

## **Strictly Confidential**

### **Report to the HSWP Politburo and the Council of Ministers**

The Political Consultative Committee held a meeting in Moscow on August 20, 1970. A three-person delegation took part on behalf of our party and government: the leader of the delegation, János Kádár, as well as Jenő Fock and János Péter.

On August 20, Comrade Jenő Fock opened our national exhibition, displaying the 25-year development of the Hungarian People's Republic. Comrade A. Kosygin participated and delivered a speech on behalf of the Soviet government.

On August 21, the delegation, headed by Comrade János Kádár, visited the exhibition together with some members of the CPSU Politburo and members of the Hungarian government delegation, and they participated in the opening ceremony. Because of their other duties, Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny were unable to participate in the exhibition, but signaled that they would pay a visit at a later date. (A press communiqué was released about the opening ceremony and the subsequent visit.)

#### **I.**

Comrade Brezhnev opened the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee. After greeting the party and state leaders of the member-states – he gave a separate greeting to the Hungarian delegation on the occasion of Constitution Day – he gave a briefing on the Soviet-West German talks, appraised the significance of the Treaty signed on August 12 and described the elements of the Soviet position that are significant for our common foreign policy. The Soviet Union conducted the talks in the spirit of the joint policy approved in December 1969 to consolidate the most important results of the Second World War and the developments after the war, to consolidate the positions of socialism and to consolidate European security. This was no easy task; a hard struggle was waged for each and every article of the treaty. The West Germans wanted to insert language into the treaty that would have weakened their recognition of the inviolability of border and that would have called into question the rights of the GDR as a sovereign state. The Soviets foiled these attempts. The treaty does not mention the lack of a peace settlement for Germany, West Berlin or the reunification of Germany. (In keeping with its aspirations for German reunification, the West Germans addressed a unilateral letter to the Soviet Union sent by regular mail. Of course, this is not a part of

the Treaty and does not constitute an obligation for the Soviet Union; therefore, its receipt was not acknowledged.)

The stubborn resistance of the reactionary forces of the FRG, NATO, and most of all, of the United States -- which has understood that a successful outcome of the talks would weaken its position in Europe -- had to be overcome. Greatly assisting the successful outcome of the talks was the fact that at the same time as the CPSU, our comrades in Poland and the GDR did a great amount of work. The signing of the treaty brought about a series of very important changes in the European situation, but not only in Europe; this is why it has become necessary to harmonize our common foreign policy for the future.

The West German government accepted some of our demands as spelled out in the resolutions of the conference in Karlovy Vary and at the great conference in Moscow, whose political core was the acceptance of borders and acceptance of the territorial status quo in Europe. The Treaty does not speak about the recognition of borders in abstract terms, but in the form of specific obligations.

The Government of the FRG is practically ready to settle the question of the Munich Conference, to renounce the principle of "sole representation" -- there was a great step forward in the reinforcing the GDR's legal position as a sovereign country. Earlier, it [the FRG] signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but there will need to be further efforts to get it ratified.

The sum of these results constitutes the political significance of the Treaty. This is the first document in which the FRG has recognized the inviolability of the borders that emerged after the Second World War. This recognition undermines the position of political adventurers and reactionary forces (the CDU/CSU, NDP) in the FRG. It reinforces peoples' belief in the preservation of peace in Europe and the resolution of complex issues by peaceful means. A great victory for the policy of peaceful coexistence. The Treaty reinforces the positions of socialism in Europe and promotes the deepening of conflicts within NATO, along with the development of peaceful cooperation between East and West. Its significance extends beyond the borders of Europe.

Of course, the treaty will fulfill its role only if the FRG faithfully carries out its obligations. We will need to take additional steps in order to realize the treaty's true potential. Of course, the treaty will not solve all the problems of European security. NATO, headed by the USA, the mightiest imperialist power, still exists.

The question arises: If the Treaty does in fact serve the cause of peace and socialism, why did the FRG sign it, and how can we explain that the FRG's NATO allies, first of all the USA, permitted Bonn to take this step?

- The main reason for this is that the correlation of forces in Europe and in the world arena as a whole demonstrated to the FRG the hopelessness of its policies towards the Soviet Union, the GDR and the other socialist states. The policy of cold war failed; the European scene compelled West Germany's political leaders to make a choice. The Brandt government, taking into account the mood of wide segments of the West German public, chose the more realistic road.
- It is trying to lessen its dependence on other Western states.
- Because of the cyclical nature of the capitalist market, the representatives of peacefully-oriented production in the FRG are interested in firm commercial and economic links to the socialist states.
- The Social Democratic leadership hopes for more opportunities to engage in subversive penetration of the socialist countries, especially the GDR.

In addition to the opportunities that the treaty has opened up, we mustn't forget that the FRG remains an imperialist power and a member of NATO with no intentions of leaving it. It will remain under U.S. influence for a long time to come and will remain a U.S. staging ground in Europe.

At the same time, the treaty will deepen the rift between the radical right-wing elements of the bourgeoisie and its more realistic elements and will strengthen the latter's position in West Germany. Therefore, we must increase our support for the progressive and democratic elements, for the communists in the FRG.

As far as the Social Democrats are concerned, ideological cooperation with them is ruled out, but in terms of the struggle for peace, European security, disarmament, etc., cooperation is expedient, especially with those in power.

## II.

The favorable possibilities pose a series of new tasks for the foreign policy of the socialist states. With regard to the treaty, our task is to foil the aspirations of the right-wing and revanchist forces in West Germany and influential circles among the Western powers that seek to thwart ratification.

In our propaganda it seems expedient to pursue a line that doesn't make the situation more difficult for the Brandt Government and the circles supporting it, a line that doesn't supply arguments for the Strauss group and other right-wing forces.

Tactically, it is not expedient to emphasize the elements of the Treaty that are the most positive from the perspective of socialism, but instead, its mutual advantages in terms of consolidating European security and peaceful cooperation.

Understandably, this does not rule out our unmasking, as necessary, slanders and provocations against signing the treaty.

We must pursue a policy of actively enlightening those political circles in the FRG where there is a hope of influence. It is an important task for our diplomats to impede the activities of the Western powers directed at foiling ratification. Therefore, our diplomats must maintain regular contact with each other.

The talks the Polish comrades are conducting with the FRG are of great significance. Their successful conclusion will represent yet another contribution to reinforcing the positions of socialism in Europe, as well as peace on the continent.

The FRG plans to start talks with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as well. What may cause difficulties is the formula that the Munich Agreement was “invalid from the outset” – otherwise, the final elimination of the issue is possible.

The further reinforcement of the GDR’s international position will require a great deal of complicated work. The road to this [reinforcement] leads through the further delimitation of the two states and the development of contacts between them on the basis of accepted international legal norms. The FRG has agreed to facilitate the GDR’s admission to the UN. We must do our best to see that the admission of the two German states occurs in the not-too-distant future because it would constitute yet another convincing expression of the GDR’s recognition in international law. Therefore, we must work first of all with the neutral states and the countries of the Third World.

The issue of West Berlin, about which there are four-power talks at the ambassadorial level, is of no small significance. The Soviet Union -- in constant contact and in unity with the German comrades -- is decisively resisting all attempts by the Western powers to extract certain “rights” for the FRG with regard to West Berlin. We consider the city to be an independent political unit. At the same time, we must strive so that West Berlin will not to be a source of high and constant tension in Europe.

For the sake of an appropriate agreement with the Western powers, we must take some steps -- in harmony with the interests of the Soviet Union and the GDR -- to ease West Berlin’s contacts with the capital of the GDR and the outside world. If there is mutual goodwill, it is conceivable that progress can be made at the four-power talks. Currently, the three Western powers are exploiting the talks as a weapon to put pressure on the FRG’s government. The essence of the dictate of the three powers and the right-wing

opposition in the FRG is: the West Germans will ratify the Treaty if the talks on West Berlin yield a “satisfactory result.”

In Moscow, Brandt’s attention was called to the absurdity of posing the question this way. In response, Brandt declared that the FRG would not make the treaty’s ratification a direct function of the results of the four-power talks, but he was raising the need for progress as a general political wish. To the extent that the socialist countries consider West Berlin to be an independent political unit, it would be worth considering how to activate direct contacts. It is of particular importance that the socialist countries continue to act with regard to this question on the basis of a common, principled platform, in close contact with the GDR.

The FRG, one can assume, will widen its economic contacts with the socialist states; this will require a coordination of activities in this field as well. It would be expedient to exploit the FRG’s technological advances to the advantage of the socialist countries without becoming dependent on it in any way.

It is evident that the treaty will create conditions more amenable conditions to achieving one of the timeliest European tasks – the convocation of an all-European security conference. The West Germans have voiced agreement to convening the conference, along with a readiness to facilitate its successful conclusion. Considering this, it would probably be expedient to try to get the FRG involved in preparing the conference.

We must consider what further steps we might take to mobilize European public opinion and the peace-loving forces for consolidating security on the continent. As we know, preparations are being made to convene a Congress of European Peoples. The next meeting of the representatives of the European Communist Parties will soon convene in Moscow to discuss details regarding its preparation. It would be expedient to focus great attention on this matter.

Signing the treaty could have certain consequences for our relations with the United States; it could have a beneficial effect on Nixon’s policies. It could also affect the positions of the French and the British governments.

At the end of his speech, Comrade Brezhnev repeatedly stressed the socialist states’ unity; the coordination of their policies will be decisive in terms of exploiting the new opportunities. Therefore, the Soviet Union supports the creation of an appropriate organ in addition to the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact; it would deal with and coordinate foreign policy issues on a regular basis, as needed. Other forms are also possible, but it’s time to solve this problem.

(The full text of Comrade Brezhnev’s speech is available to the comrades in the Central Committee office.)

## II.

The heads of delegation of the [other] member-states were unanimous in their contributions in praising the efforts of the Soviet Union and the results of the Soviet-West German talks and in congratulating the CPSU. They all concurred in Comrade Brezhnev's appraisal and view the treaty's conclusion as a common victory. Strengthening our unity and coordinating our policies, they stressed, will be the source of our future victories.

Below, we summarize the essence of the speeches in the order of their delivery:

Comrade Willi Stoph spoke on behalf of the GDR's delegation because Comrade Ulbricht was feeling unwell. His speech was delivered in the spirit of the flexible position contained in the declaration of the GDR Council of Ministers published on August 15.

He repeatedly thanked the CPSU for shoring up the international position of the GDR by signing the treaty. They [the East Germans] consider their main task to be the all-round strengthening of the GDR and completing the construction of a socialist society within this context. The [GDR's] social and political delimitation from the FRG is proceeding; thus, bilateral relations can be established only on this basis.

West German imperialism has not renounced its basic objectives, which include subverting the GDR. To this end, it is trying to exploit West Berlin and is proposing the development of so-called "humanitarian relations" and the "relativization" of borders.

This makes the following tasks all the timelier: developing multilateral cooperation among the socialist states -- in particular, developing economic integration; promoting recognition of the GDR in international law; preparing the path to a European security conference; struggling to ratify the treaty with the support of the progressive forces in West Germany. The struggle continues; the GDR will proceed in the spirit of the coordinated line.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu emphasized that the trends in international affairs have verified the correctness of the Bucharest Declaration of 1966 in terms of encouraging all-European cooperation.

Experience has shown the correctness of our activities aimed at settling our relations with the FRG and Romania's activist policies towards the West European states, carried out in the spirit of the Bucharest Declaration. There is a shift towards more realistic policies throughout all of Western Europe; the forces of progress are growing.



The treaty's essence is renunciation of force. It is an example that disputes can be resolved by peaceful means. It promotes peoples' struggle for independence and guarantees the territorial integrity of [all] European states.

The treaty is contributing to a favorable shift in the FRG's domestic situation. We must support those domestic forces in West Germany that represent a progressive, more realistic position. To this end, we must act so that all socialist states will have diplomatic relations with the FRG.

There is still much to be done in order to eliminate the remnants of World War II; the treaty is just a first step on the road toward establishing European security. The cause of European security is not limited to the two German states; good cooperation must be established between all the European states in order for the favorable atmosphere to take root. Other states must also conclude renunciation-of-force treaties.

It would be expedient to clarify our position regarding West Berlin and to coordinate our activity; perhaps the foreign ministers could discuss it.

Greater effort should be directed towards convening a European security conference. It would be expedient to hold preparatory talks with the participation of the representatives of all the European states this year.

There is no need to create another organ in addition to the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee; the present organizational framework is sufficient. But Romania is not against holding consultations in some form if the need arises.

Comrade János Kádár first of all thanked Comrade Brezhnev for his words of welcome for our delegation on Constitution Day and for his briefing on the Soviet-West German talks and his appraisal.

We accept the CPSU's evaluation that the developments are in keeping with our coordinated policy of last December. In the absence of a peace treaty, the [Soviet-West German] treaty sanctions the results of World War II and the position that socialism has attained in Europe since then.

We welcome the talks being conducted by the Polish comrades; their agreement will further strengthen our position.

We agree with Comrade Stoph that the fight continues, but from a better position. We greet the GDR's activity and the German comrades' recent declarations (speech in Rostock, government declaration).

We consider West Berlin to be an independent political unit. We consider it expedient to take rational steps toward relaxing tensions around West Berlin.

The talks in December took place in a conducive atmosphere and have borne fruit. The Soviet Union has negotiated, Poland is negotiating and the GDR is acting in the same spirit. We agreed at that time on the order of talks with the FRG. We think that it is correct that after the Soviet Union, Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia should negotiate in the first instance.

It is expedient that the remaining socialist countries pursue an active policy toward the FRG. We also have our contacts, and the Hungarian People's Republic, as a member of the Warsaw Pact, will act in accordance with the common platform both in joint actions and on our own in terms of political, economic and diplomatic activities.

We were the first to propose the idea of a foreign policy organ in addition to the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact. Our opinion has not changed; it would be useful. If it is not possible for now, let's agree that our foreign ministers will meet and consult more frequently.

Comrade Gustav Husák stressed that the FRG did not decide to sign the treaty out of love, but because of a more realistic appraisal of the situation.

The conclusion of the treaty contributes to the defeat of the Czechoslovak reactionary forces and their supporters. The imperialists' plot against Czechoslovakia in 1968 was foiled; the assistance of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states was correct, and it is highly appreciated. The Czechoslovak people increasingly understand the 1968 action.

Since 1968, the FRG understands realities better, too. The West German reaction will remain a dangerous opponent; it employs sophisticated methods against us, primarily in the realm of ideology, Czechoslovakia is an example of this. Social democracy tried to play the role of a Trojan horse during the Czechoslovak crisis. Czechoslovakia appreciates the GDR's efforts and will try to provide support for its membership in the UN.

We owe the Soviet leadership a debt of gratitude because the treaty provides an opportunity to remove the Munich issue from the agenda for once and for all. Better cooperation in the future requires more frequent consultations by the foreign ministers in some form. The Czechoslovak Communist Party will act in accordance with our common policy line.

Comrade Władysław Gomułka: Not enough time has passed; therefore, it is too early to give a thorough assessment of the results of the talks. Nevertheless, the treaty is undoubtedly a great success for us. More efforts are needed. By signing the treaty, both sides are counting on something.



A thorough analysis is necessary to see what benefits the FRG is counting on: mutual attraction between people in the two Germanys. Above all else, there main activity is directed toward a rapprochement between the two parts of the nation.

Ideological and economic penetration of the socialist countries. The GDR is in the greatest danger of economic penetration. The opponent must not be permitted to realize this plan.

[The FRG] would not renounce reunification; it seeks to accomplish it through a new method: economic cooperation with the GDR.

Comrade Ceaușescu stated that Romania acted in the spirit of the Bucharest Declaration of 1966 when it established diplomatic relations with the FRG. This does not correspond to reality. Romania did not act in unity with us. We have been successful now because nobody followed Romania then.

The German comrades say that the FRG cannot penetrate the GDR. But we mustn't gloss over certain things. In the long run, a peace treaty will become superfluous. The Soviet-West German treaty has set the direction of progress, and we cannot diverge from this.

It is now Poland's turn to negotiate. They are closely coordinating with the Soviet Union. Their talks are focused on the border question and commercial cooperation. The fact that Brandt and his group are at the helm of the FRG's government is a very favorable alternative for us. We know him, he is not our friend ideologically, he is a supporter of West European integration, but he has realistic views.

The most important task is the successful conclusion of talks between the FRG and the GDR. The GDR's admission to the UN is of greater significance than the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. More frequent consultation, as needed, between the Warsaw Pact's foreign ministers is desirable.

Comrade Todor Zhivkov announced that they [the Bulgarians] had submitted their speech in writing and requested that it be added to the protocol. It devoted just a few sentences to praising the Treaty and congratulating [Moscow] on it.

At the end of the meeting Comrade Brezhnev asked to speak again and voiced the CPSU's satisfaction at the great manifestation of the unified platform of the member-states. He voiced his thanks for the high praise given the treaty and the Soviet Union's efforts in foreign policy.

He declared: "Politically, our unity and friendship gained decisive expression today."

Comrade Zhivkov presided over the meeting. A brief communiqué for the press was approved without substantial debate. The CPSU held a reception after the meeting, in which all the delegations participated in a comradely spirit.

In our delegation's view the Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee was timely and politically useful. It gave an appropriate evaluation of the current situation and provided direction for the coordinated political work of the member-states, including the Hungarian People's Republic.

We request that our report be approved.

Budapest, August 24, 1970  
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Attachment: 2 pages

*[Translation by László Borhi]*