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ANNEX IV

Information on the Discussions at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of
the Warsaw Treaty Member-States, Moscow, August 20, 1970

Comrade Willi Stoph

He first thanked the Soviet comrades for calling the meeting, which the German comrades consider very important. He believed, he said, that the meeting's outcome would strengthen our unity and deepen the common line and approach of the member-states. The CC of the SED¹ and the government of the GDR congratulate the CC of CPSU and the Soviet government on the signing of the treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union. They view the document as the result of the long struggle to confirm the results of World War II. The treaty represents a major step forward towards détente. The Soviet comrades successfully implemented the common line upon which we collectively agreed. Our common struggle has been crowned with a major success. The treaty establishes a realistic platform for the ongoing struggle for European security and guaranteed peace. It is a major step towards the recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. The treaty expressly confirms the inviolability and finality of the borders in Europe, especially the Oder-Neisse border and the border between the GDR and the FRG. This is fully in keeping with the goals and objective of our defensive organization.

We have made significant progress toward implementing the conclusions that we reached at the conference in Karlovy Vary and at last year's global conference of communist and workers' parties in Moscow. These conclusions have been implemented in a creative manner. This is why we see the treaty as a major step forward in terms of international détente and the establishment of the effective prerequisites for a European security conference.

He² once again voiced the GDR's gratitude to the Soviet Union for all its work, whose results will reinforce the security and inviolability of the GDR. From the standpoint of international law, the FRG has been forced to recognize the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the GDR. The FRG's claim to sole representation of all Germany has

¹ Transl. Note: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the communist party of East Germany.

² Transl. Note: Stoph.

collapsed. Our own conclusion is that our first and foremost task is to strengthen the GDR as a national and socialist state of the German nation; to develop and augment socialist rule in our country; to disassociate ourselves from the FRG both socially and ideologically; to effectively expand our people's education in Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism; and to develop the socialist ideology and consciousness of the masses. Another important task is to fight against the social-democratic tendencies that are seeking to penetrate the GDR. We want to and will develop the closest possible economic cooperation and ties to the Soviet Union, for this is the most reliable path to strengthen and develop the GDR as a national and socialist state of the German nation.

There's another important aspect to the treaty. In the global strategy of imperialism, the FRG's role was to serve as a spearhead aimed at the socialist countries. This role has now begun to crumble. In the treaty, the FRG waives all territorial claims, present and future, and recognizes the current borders. This is a concession in comparison to its initial demand for the restoration of the German borders of 1937, something which previous [West] German governments had been demanding for years. This change is not a manifestation of goodwill; it reflects the fact that imperialism has been forced to take into account and adapt itself to the changed correlation of forces.

Cde. Willi Stoph also voiced his agreement with Cde. Brezhnev's proposals and expressly supported Cde. Brezhnev's suggestions and comments regarding a European security conference, disarmament issues, further negotiations between Poland and the FRG and between Czechoslovakia and the FRG (annulment of the Munich Treaty from the very beginning). He voiced his appreciation for the unequivocally-formulated demand, supported by the Warsaw Treaty member-states, for international recognition of the GDR.

With regard to West Berlin, he said it is necessary, for the sake of international détente, to undertake every possible effort to convert it into an independent political entity and to adopt measures paralyzing the FRG's claims to West Berlin. We should not forget that the West German imperialists have not renounced their aims; they want to expand their foothold in West Berlin. They have not given up their basic objective of penetrating the GDR; this is why they want to reinforce their positions in West Berlin. We cannot permit any illusions about the goals of West German imperialism. We must consolidate the unity of the GDR's nation and people against the plans to penetrate our country through "special inner-German relations" or people-to-people relations and to weaken its borders. This requires a decisive and determined fight against social-democratism, which has assumed a special role in the strategy of imperialism. In this respect, we must consider

what we must do now and in the future. This will be a clearly-delineated front in the class struggle, for which we must be properly prepared and have a clear conception.

At the end of his speech, Cde. Stoph underlined the importance of a common line, reflecting the unity and might of the socialist community. This could have a favorable impact upon the GDR's international recognition and its admission to the UN. We are grateful for the solidarity extended to us so far. We must positively influence the struggle for the treaty's ratification in the FRG, where it is opposed by strong, right-wing reactionary forces. Our political actions must be closely coordinated so that we can achieve the goals that we have set.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu

The purpose of our meeting is to exchange opinions regarding the treaty between the FRG and the USSR and to consider opportunities for cooperation in the establishment of a security system in Europe. I will not present a comprehensive treatise here; the interrelated problems are complex, and we cannot deal with all their aspects. I will therefore limit myself to a few considerations.

We welcome the treaty, which confirms as correct the line that we emphasized at the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty in 1966 – namely, that disputed matters should be solved through negotiation, mutual understanding and rapprochement. The international situation has confirmed our assessment of last December. The positive changes in the policy of Brandt³ and Scheel⁴ have made themselves felt, and as a result, we must become more active in our policy.

These changes confirm that there is an ongoing shift toward a realistic security policy in the society of the FRG and in Europe as a whole. The treaty is of particular importance in this regard; it represents a major milestone in international politics. Romania has proceeded in accordance with the Bucharest Declaration in terms of its relations to the FRG and other European countries. We established diplomatic relations with the FRG and recently took some steps in the spirit of peaceful coexistence. This line was manifested during my visit to France, Cde. Maurer's⁵ visit to the FRG, and the other discussions and contacts that we have had. All these activities, we believe, have also contributed to détente.

³ Transl. Note: West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (Social Democratic Party, SPD).

⁴ Transl. Note: West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (Free Democratic Party, FDP).

⁵ Transl. Note: Romanian Foreign Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer.

In our opinion, the provisions by which both countries undertake to resolve their disputes peacefully and renounce the use of force are key and crucial. The express stipulation of this principle is essential for the preservation of peace. In this respect, we view the treaty as a contribution to confidence-building measures and one of the most important steps since World War II. It lays a foundation for the development of mutual relations, guarantees the territorial integrity of the European states within their existing borders, and confirms that there are no territorial claims. However, there is still much to be done to eliminate the consequences of World War II. What matters most is a willingness to resolve outstanding issues through negotiation, to remove obstacles to normalization and to ensure a broad development of mutual relations. All the socialist countries are thus obliged to undertake further actions to help maintain and expand these achievements. Cde. Ceaușescu further urged all participants to move toward establishing diplomatic relations with the FRG. Such a line of action would be useful because it will support realistic elements in the FRG. We should harbor no illusions; reactionary forces still exist in Germany. At the same time, Romania fully supports the GDR's accession to the UN. Security issues should not be limited to relations between the two German states; they require the consolidation and development of broad cooperation.

He supported the ongoing negotiations between Poland and the FRG and between the GDR and the FRG. The GDR, he said, must be recognized under the principles of international law. (He did not mention the negotiations between the ČSSR and the FRG.)

Cde. Ceaușescu went on to list and explain additional steps that the socialist countries should consider in the interests of détente. In particular, he referred to renunciation-of-force agreements with neighboring states, both locally and internationally, for the sake of preventing and defusing potential conflicts. He spoke in this regard about the creation of "zones of mutual trust" in the Balkans and Central Europe. The socialist countries should pursue this line more vigorously.

Moving beyond his prepared text, Cde. Ceaușescu also touched upon the issue of West Berlin. In general, he agreed, he said, with Cde. Brezhnev's speech and added that West Berlin is one of the issues troubling the nations of Europe. In order to have clearly defined opinions, our foreign ministers should hold talks with the goal of reaching a common position on West Berlin. Moreover, attention must be paid to disarmament issues, especially in the nuclear area, because tangible disarmament measures may achieve the greatest success in the struggle against imperialism. In this regard, we should seek concessions, even small ones, such as the closing of military bases and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, in order to mobilize all progressive

forces. Furthermore, a conference of European nations on collective security arrangements is needed. We must demonstrate more resolve in organizing a meeting of European leaders and having a preparatory meeting by autumn.

With regard to Cde. Brezhnev's proposal to establish a committee for political consultation on foreign policy issues, we have repeatedly stated our position. The Central Committees and governments of the individual states hold the basic competencies in this area. The Central Committee of the CPR⁶ believes that the existing Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty represents an adequate platform; there is no need to establish another body, since there is always the possibility of holding normal meetings of the foreign ministers to discuss basic problems.

Comrade János Kádár

He began by thanking everyone for their congratulations on Constitution Day. The Central Committee of the HSWP⁷ welcomed the initiative that resulted in today's meeting. The treaty is in full accordance with our line. He voiced complete agreement with Cde. Brezhnev's analysis and proposals; attention, he stressed, should now be focused on the ratification process, so that the treaty is approved and implemented. We have been fighting for a long time for the just demands that have now been achieved, thanks to the treaty. We must bear in mind that there was no peace treaty concluding World War II; the current treaty between the FRG and the Soviet Union more or less confirms the results of the battle against fascism. The struggle goes on, and the treaty has made it possible for us to wage it from a better position.

Cde. Kádár wished the Polish comrades success in concluding their negotiations with the FRG; with regard to us, he said the time had come to bury the Munich Agreement. He supported Cde. Brezhnev's position regarding West Berlin. On the one hand, we must undertake every effort to make West Berlin an independent political entity and must not concede any rights to the FRG with regard to the city. However, the other important point is that realistic steps should be taken to eliminate the risks that West Berlin now poses to Europe.

In conclusion, he voiced his great appreciation for today's meeting, which has confirmed the correctness of our decisions of last December. All our parties and countries should

⁶ Transl. Note: Communist Party of Romania.

⁷ Transl. Note: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

make their decisions in accordance with our common line, which lies in the interests of each and every one of us.

We agree with Cde. Brezhnev's proposal, which points to the necessity of coordinating our foreign policy efforts. Experience has shown that we cannot afford any delays because international developments are dynamic. If there are any objections (to Cde. Brezhnev's proposal), we would suggest considering a proposal to the effect that our foreign ministers should meet as frequently as possible in order to deal promptly with outstanding issues.

He voiced his conviction that the Hungarian comrades would continue to follow the common line.

Comrade Gustáv Husák

He began by thanking the Soviet comrades for organizing today's meeting and congratulated them on signing the treaty with the FRG. We fully agree with the treaty, Cde. Brezhnev's speech and his evaluation of the situation. Twenty-five years after World War II, the treaty brings forth new elements that are consistent with our common policy line. The FRG's decision to sign the treaty does not come from its love of socialism; it represents, instead, the results of a realistic assessment of the correlation of forces, which has changed in favor of socialism; the assessment of the USSR's global might, and the Warsaw Treaty member-states' unified approach. Contributing to the treaty's signing was also the defeat of the right-wing and anti-socialist forces in our country and the wrecking of the imperialists' plans; they found out the hard way that a policy of pitting one socialist country against another, a policy of ripping this or that socialist state out of the socialist commonwealth, is doomed to failure. In this respect, we must voice once again our appreciation for the Soviet Union's international assistance in 1968. Looking back, we can only now fully appreciate its impact, although there are voices within the Communist movement that have a different opinion. However, the Western bourgeoisie understand what they have lost. In our country, this correct assessment is accepted both within and outside the party, in accordance with conclusions of CC plenums of September 1969 and January 1970. Now, we must adopt a tactical and active approach to assure the treaty's ratification, so that everything we have achieved so far is secured and there's no turning back.

We support the efforts of our Polish comrades to safeguard their borders. The borders are guaranteed not only by the treaty but also by the unity and might of the socialist countries. Cde. Husák went on to express support for the German comrades' demand for

the GDR's accession to the UN and praised the overall approach contained in Cde. Stoph's speech.

With regard to the Munich Agreement, we are in no hurry. We have made it clear we are ready for negotiations. We are very much interested in dealing with this issue because Munich marked the beginning of fascist aggression and, in fact, World War II. We support the further development of mutual relations, but we must agree on common tactics in order to deny the FRG any room for exerting their influence.

In terms of ideology, we share the German comrades' opinion -- namely, we must actively oppose ideological diversion, because there will certainly be attempts and efforts to intensify it. The lessons we have learned are useful in this regard. As indicated by the analysis that we have been working on for some time, there were efforts to sow petty-bourgeois ideologies and prejudices in our country, to create an opposition front there. The same applies to our struggle against social-democratism, whose main purpose has always been to serve as a Trojan horse against our ideology. Our experience shows how German and Austrian Social Democrats sought to undermine and destroy our Communist doctrine. This is why we must stress and give top priority to intensive educational efforts, a class-based approach and readiness for ideological struggle.

With respect to West Berlin, Cde. Husák also voiced his agreement with Cde. Brezhnev's speech. Our further successes will depend upon our common policy line, which is decisively opposed to all attempts at driving a wedge between us and weakening our efforts. The proposals presented by Cde. Brezhnev lay the foundation for a well-considered approach.

With regard to Cde. Brezhnev's proposal for coordinating our efforts in foreign policy, we favor effective meetings of the foreign ministers. If the ministers meet more frequently under appropriate organizational arrangements, it will bear fruit in terms of coordination, and will preclude any possibility of manipulation by our enemies.

In conclusion, Cde. Husák thanked the Soviet comrades for their hospitality.

Comrade Władysław Gomułka

He began by thanking the Soviet comrades for the information, voicing appreciation for the Soviet comrades' efforts, and welcoming the signing of the treaty between the FRG and the USSR. Too little time has elapsed since the signing for us to fully appreciate the significance of the document. There is no doubt that the agreement represents a great

success for all the Warsaw Treaty countries, a great success for all the forces striving for détente. It is the result of the unity and the common policy implemented by the Warsaw Treaty member-states. We agree with Cde. Brezhnev's assessment of the document. However, many things require an analysis in terms of identifying its benefits for the FRG and the North Atlantic Treaty, which led them to accept the treaty. Although they agreed to everything, this does not mean they accept the treaty enthusiastically. Their calculations are not without basis; all agreements are compromises, which bring perceived benefits to both parties concerned. What are Brandt and the Social Democrats speculating about? There exists – they write and say – a better opportunity to construct improved relations between the FRG and the GDR, a better opportunity for the two parts of the German nation to draw closer together. It is not just the ideological and political penetration of the GDR and the other socialist countries to which they are referring; they are also stressing economic expansion. These plans aim at our disintegration. This problem is not new. They will continue to implement what they have been doing up to now under the guise of slogans about economic cooperation and the expansion of human contacts. We highly value the fact that the Central Committee of the SED understands the situation perfectly and is focusing on strengthening its political and economic relations with the USSR and its economic integration with the socialist countries. The GDR represents one of the results of World War II; this is why we must thwart any plans about which our class enemies may be speculating.

Cde. Gomulka also mentioned the varied opinions in the West. On the one hand, they do not want a unified Germany, which is why they favor the treaty; on the other hand, they will certainly want to make every possible use, both political and ideological, of the normalization process. Our policy must be ready for this; it must be a principled policy, but also flexible. Three years ago, we couldn't even imagine signing such a treaty. At that time, the Romanian comrades established diplomatic relations,⁸ but no one followed Romania, so it was possible to achieve what we have achieved now. We agreed on a common approach in Warsaw back in 1967, and the common approach has come to fruition. We must emphasize the economic area in order to achieve general benefits for all. The present treaty is not a substitute for a peace treaty, but the things incorporated in it, 25 years after the war, are very important. We can say that the time will come when the present treaty will substitute for a peace treaty.

Continuing, he shared some information about Poland's experiences in its negotiations with the FRG; he explained why Brandt's group was a better choice for us at present. We

⁸ Transl. note: Reference to Romania's establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1967.

cannot promote the treaty with Brandt as our victory because it is not in our interest to saw off the branch upon which Brandt and his people are sitting.

With regard to negotiations between the ČSSR and the FRG, Cde. Gomulka asserted that our position is somewhat better because there is no outstanding territorial problem to be resolved. With regard to the GDR, the principal task is to bring it into the UN. It would mark a major contribution to the GDR's international recognition. This step would carry more weight than any documents voicing international recognition.

The issue of West Berlin is not of immediate concern to us, but the remnants of the Cold War must be removed, and we must get something in return. We must prove that there cannot and will not be a single place in Europe where the relicts of the Cold War are permitted to live on.

In conclusion, Cde. Gomulka emphasized that the principal task is to create normal conditions for foreign-policy cooperation; in this regard, our common interests, common approach and common policy line should come first, rather than matters of prestige.

Cde. Todor Zhivkov

In a brief speech, Cde. Zhivkov voiced his agreement with Cde. Brezhnev's speech and the ideas contained therein. A written position statement by the CC of the Communist Party of Bulgaria will be submitted for the record.

Our success, he emphasized, resulted from our correct principles and flexible policy. The prime mover behind them has been the unity of the Warsaw Treaty countries, which is of key importance. We will continue to use the same approach as in years past and strictly pursue a common policy line.

In a short reply, Cde. Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet comrades had intentionally refrained from a broad analysis of the international situation due to the lack of time, but that he broadly agreed with what Cde. Gomulka and the other comrades had said. What matters most is that we know what our tactics and our reactions should be. Our unity and our strength represent our most valuable assets. They send a strong political signal and have fully proven their value in terms of the treaty with the FRG.

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Overall, one can say that the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee was successful, smooth and effective. Even the final communiqué did not encounter any obstacles. The contribution of the GDR delegation, with which the Soviet comrades had held a six-hour conversation before the meeting, can be regarded as a positive factor. The meeting has helped harmonize our fundamental positions and attitudes.

Cde. Ceaușescu's speech, which reflected the usual opinions of the Romanian comrades, was held in a different tone. Nevertheless, the Romanian position was not provocative, which is attributable to the fact that the Romanian comrades have become somewhat isolated. Their position could not be organically incorporated into the concept that the Soviet comrades followed and resulted in the treaty's signing. The wording of the treaty (attached) reflects this broad context; it meets and guarantees the basic requirements that the socialist countries have been stressing for many years.

The Moscow meeting indicates that the key task of Czechoslovak foreign policy is to thoroughly prepare for negotiations with the FRG and during the course of them, to attain an annulment of the Munich Agreement from the very beginning with all the ensuing consequences. This means that by September 15, the Politburo of the CC of the CPC must discuss various alternative proposals for Czechoslovakia's approach and tactics in the negotiations with the FRG so that the Czechoslovak side is ready for negotiations in September, after the initialing of the treaty with Poland (which will probably occur in the first ten days of September). To this end, the most skilled experts must concentrate together at the MFA.⁹ We will face extraordinary demands in terms of the quality and readiness of our propaganda; it must provide a correct interpretation of the joint approach of the socialist countries, along with our own interests vis-à-vis the FRG. This means working in a conceptual fashion, ahead of time, and with a view to the future. Consequently, these issues should be elaborated as soon as possible in a general plan for our propaganda and ideological efforts, so that they evolve in a fashion fully consistent with the agreed policy of the socialist states and in keeping with our own interests.

[Translation by Jiří Mareš]

⁹ Transl. note: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.