is crystal clear that this idea is so popular with world public opinion that, in order to hide the aggressive character of its policy, the U.S. is trying to present itself as a proponent of nonproliferation. What the Romanian comrades have said about India's intentions is a minor thing; it can easily be thwarted by our action at the UN.

It is true that the draft nonproliferation treaty put forth by the German comrades cannot be adopted now, but we can declare ourselves in favor of raising the issue at the UN in principle since the draft treaty has been duly considered by our responsible organs.

We have a program for struggle, drawn up and adopted by mutual agreement, that specifies our objectives: a ban on nuclear weapons, a ban on the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons, their destruction, and the achievement of universal and complete disarmament. The question now arises: Which of these objectives can the international communist movement as a whole achieve more readily?

Obviously, the problem of banning the use of nuclear weapons will be very difficult to resolve because, at this stage, the West will not accept such a proposal.

Of all the problems related to disarmament, the problem of nonproliferation is the easiest to solve, and any favorable stance that we adopt regarding this idea will be of tremendous value to the socialist countries from the standpoint of propaganda. If we do not approve such a decision, people will misunderstand our position.

In their speeches yesterday, a majority of comrades declared their support for this proposal. We would ask you, Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej and Cde. Maurer, also to agree to the inclusion of the nonproliferation issue in the draft communiqué as we have proposed.

Cde. I.Gh. Maurer:

Cde. Gomulka has spent a great deal of energy and used beautiful logic to demonstrate things that are already known. It is clear that the MLF's creation constitutes proliferation. It is also clear that, irrespective of how a country might come to possess nuclear weapons, this also means proliferation. However, in our opinion, right at the present moment, we must declare ourselves against the form of proliferation that the MLF and other similar plans represent because other countries, first of all the FRG, will come into possession of nuclear weapons through them.

Cde. A. Novotný:

I would like to ask the Romanian comrades a question. It is a well-known fact that all the press in the West expects Romania to adopt a position at this session that diverges from the other socialist countries. If we do not include the issue of nonproliferation in the communiqué, it will be clear to everybody that Romania disagreed.

If we do not voice our opposition to nuclear proliferation, then public opinion the world over – first of all, the communist parties in other countries – will not understand and will ask themselves whether we might have changed our position.

Could the Romanian comrades possibly repeat, before world public opinion, what they are saying here -- namely, that they oppose any mention of nonproliferation?

It is common knowledge that world public opinion, all of the progressive people in the world, are anticipating with great interest that our meeting will declare its opposition once more to the danger of nuclear proliferation.

Cde. I.G. Maurer:

I do not understand what this question is about. Romania's stance will be determined by the responsible organs authorized to create and implement it. Romania has the right to justify its position anywhere and at any time it chooses, using whatever arguments it deems suitable for the purpose.

Cde. J. Kádár:

The central issue of our meeting is our position regarding the plans for creating the MLF and, in connection with this, the problem of nuclear proliferation. We condemn the plans for creating the MLF and similarly condemn the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. At present, there are five nuclear powers: the U.S., Great Britain, the USSR, China, and France. To fight against imperialism today in a concrete fashion means to declare oneself in favor of nonproliferation, against the plans of the U.S. If proliferation is not put to an end, a small gate will open and remain so for several years straight, and at least five or six capitalist states will come to possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, this will be a weapon in the hands of imperialists. That is why the communiqué quite appropriately tackles the issue.

In terms of raising the issue at the UN, we can do nothing to stop the process. Today, for example, the PAP<sup>1</sup> news agency has transmitted news that the English government intends to make a nonproliferation proposal at the UN. In terms of India, we can speak with it and prevent it from making a proposal simply opposed to China.

We also support consulting the Chinese comrades. In general, some time ago, the other socialist states participated in our sessions as observers. Today, they no longer participate, and this is not good at all.

We propose drawing up an informational note for the other socialist countries that are not members of the Treaty, in which the issues discussed at our session will be presented in more detail, not in the form that the communiqué sets forth.

Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej proposed the elimination of the passage dealing with nonproliferation from the communiqué. I would propose a formulation that would also take into account the objections of the Romanian comrades -- namely, the nuclear powers shall not use nuclear weapons and shall not give other states access to such weapons.

Cde. T. Zhivkov:

We think that the issues we are now discussing originated in some misunderstanding. During our meeting, we have concentrated mainly on the plans for disseminating nuclear weapons to other Western powers, and first of all to the FRG. Can we possibly accept this situation, in which the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons grows larger and larger? It goes without saying that we have to oppose such plans, declare ourselves against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, against the creation of the MLF.

The strategy and tactics that have been used in approaching the nonproliferation issue were drawn up collectively by the communist and workers' parties and included in the documents adopted at their Conferences in 1957 and 1960. This is the element that

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<sup>1</sup> Polska Agencja Prasowa – the Polish Press Agency.



presents us with the possibility of mobilizing the largest possible circles for the fight against the danger of war.

If we do not include the idea of nonproliferation in our communiqué, nobody will understand what we are fighting for. The question can then be asked: In general, is our fight against the creation of the MLF right?

The communiqué is worded in a dry, unconvincing form. We need, however, a document that will mobilize and serve as a weapon in our fight.

I am asking Comrades Dej and Maurer to understand the necessity of including this idea in the communiqué, of making a corresponding proposal at the UN. Otherwise, we will become isolated. As we have seen, a series of initiatives regarding this issue have already appeared at the UN.

We need not renounce the ideas formulated jointly and adopted by our parties. At present, the international situation favors tackling the nonproliferation issue.

Cde. L. Brezhnev:

Before presenting some considerations from our delegation, I would like to ask the Romanian delegates two questions so that their position will be as clear as possible: a/ Is the RWP's own position on nonproliferation favorable, in principle, toward the idea?, or b/ Is the position of the Romanian comrades on this issue conditional upon reaching an agreement with the other socialist countries? It is very important that we know precisely what their position is because I could not understand it clearly enough.

The RWP could be in favor of nonproliferation in principle, but for certain reasons it holds the view that it is not opportune to support nonproliferation at this moment. It could be, however, that the Romanian comrades consider their position to be dependent upon the agreement of the other socialist states. That's another thing. If, for instance, a socialist country does not agree with our proposal...

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

Which country?

Cde. I.Gh. Maurer:

China, of course.

Cde. L. Brezhnev:

If a socialist country does not agree, then what are we to do? Give up our proposal? That's why I would like to hear once more the RWP's principled position regarding nonproliferation.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

We support nonproliferation, support nonproliferation, support nonproliferation. We can repeat this assertion as many times as you want so that it can be understood. This is the principled position of our party. We have voiced our support innumerable times for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not want, however, this idea to be used by somebody – even if this somebody is a country like India, with which we have good relations – to condemn China. Before taking this step, we want to be certain that we will not be criticized within our own camp. Let us consult with the Chinese, with the Koreans, and with others! I am firmly convinced that they will back us. As a matter of fact, the PR China has already declared that it would go with us all the way in our fight against the creation of the MLF and it would back the GDR against the FRG. I am convinced that we will find a positive answer to this issue, too. But let us talk, let us discuss. Why are we in such a hurry?

Cde. L. Brezhnev:

Our meeting is taking place at a moment of great responsibility, and I would say - as I emphasized in my speech yesterday – at a historical moment. We all see that, despite some partial successes, the imperialist circles are continuing their intensive preparations for war. Not to see this real danger -- I repeat, real danger -- is a sign of downright naïveté. It is sufficient for us to remember how preparations were made for the Second World War to notice that, at the present time, the same thing is being tried. When we encounter such facts, we cannot accept them with resignation. The idea of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been embraced by the broadest circles around the world.

I think that there is no communist, no progressive individual in the world, who would dare support the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is thus very important that we do not trail behind public opinion, but show further initiative. Not to raise this issue in the communiqué is clear proof of insufficient manhood. And, since we are here among ourselves, as communists, I take the liberty to say openly that to raise this issue as the Romanian comrades have done means to impart a dilly-dallying character to our fight against the peril of war. That is why we must understand the responsibility incumbent upon us. We have to see who the people are who are interested in the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It might happen that, in response to Western plans, we also decide that the other socialist countries should come to possess nuclear weapons. What would this lead to? I am convinced that this would lead only to economic difficulties and futile material and spiritual expenses, which, in turn, would have negative effects upon the peoples in these countries.

We have discussed this issue in our Presidium more than once, and I can confirm that every member of the Presidium and every Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee



has had his or her say on this matter. After such thorough and serious discussions, we reached the conclusion that it is necessary to let public opinion know once more our viewpoint on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The Romanian comrades tell us that they also support nonproliferation, but there are shades of meaning in their position that prevent them from accepting the inclusion of this idea in the communiqué at the present moment. If the RWP favors nonproliferation in principle, we can discuss why they have reservations. If, however, they are conditioning their adoption of a position in favor of nonproliferation upon the attitude of other socialist countries, then the situation is altogether different.

We think that the idea of nonproliferation must be included in the communiqué. The exact formulation could probably be discussed as well, but the idea as such has to be put into the communiqué.

With regard to raising the issue at the UN, we could decide here how our countries will act; our countries at this meeting should collectively raise the issue at the UN in their capacity as members of the organization, without mentioning the Warsaw Treaty. In fact, decisions from all our countries regarding this issue already exist. Are these decisions no longer just?

Cde. I.Gh. Maurer:

We have not stated that they are either just or unjust. At present, the issue of nonproliferation is a neutral one for us.

Why do we have to link the fight against the MLF and the atomic armament of Western Germany, a much more general issue that concerns not only our states, with the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons? Why should we do this without first having been convinced that the idea serves the purpose for which we have mobilized -- namely, to resist the FRG's nuclear armament? Why should we do this before knowing for certain what the position of the other socialist countries is, before making sure that all the socialist countries will back us? For, if there are any states that will not support us, the nonproliferation issue may weaken our position.

However, in this regard, we are interested not only in the socialist states, but also in the capitalist states, even developed capitalist states. There are developed capitalist states that, although they have declared their opposition to the creation of the MLF, might not support the idea of nonproliferation. A case in point, an example, is France, which has been an extremely active champion in the fight against the MLF, even within NATO. Two questions may be asked: 1/Does France favor nonproliferation? 2/If France does not favor nonproliferation, isn't it clear that this could weaken the latent agreement between France's standpoint and ours regarding the fight against the MLF?

. . . <sup>2</sup> has conducted, on behalf of the UN General Assembly, an inquiry among the member-states of the UN, asking them to state – with the utmost precision – their position on nuclear armament. Of the 114 member states of the UN, only fewer than half responded, and only about half the answers favored the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. In our opinion, this must be taken into consideration if there is the intention to make a proposal concerning not only the Warsaw Treaty member-countries but all other states in general.

We believe that nonproliferation has a point only if it marks the beginning of a process, organically linked to the following measures: nuclear disarmament, a prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons, and the destruction of nuclear stockpiles. Only in this way can nonproliferation be a step toward eliminating the danger of nuclear war. Nonproliferation as a “purpose in itself,” without any link to the aforementioned measures, leads only to nuclear monopoly and the ongoing existence and further development of nuclear weapons; in other words, nonproliferation will not truly be achieved and thus the peril of nuclear war will not be abolished.

It is necessary, first of all, to agree – along with the other socialist countries – on the broad, comprehensive significance we confer to the concept of nonproliferation, and only afterwards to reveal this strong, mobilizing significance. Why must we reach, here and now, a decision on this issue? Would we lose something if we raised it for discussion after consultations with the other socialist countries?

Cde. L. Brezhnev:

You see, if you approach the issue this way, it is another kettle of fish altogether. That is why I asked you, at the outset of the discussion, what your clear-cut position is regarding nonproliferation. If we link it with all other aspects of disarmament as you have done, it will be difficult to obtain even partial results.

Cde. A. Novotný:

Earlier, I raised a number of issues so that we might fully understand what Romania’s position is regarding nonproliferation. It is now clear that the Romanian comrades favor nonproliferation. At the same time, however, they oppose including this idea in the communiqué. But this is a principled political issue. We cannot voice our opposition to the FRG’s nuclear armament without likewise pointing out that, in general, we favor nuclear nonproliferation. The current international situation favors our taking such a stand. In one or two months’ time it will be too late. I agree with the formulation that Cde. Kadar proposed to include in the communiqué.

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<sup>2</sup> Transl. note: One line of text is illegible in the original.

With respect to raising the issue at the UN, we could agree that the governments be tasked with considering the nonproliferation issue by a certain date, but as soon as possible. It has been pointed out here that this issue has been raised at the UN by other countries, too.

Another consideration that must be pointed out is that all our countries are having problems in terms of economic development. The USSR has incurred the greatest expenses for ensuring the security of our countries. If we compare the possibilities that our countries and the capitalist countries have at their disposal, we will see that many of the latter have greater possibilities for obtaining nuclear weapons than we do. This is true of the FRG, Italy, Spain, Japan and other countries. As time goes by, it will be ever more difficult to expect success with nonproliferation because the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, first of all among the capitalist countries, will grow. That is why we have taken the position that the present moment is opportune for our countries to embark on such an initiative regarding nonproliferation and to include such an initiative in the communiqué.

We do not want to make the Romanian comrades angry, but we believe their position is incorrect. The Western press knows what issues we are discussing here, and if we do not make a decision on nonproliferation, this will be interpreted as having arisen from our lack of unity. If the Romanian comrades do not want the issue of nonproliferation to be raised at the UN, then nobody can prevent the other countries that want this to happen from making such a proposal in their capacity as member-states of the UN. This is their right.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

But does the fact that even the USA – for example, [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk – has declared its support for nonproliferation not lead us to think the matter over? It is worth thinking about.

Cde. A. Kosygin:

Regarding the issue under discussion, I would only like to call your attention to the current military situation, which requires – more than ever – that we close ranks so that we can touch the shoulder of the comrade next to us.

With regard to what Rusk said, things are a little different. I spoke with Rusk, and I know how he understands nonproliferation. He supports the view that the very creation of the MLF means limiting the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons. The view we hold, however, is exactly the opposite -- namely, that this represents a proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the draft communiqué agreed to by the experts, there is a formulation, which – in my opinion – could also be accepted by the Romanian comrades.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

Let us also see this formulation. Is this the final form of the communiqué?

Cde. W. Gomułka:

It is the final form of the communiqué, upon which the experts agreed last night, and which I received at 9.30 this morning, before our meeting.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

In view of this fact, we would ask you to also allow us to examine it so that we might express our opinion. Since we will meet at 16.00, it might perhaps be better to close our discussions, put away the other issues, and focus on the communiqué now.

Cde. W. Gomułka:

But we still have other issues to discuss. For instance, the German comrades proposed the adoption of an internal decision whereby the deputy ministers of foreign affairs should meet periodically for consultations. All the comrades supported the adoption of this decision; we do not know, however, the opinion of the Romanian comrades.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

We have already expressed our opinion regarding the proposals to create new organs in addition to those that already exist within the Warsaw Treaty. We do not understand why these new organs are necessary. What competencies will they have? Why must a decision be adopted providing for the creation of a permanent organ composed of the deputy ministers of foreign affairs, when, as is well known, the latter cannot act except under instructions from superior party and government bodies in our countries?

Cde. I.Gh. Maurer:

In actual fact, the policy of our countries is made by the parties and the governments.

Cde. W. Gomułka:

But this is not about the creation of some organ, but about periodic consultations, at least twice a year. This will not be an independent body, and it will not replace the Political Consultative Committee.

Cde. I.Gh. Maurer:

But since a set of rules and a functioning framework have been established and certain duties have been outlined for it, regardless of whether we give it a name or not, it is still an organ of permanent character.

We responded to a similar proposal made by Cde. Khrushchev and explained at that time why we oppose the creation of such an organ. We do not see any reason that would lead us to change our opinion.

Cde. L. Brezhnev:

No proposal was made for creating an organ within the Warsaw Treaty. The proposal actually referred to more frequent, more organized meetings. That is why we back the proposal made by the German comrades and view it as useful for the improvement of our work.

Cde. W. Ulbricht:

Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej, you spoke about the necessity of holding more frequent consultations not only between the Warsaw Treaty member-states, but also between all socialist countries. I do not understand, then, why you are against the adoption of an internal decision that the deputy foreign ministers should meet periodically for consultations. Such consultations have been extremely sporadic in the last two or three years. And this has happened despite the fact that the Western powers have achieved close consultation among themselves.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

Up to now, such consultations have been held only when it was necessary to do so. Consultations can be held from now on, too, whenever circumstances require them and there is a clear indication of the issues likely to be discussed. The materials must be sent out reasonably ahead of time, not twenty-four hours before we left for Warsaw as happened to us. *This* is the real issue, not the adoption of a decision or the creation of a new organ.

The meetings can take place without any preconditions regarding the level of representation. If you remember, in 1961, we adopted a decision on the level of representation. After all, the policy of our countries is made by the parties and governments . . .<sup>3</sup> of a country – Albania – at one of our meetings, a decision we deem unjust. If you want, view this as self-criticism on our part, but nothing like this should ever happen again.

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<sup>3</sup> Transl. note: At this point, one line of the text is illegible.

Cde. W. Gomułka:

But why can't we adopt an internal decision? In fact, we are an organization that can make whatever decisions it deems necessary to function properly.

Cde. W. Ulbricht:

What would you say, then, if we decided now that in June 1965, the ministers of foreign affairs will meet to prepare materials on European security, and then, in the month of July 1965, a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee will take place to discuss this issue?

Cde. J. Kádár:

All the comrades, including the Romanian comrades, have stressed the need for more systematic consultations between us. It currently takes us five to seven weeks to reach an understanding on an issue. In my opinion, we could adopt an internal decision that would regulate this question. I would propose, for instance, that each year the ministers of foreign affairs of our countries meet between August 20 and 30 to agree on a position regarding the agenda of the [upcoming] session of the UN General Assembly. It might also be possible for our ministers of foreign affairs to meet somewhere around the beginning of March. The foreign ministers of the NATO countries get together and consult; so do the foreign ministers of the Arab, African, and Latin American countries. We are the only ones who cannot get together. Why? What is happening at this session is a crying shame. Why on earth can't we get together more often and discuss issues of interest to us?

I back the German comrades' proposal that the ministers of foreign affairs of our countries meet on a mandatory basis at least twice a year, in August and March, in order to hold consultations on matters of common interest.

Cde. W. Gomułka:

All the comrades attending this meeting agree with the proposals, only the Romanian comrades do not.

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

We do not agree and will not agree to the creation of new organs within the Warsaw Treaty Organization. We can just as easily hold consultations without having a permanent organ.

Cde. W. Gomułka:



The only issue still to be discussed is the creation of the General Staff of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty. All of the comrades have agreed to support this proposal. What is the opinion of the Romanian comrades?

Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej:

We do not have a mandate to discuss this issue. When we return home, we will submit it to our leadership bodies for consideration, and only then will we be able to let you know our view.

Cde. W. Gomułka:

Then there is nothing more for us to discuss.

Comrades, I want to thank you for taking part in this open, comradely discussion. As it is very late, I propose that the afternoon meeting begin at 17.00 instead of 16.00.

(All those in attendance agree.)

I propose that we drink a glass of wine to the success of our meeting, to new successes in our activity.

(Cde. L. Brezhnev, clinking glasses with Cde. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej: It is a pity that we did not make a decision regarding the General Staff. The military has been waiting impatiently for this problem to be solved).

The discussions lasted from 10.00 to 13.00.

*[Translation by Viorel Buta]*