

BREZHNEV. Dear Comrades! Our delegation is very glad that we have been able to meet again to discuss foreign policy questions and jointly consider the resolution of complex foreign policy questions—something that is rather important at this time.

Four months after our last meeting, we find ourselves at a new level, and, it can be said, at a new frontier. I am referring to the agreement that has been signed between the PRP and the FRG on the normalization of their relations. The evidence is growing of how influential the socialist countries have become in international affairs when they proceed upon the basis of coordinated policies and a joint determination to defend the interests of socialism. If positive tendencies have been gaining strength in Europe, it is because our parties have been able to coordinate the actions of our socialist community and our socialist countries.

Although the treaty between the Soviet Union and the FRG has not yet been ratified and although its potential has not yet been realized, it is already influencing Europe's political balance.

The treaty between the People's Republic of Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany will certainly have the same impact.

Both treaties mark a turning point in the political situation in Europe. They serve the interests of not only the socialist countries but also all European nations. At the same time, it is necessary to note that we have had to travel a journey of over a quarter century in order to crush our opponents' plans to redraw Poland's western border, established at Yalta and Potsdam at the insistence of the Soviet Union.

We needed two tense decades to create the preconditions for the explicit recognition of a German socialist state by imperialist West Germany.

If I may say so, we are now approaching such recognition. The FRG has already recognized the inviolability of the borders of the GDR, along with the other socialist countries.

The political struggles in the West regarding the FRG's treaties with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Poland, GDR-FRG relations, the invalidity of the Munich Agreement *ab initio*, and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin have drawn a clear dividing line between the supporters and opponents of peace in Europe. Clearly, the forces of reaction are far from laying down their arms, and their activity is slowing down the positive trends in European developments and creating major difficulties in settling unresolved questions.

In this connection, one should consider the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany. Apart from the well-known positive changes, neo-Nazism has clearly sprung back to life. There have been attempts to unite right-wing forces around revanchist aspirations, militarism,

and unbridled hostility toward the socialist countries, above all towards the German Democratic Republic.

As witnessed by the election results in Hesse and Bavaria, a significant portion of the masses remains captivated by the chauvinistic slogans of the CDU/CSU¹ right wing. And if Strauss² and Kiesinger³ were to come to power, they would create many problems in Europe, regardless of the costs to their own country. The Brandt⁴ government's position, although it has not weakened since Brandt's ascent to power, still remains weak. This can be explained not only by the Free Democratic Party's instability, but also by the SPD⁵ leadership's inconsistent actions, its politicking tendencies, and its fear of not keeping pace with its right-wing rivals' anti-communist views. Does this really strengthen Brandt's position?

Even in cases when the Social Democrats have had all the necessary means to go on the offensive – for example, regarding the ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty – they have sought to justify themselves and have worried about convincing the opposition, and this, in the end, has increased their own difficulties.

The Brandt government's difficulties are exacerbated by the resistance that it has been meeting more often than not from the Western powers.

Attention should be drawn to America's policies. It seems to us that they are continuing to play a double game. On the surface, they appear cooperative, but in practice they have missed no opportunity to weaken the current coalition in Bonn and to discipline Brandt when he, in their opinion, has demonstrated too much independence.

Such policies are also characteristic of Britain, although it avoids pressuring Brandt too much; apparently, the British, hoping to join the Common Market, are counting on the FRG's support. Naturally, Western nations, primarily the United States, have been trying to hinder Brandt's Ostpolitik, which weakens NATO's hold over Europe. This has been evident in the quadripartite talks on West Berlin. It must be stated frankly that the Western powers have been taking a position that can only be called extortionist. They have imposed upon Brandt a linkage between ratification of the Soviet-West German Treaty and progress in the negotiations on West Berlin. They are now exploiting the linkage to the treaty's entry into force in order to obtain one-sided advantages. They are artificially linking the convocation of the all-European conference and other foreign policy questions with the outcome of the

¹ The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU)

² Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the Bavarian CSU

³ Former West German Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU)

⁴ West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD)

⁵ Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)

Berlin negotiations. We must remember this when discussing our efforts to convene an all-European conference.

It would probably be premature in these circumstances to make any predictions about the duration and possible outcome of the negotiations on West Berlin. As we previously noted, the current positive trend in European developments does not satisfy the American imperialists and does not fit, so to speak, the mold of their global strategy. Apparently, Nixon has been trying to figure out how to slow down the gradual weakening of the U.S. position in Europe, where doubts have been growing about the need for an American “shield,” at least in its current form.

However, we must remember that the United States has many supporters on the European continent. These are the right-wing reactionary forces in the FRG and other countries. When the United States is unable to use its leverage to deal with undesirable developments in Europe, it resorts to aggravating tensions elsewhere in the world.

By the way, I would like to draw attention to the dubious, dangerous, and adventurist policies that Nixon has been pursuing recently. They have been exemplified by his Vietnam policy, which changes on a daily basis. They have also been exemplified by the U.S. policies in the Middle East and the U.S. position on the West Berlin question. One cannot be certain about the stability of the policies of this public figure. The hysteria over the so-called “credibility crisis,” instigated by the Americans in relation to Cuba and the Middle East, along with the tensions in Cambodia and Vietnam – all of this has been directed largely against détente in Europe, the Soviet-West German Treaty, and the normalization of the FRG’s relations with the socialist countries. However, it would not be false to say that every year it is getting more and more complicated for the United States to maintain its position on the European continent.

Considering all of this, it can be said that two approaches to international affairs are currently colliding in Europe. One, imposed by the United States, seeks to walk away from the existing problems in the region, to preserve tensions, and to restrict relations among states of different political systems, including economic relations. The other approach, supported by our socialist community, seeks to expand and deepen peaceful cooperation among our countries on the basis of the status quo in Europe.

Based on our achievements and our experience on the world stage, the conclusion is inescapable: we must not let the initiative slip from our fingers. We have managed to make significant progress in our relations with the Federal Republic [of Germany], as well as in the general stabilization of the European climate, thanks to the systematic consultations and coordinated activities of our community of Warsaw Treaty member-states. Therefore, we must preserve this joint initiative. Political developments can take various forms, and we will

hardly be able to predict everything. Life can guide us to a large extent. It is important that we conduct our future meetings on short notice – whether they are meetings of the foreign ministers, government leaders, or Central Committee secretaries – so that we can react expeditiously to the various situations that we encounter. It is important that our policies be just and peaceful. We cannot fight on the basis of any other policies. This is the most important lever, and we must utilize it skillfully. Experience has shown that our policies keep winning more and more adherents.

As a result, the socialist countries have attained good relations with, for example, France, Italy, Finland, and several other Western nations. The drive of most Western European nations toward more independent policies – including small states – is gaining momentum. Societies are becoming more active, and this is having an effect upon the policies of the bourgeois governments.

Today, we can rightly say that our jointly-developed policy on European – especially German – affairs has proved its vitality and effectiveness.

Of course, everything is not completed. A difficult and perhaps lengthy struggle for implementing the entire program of European security, developed at the meetings of the PCC and our parties' international conferences, still lies before us. It is quite possible, comrades, that our agreements with the FRG will not be ratified soon. It is quite possible. Moreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that the balance of forces in the FRG will shift in a negative direction. We must be prepared for this. If there are those who want to complicate matters, we will see whether the FRG is meeting its responsibilities and whether we need to make even stricter demands. Naturally, we are not indifferent to the direction that events may take or whether the faction with the more sober views is in power in the FRG.

Taking into consideration the long-term interests of peace in Europe, it is tactically advantageous to encourage realistic policies on the part of the West German government, although the struggle within the FRG will clearly not avoid acute crises and unexpected twists and turns.

None of us has any illusions about the political conceptions of the current FRG leadership. They are certainly counting on benefits from relations with the socialist countries, from the treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and with Poland. If the agreements only brought negative consequences, they would not sign them. We see that at nearly every step, positive signs in inter-governmental relations are accompanied by attempts to harm socialism or destroy our unity. Why do we say this? Let us address the facts.

The FRG has not applied for a long time such massive pressure or conducted such sophisticated propaganda against the GDR as it is doing so now.

We must not ignore the fact that the Brandt government's rise to power has changed little in the military arena. The budget of the Bundeswehr for the next year has been raised by three billion marks. And, now, Brussels reports that the FRG has promised to allocate another 1.8 billion marks to fulfill its NATO commitments during the next five years. Expenses for military preparedness have thus been increasing beyond measure. Moreover, the FRG Defense Minister, the Social Democrat Schmidt, has been participating in the establishment of a program to strengthen and modernize the NATO military machine.

None of the North Atlantic allies has voiced a single word of criticism regarding Brandt's attitude toward the communists. This is not surprising. You know about Brandt's attitude toward communists. We have found out (all of our comrades are probably aware of this as well) that the leadership of the FRG's Social Democratic Party approved very recently a special document that confirms in a most definitive fashion that anticommunism remains the basic policy of the Social Democrats.

For example, Social Democrats are forbidden from having any sort of ties to West German communists. They are also forbidden from having any relations with members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, although we know that the Social Democratic leadership does not mind making contact with certain communist parties at its own discretion. The political goals of such a differentiated approach do not require any special explanation.

Our comrades here have spoken about the necessity of more actively aiding and strengthening the realistic, democratic, and progressive powers within the Federal Republic itself. It is difficult perhaps to discuss specifics today, but, in general, we might agree that all our parties will lend all necessary support to the West German communists in their work, in the ideological and political struggle that they lead. It is probably only right that we consider this our duty.

It is clear that the ideological struggle with the Social Democrats will demand constant attention from our parties. We, for example, believe that we should not back away from our struggle with ideological enemies. We must give clear and convincing responses to the questions for which the Social Democrats would like to impose their points of view. Again, it is important to preserve an offensive spirit and to win over new social strata to our side in the ideological struggle.

We support the development of coordinated positions in evaluating Social Democracy today, its ideology and policies. This, comrades, is very important; it is a vast front in our struggle. I am convinced that the more we act in concert – all our parties and countries -- the greater our actions' effectiveness will be.

Moreover, we would also like to stress that it would be wise – for the sake of normalizing relations between all European countries under existing circumstances – to separate, whenever possible, ideological arguments with the Social Democrats from formal ties to the Brandt-Scheel government.

The task of further consolidating the GDR's international position is linked to a complex set of questions.

In a relatively short time, the GDR has been able to travel down a path that would have taken many years under other circumstances. Supporting the GDR in its struggle for normalizing relations with the imperialist states – first of all, the FRG – on the basis of commonly-accepted international norms is our common responsibility. We note with great satisfaction that all the participants in this meeting have expressed a unanimous opinion in this regard.

I have no doubt that all of us proceed from the assumption that there is a need to unwaveringly defend the GDR's standing – its sovereignty as a socialist German state, as an integral part of the socialist community. Furthermore, we fully share the opinion of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the GDR government that firm resistance to Bonn is necessary. Bonn has been attempting to invent some sort of "inter-German" principles for forging relations between the FRG and the GDR. Bonn is also trying to subordinate the settlement of relations between two sovereign countries with opposing social systems to the idea of preserving a "national community of all Germans."

In our opinion, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany's policy of cutting all the country's ties to the past, overcoming nationalistic remnants and illusions in people's consciousness, and decisively demarcating the FRG from the GDR on the basis of class and social principles – which should lie at the heart of any socialist state's policy – is completely justified. As for our country and our government, we have provided and will continue to provide comprehensive aid and assistance for this policy's realization.

We agree with what our comrades have said here: we must continue our struggle against attempts to discriminate against the GDR on the world stage and attempts to impede its activities in international organizations – so that the GDR can maintain normal relations with all states. The current conditions for settling relations between the GDR and the FRG differ drastically from those that existed even a short while ago. When the FRG's treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland enter into force, it will certainly give new impetus to Bonn's transition to a more realistic stance regarding the settlement of its relations with the GDR.

Of course, Brandt has maneuvered and will continue to maneuver, but it would be very risky for him to take a step back from the commitments that he has assumed.

The “Declaration of Intent,” which you know and was developed in close consultation with the fraternal parties, incorporated a summary of the requirements proposed at the meetings in Bucharest and Budapest and at our other sessions. In the “Declaration,” the conclusion of agreements between the FRG and the socialist countries – namely the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People’s Republic, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic – are viewed as a whole. The “Declaration” clearly states the West German government’s responsibility for establishing relations with the GDR on the basis of complete equality, non-discrimination, and respect for the independence and sovereignty of both states, as well as its responsibility for facilitating the FRG’s and GDR’s entry into the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The document refers to the need to resolve the issue of the Munich Agreement’s invalidity through negotiations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia.

To a certain extent, the implementation of parts of the “Declaration of Intent” has already begun. With regard to other aspects, Brandt is still hesitating. Our task, it seems, is to align Brandt’s actual policies with the commitments that he has undertaken. Of course, obtaining the agreements’ ratification stands in the foreground; this would help create an even firmer basis for the success of our efforts.

We firmly believe that the principle of jointly defending the socialist countries’ achievements, which has achieved good results at previous stages, has not completely lost its significance at the current stage. We all seem to agree that the steps we take should be coordinated and that their execution should depend upon progress in all areas.

In our opinion, comrades, the coordination of our actions and a unified approach to normalizing relations with the FRG have been and will remain a reliable key to success.

This opens the prospect of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the socialist countries and West Germany. During our previous sessions, our Polish friends spoke in favor of establishing diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of Poland and the FRG upon the ratification of the treaties between the USSR and the FRG and between the PRP and the FRG. Evidently, such a prospect is now imminent. It appears that, in due time, this may occur in practice for Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria as well.

At the same time, as we understand it, based on our common viewpoint, the level of our diplomatic relations with the FRG – as well as other activities pertaining to the normalization of our countries’ relations with the FRG – must correspond to the extent to which Bonn has acquiesced in our agreed demands; the establishment of relations with the GDR as a sovereign state should entail the settlement of all the problems that we have raised. In this context, we can express our complete solidarity with the position formulated by Com. Gomułka in his speech to the 10th Congress of the Socialist Workers’ Party of Hungary.

Comrades! Our meeting today has provided us with the opportunity to discuss another question that we have already mentioned – that of preparations for the all-European conference. The conference idea, proposed by our countries, has become the focus of European politics. Almost all of the continent's countries have voiced their willingness to participate in such a conference in one way or another, but, in fact, few of them are willing to apply the necessary energy to overcome the obstacles placed by the United States on the path to such a conference. It must be stated clearly that Washington is hoping to paralyze the actions of its NATO allies and is attempting to make the preparations for the conference a topic of political bargaining. It can be gathered that the session of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization opening in Brussels today will not miss this opportunity to comment on the conference and on our latest suggestions regarding its preparation. Regardless of what we decide at this session, it would be worthwhile to voice a positive opinion about Finland's recent initiative, which our comrades have already discussed here.

We must facilitate the convocation of the all-European conference as soon as possible or in the near future. If the comrades support it, we can agree that our ministers of foreign affairs will hold special consultations regarding additional steps that might prove useful. However difficult it might be, conducting an all-European conference on security matters would be of great importance to us. The nations of Europe would breathe a sigh of relief and would finally understand that they can handle European affairs on their own.

In conclusion, permit me to express my gratitude to Comrade Ulbricht and to all of our German friends for their hospitality, for the attention that they have given us, for meeting the participants, and for the good working environment.

Thank you for your attention.

[Translation from the Russian by Julia La Villa Nossava]