
**Report to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Council
of Ministers on the Meeting of the
Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Prague,
January 25-26, 1972**

In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo, a three-member delegation representing our party and government participated in the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee held on January 25-26 in Prague: head of delegation János Kádár, and members of delegation Comrades Jenő Fock and János Péter. (The member-states accepted a Soviet recommendation that the ministers of defense would not take part in the conference.) Our delegation, carrying out its mandate, spelled out the Hungarian position on the questions under discussion, participated in editing the documents and finalizing them.

I.

The leaders of the member-states discussed the convocation of a meeting in Prague of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee at the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in early December 1971. The Soviet Comrades prepared the preliminary drafts of the documents, which were sent to the responsible officials of the member-states for evaluation even before the meeting convened. Final consultations regarding the drafts and discussion of them took place in Prague at the foreign minister and deputy foreign minister levels.

In keeping with the preliminary agreement, there were two items on the agenda at the Prague meeting of the PCC:

1. Current issues of peace, security and cooperation in Europe.
 2. A report by the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces.
- With regard to the first item, the PCC approved a Declaration on European Peace, Security and Cooperation, which was signed by the first secretaries and the prime ministers. The Declaration was published on January 27.
 - A resolution was adopted in response to the Supreme Commander's report, which was signed by the prime ministers and the party first secretaries. This document was not made public. The defense ministers of the member-states received the declaration.
 - The Soviet and the Czechoslovak comrades – taking into account the opinion of the Vietnamese comrades – worked out a declaration regarding the ongoing

aggression by the United States in Indochina. After consultations, the PCC approved this document as well, and it was also made public on January 27.

- At the conclusion: a final communiqué from the PCC meeting was published. The meeting aimed at giving a new impetus to our common struggle for the strengthening of European peace and security. We focused on two main questions:
- The measures required for the convocation of an all-European conference on security and cooperation in accordance with a timetable;
- Our common position and practical moves concerning the further normalization of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.

The atmosphere of the meeting was characterized by unity and mutual understanding. The views on the majority of questions under discussion were identical, or very close to one another; this can be explained by the successes of our coordinated foreign policy and the identical assessment [of these successes], along with the good preparation of the present meeting. More divergent views arose only with regard to questions unrelated to the approval of the present documents, and this did not prevent the formulation of common positions that, however, remain to be discussed later.

The location of the PCC in Prague was favorable as well. After the 1968 events, Czechoslovakia was given the opportunity to become increasingly active in foreign policy when the PCC gave the Czechoslovak foreign ministry the mandate to deliver the declaration¹ [on European security] to the other European states and to the U.S. and Canada as well.

We can say that the meeting was especially successful and was a step forward in comparison to previous PCC meetings in terms of the atmosphere and practical results. Every party voiced the wish that there should be a similar meeting of the minds regarding the interpretation and practical implementation of the declared principles. Every delegation emphasized that the most important sign of the success of our European policy is the further strengthening of our unity.

Comrade Brezhnev spoke in his keynote speech for the Soviets only about European issues. Beyond European issues, the participants addressed all important topical questions in world politics; several of them focused on new aspects of the Chinese

¹ The reference here is to the Budapest Appeal for a European Security Conference, April 1969; see <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=18022&navinfo=14465>.

leadership's schismatic policies, events in the Indian subcontinent, and developments in Indochina and the Middle East.

The Prague meeting of the Political Consultative Committee was opened by Comrade Husák, who, as host, greeted the participants. The meeting was chaired in the usual alphabetical order by Comrades Honecker, Gierek and Ceaușescu.

II.

Below we will summarize the most important parts of the speeches in the order that they were given. (With the exception of the Polish and the Romanian speeches, the complete texts of the speeches are available at the Secretariat of the Central Committee.) Because of its comprehensive nature, Comrade Brezhnev's speech will be summarized in more detail, whereas the summaries of the other speeches will emphasize what is new or different. The full text of the Hungarian speech is attached to this report.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev asserted that the international situation continues to change in favor of the causes of socialism, peace and progress. Our peace initiatives have helped promote a political atmosphere conducive to the solution of even the most burning and complicated problems of foreign policy that to some extent still burden the international situation.

Progress has been particularly noteworthy on the continent of Europe. It is especially significant that our countries have been able to take into account and constructively exploit in their policies the positive changes that have occurred in a number of West European states – especially in the two largest ones, France and the FRG – and to use them for the benefit of peace and socialism.

The positive changes in Europe have been facilitated as well by the change in power relations in the capitalist world. The West European countries are no longer vassals of the United States. Although the United States' influence is still strong, and its political ties to the capitalist states in Western Europe will remain close for a long time to come, its conflicts with other capitalist states have been multiplying. The weight of the EEC countries is growing within NATO, but Britain's entry into the EEC will have the effect of increasing the influence of American monopolies within this economic community. This has caused anxiety in France, the FRG and Italy and brought a new element of conflict into the capitalist camp. These tendencies have been reflected in the increasingly apparent, positive changes in attitude of some West European capitalist states toward the socialist countries in the past few years.

In the past few years, the socialist countries have presented a consistent program for peace at the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee, with the goal of establishing peace and security in Europe. Our concerted and coordinated foreign policy has led to impressive results; many of our aims have been accomplished:

- We fought to stop the FRG from gaining access to nuclear weapons in any form. Our demand has succeeded; the FRG signed the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, although it has not yet ratified it.
- We wanted West Germany to recognize the inviolability of European borders; this came to fruition in the treaties [that Bonn] signed with the Soviet Union and Poland.
- We insisted that the FRG recognize the existence of the GDR as an equal and sovereign state and renounce the Hallstein Doctrine. Today, the FRG recognizes the existence of the GDR *de facto*, although it has reservations and refers to special “inner-German” relations.
- The socialist countries have consistently fought for recognition of the fact that West Berlin does not belong to the FRG; this goal has also been realized through the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.
- We all took the position that the FRG must renounce the Munich *Diktat* and recognize it as null and void *ab initio*. West German-Czechoslovak talks have begun with regard to this question, but they are still in their opening phase. It is possible that the West Germans will try to procrastinate, but in the end we can expect a successful outcome to the talks. It is the common obligation of all the member-states to support Czechoslovakia during the negotiations.
- We have consistently supported the development of mutually advantageous links to the countries of Western Europe. We have achieved significant results in this area as well. In the Soviet Union’s case, this is particularly true for its relations with France, the Scandinavian countries and Italy.
- A few years ago, we raised the idea of convening an all-European conference on security and cooperation. Today, no European country opposes the idea. The official circles in the United States do not openly oppose it either, but they have adopted the tactic of procrastination.

- This general overview shows that we already have achieved many results in our struggle for European security. The positions of socialism on the continent have been reinforced. However, more initiatives and persistent struggle by the Warsaw Treaty member-states will be necessary for a radical improvement in the European atmosphere. The consolidation and further development of our successes definitely requires it. There are many major tasks in this regard:
- We must make certain that the Soviet-West German and the Polish-West German treaties are ratified. Brandt and his circle believe that they can ratify the treaties. Wide segments of the West German public support Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Brandt has been able to secure Nixon's benevolent "neutrality," and Britain does not oppose ratification, either. As far as Pompidou is concerned, he has promised to actively promote it. Nevertheless, a determined struggle by the socialist states will be necessary. We have gained significant leverage by tying the signing of the final protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin to a deadline for ratification. The Soviet Union will not sign the protocol until the treaty has been ratified.
- In our propaganda it would be expedient to show restraint in criticizing the Brandt government. But the GDR is in a special position in this regard, because it must react to manifestations of hostility on the part of the West German government.
- The next important task is settling relations between the FRG and Czechoslovakia. It would be useful to remind the FRG from time to time that the settlement of its relations with Czechoslovakia is a precondition for the other socialist countries' establishment of relations with it. We cannot expect more from the West German government than ratification of the Soviet-West German and the Polish-West German treaties and the settlement of its relations with Czechoslovakia.
- Another task of great magnitude is the further strengthening of the international position of the GDR, including the settlement of relations between the two German states according to the accepted norms of international law. Recently, there have been three agreements between the GDR and the FRG, as well as the GDR and the West Berlin Senate. These are initial steps, and a general agreement on transit is now on the agenda. Brandt has been talking about the need for a general agreement between the two German states. This conceals his personal ambitions, but we must exploit the West German government's interest in it. We

must try to resolve certain questions in this regard. Thus, for example, the FRG should renounce its discrimination against the GDR in third countries. Another question that we must focus on is promoting the admission of both [German] states into the UN as soon as possible.

- The soonest possible convention of the all-European conference – preferably in 1972 – is in our interest. We must oppose the tactic of procrastination that is being pursued by some Western countries. In theory there is no country that opposes the Finnish proposal for the multilateral preparation of the conference, but the United States and the FRG have linked this issue to the signing of the final protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin.

- For the first time, the NATO Council made positive mention of the Finnish proposal at its last meeting. It would be expedient to seize this opportunity and contact the Finnish government about the gradual accomplishment of multilateral preparation.

- At this stage of preparation for the security conference, it would be expedient to focus on coordination of the date, agenda and procedure for convening the conference, as we agreed to at the last meeting of our foreign ministers in Warsaw.

- On the Soviet side, we believe that – in line with the French position – the organizational part of preparing and holding the conference should be as follows: The conference would begin with a meeting of the foreign ministers. At this stage of the conference, the foreign ministers would discuss the basic questions and refer them to committees for further action. After the elaboration and preliminary coordination of the main political documents, the meeting would resume at a higher level, so that the necessary documents, along with firm conditions for reaching decisions, could be approved.

- The content of the conference is even more important. The best way to achieve European security would be to replace the opposing military blocs with a treaty on collective security. The socialist countries put forward such a proposal a long time ago and still support it. But looking at the situation realistically, it would be expedient to focus on solving the following questions. The peaceful conditions for the construction of socialism require, at the very least, that we exclude the possibility of aggression, new wars, the violation of state borders, and the possibility of intervention in each other's domestic affairs. Therefore, in a

political sense our striving for European security will focus on the inviolability of state borders, the renunciation of the use of force or the threat of use of force in state-to-state relations, peaceful coexistence and cooperation for peace, nonintervention in internal affairs, the sovereign equality and independence of all states, etc. We must make certain that all European countries accept these principles.

- The primary political measures for strengthening European security could be the following: an agreement on regular consultations, mutual information among states and urgent, extraordinary consultations in times of crisis. The realization of these measures assumes the establishment of some kind of all-European political organ as a kind of organized center – for example, a consultative committee or secretariat to assist in such consultations and perhaps to convene another all-European meeting.

- In addition to these main issues, Comrade Brezhnev talked about several other ideas and proposals that could further the cause of European security and cooperation: for example, the establishment of an all-European center for parliamentary cooperation; the normalization of diplomatic relations between all European countries; broad governmental measures to promote cooperation in the fields of communication, scientific and technical progress, protection of the human environment, culture and other areas. It would be expedient to set up joint working groups consisting of representatives from the responsible organs to elaborate these questions. He decisively condemned the Western proposal to table the “free flow of ideas, information and people” at the conference.

- Comrade Brezhnev made special mention of our relations with the Common Market. He emphasized that this was not only an economic, but also primarily a political question. For the time being, it would not be appropriate to recognize the Common Market or to establish bilateral relations with it. It would be expedient for the socialist countries to fight for cooperation based on equal economic relations and the most-favored-nation principle. We must work out a common policy on this topic.

- Regarding the military aspect of the struggle for European security, Comrade Brezhnev emphasized that we need careful, gradual progress in this field. But we could agree with the Western powers on limited, initial steps in the near future. These could include: a certain reduction of armed forces and weapons in Europe or some portion of it; a limitation on war games, especially in border regions; the

creation of a zone of limited armament between the socialist and the capitalist states, etc. But it doesn't seem expedient to link these questions to preparations for an all-European conference, or to table them there. Of course, we should deal with these questions of a military nature and work them out simultaneously with preparations for the conference, but we should focus on convening the conference.

- Finally, Comrade Brezhnev emphasized the importance of mass actions that could promote the conference's convocation and European détente in general.

Comrade Gierek voiced full agreement with Comrade Brezhnev's appraisal and evaluation. He emphasized that the unity of the socialist community has been and remains the chief factor in the success of our joint endeavors. He described the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU as marking the beginning of a new phase of development.

Comrade Gierek emphasized the linkage between ratification of the Soviet-West German and Polish-West German treaties and the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin. He is convinced that the ratification process, which is already under way, will be successful because it is also in Brandt's interest. Otherwise, the foreign policies of the present West German government would suffer utter failure. We should try to help the Brandt government in this regard. The Polish government made such a gesture by permitting 25 thousand people to emigrate from Poland to the FRG.

Poland provides all possible support to Czechoslovakia for the sake of annulling the Munich Agreement. It supports the international legal recognition of the GDR. (From the Polish speech it seemed as though Comrade Gierek was retreating from an obligation that Poland undertook when the Polish-West German treaty was signed -- that Poland would establish diplomatic relations with the FRG when the treaty is ratified.)

Concerning the development of all-European cooperation, he urged, among other things, that we work out a coordinated line with regard to the Common Market, to which Poland will adhere.

Comrade Gierek considered it important that the declaration that we were about to pass mention the topics of arms reductions and the reduction of armed forces. Poland is ready to make its contribution to working out and resolving this complex of problems.

He urged more frequent consultations between the socialist countries; the foreign ministers, deputy foreign ministers and experts should meet on a more regular basis in

order to prepare for the all-European conference, and in general, we should improve our methods of work. He specifically recommended that our foreign ministers should coordinate their stances regarding the further normalization of our relations with the FRG in the fall.

Comrade Todor Zhivkov also declared that he fully agreed with Comrade Brezhnev's speech.

In terms of our future policy toward Europe, he recommended that we work out a serious and flexible policy for the next 10-15 years. In order to constantly harmonize and coordinate our policies, the right thing to do would be to set up a permanent committee, along with working groups to work out specific questions.

Because of its position, Bulgaria is devoting special attention to the situation in the Balkans, where NATO is becoming more active. It is trying to improve its relations with Yugoslavia and is making further efforts to normalize its relations with Albania.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu emphasized that the program worked out at the 1966 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest turned out to be correct. Today, all affected countries agree with the preparation of the security conference. Life has proven our conclusions regarding changes in the FRG correct as well. Romania contributed to the development of this positive process by establishing diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1967, among other things. The major role, however, was played by the Soviet Union's broad political efforts. Comrade Ceaușescu has always praised them.

In terms of positive changes that are occurring in the world, he considered the admission of the People's Republic of China into the UN and the broadening of its diplomatic relations as proof of the increasing international influence and prestige of socialism.

In line with Romania's long-standing position, he declared that all states had to be represented equally in the resolution of international questions, whether large or small.

He urged an increase in our efforts to achieve the GDR's recognition in international law and the admission of the two German states into the UN. He assured Czechoslovakia of Romania's support for declaring the Munich Agreement null and void. He recommended that the other socialist states should also normalize their diplomatic relations with the FRG.

Comrade Ceaușescu proposed that that the Comecon should recognize the EEC as a reality. Romania is interested, as are the [other] socialist states, in normalizing their relations with the EEC in many different areas. The Comecon or the interested countries should work out a joint position on this issue.

In the interest of détente in Europe, Comrade Ceaușescu strongly urged that the cause of general disarmament and reductions in weapons and troops be brought to the forefront.

Comrade Kádár's speech is in the annex.

Comrade Erich Honecker's speech understandably devoted the most space to the relationship between the two German states. He recommended that the Warsaw Treaty member-states support the GDR's admission to the UN and the special organs of the UN after the ratification of the Soviet-West German and the Polish-West German treaties.

All the socialist states should establish diplomatic relations with the FRG only after the treaties are ratified, the agreement on West Berlin enters into force, the Munich Agreement is declared null and void from the outset, and the GDR is admitted into the UN.

Comrade Gustav Husák spoke mostly about the Czechoslovak-GDR talks. At the meetings held so far, it has become evident that the talks will be long and complicated since the political concepts of the two parties are diametrically opposed. Czechoslovakia insists on the nullity of the Munich Agreement from the outset and cannot concede on this score. The West German side has posited that the agreement was provisionally valid. Comrade Husák proposed that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the socialist states and the FRG should be made contingent upon the outcome of the Czechoslovak-West German talks.

In the next few days, Czechoslovakia will come up with new initiatives regarding the FRG and will recommend that the talks be renewed at the highest level.

Comrade Husák resolutely condemned the Western proposal for the free flow of people, ideas and information. He recommended vigilance against the hostile maneuvers of the reactionary Western circles.

We can form a united front against the EEC within the Comecon framework. We need to bring our positions into line in order to avert the Western tactic aimed at dividing

the socialist states. We need to improve the organizational framework of the Warsaw Treaty to make our cooperation even more flexible and united.

After the speeches (nobody else wanted to take the floor), Comrade Brezhnev briefly summarized the essence and common themes in the speeches. He expressed his thanks for the words in praise of the Soviet Union. The declaration, he emphasized, embodies the unified nature of our positions. We face many questions – the relationship with the Common Market, the problem of arms and troop reductions, the settlement of relations with the FRG, etc. – whose resolution will require a harmonization of our positions and efforts on several levels.

We need to devote constant attention to the European scene, we must mutually inform each other, and we must act to promote the [ongoing] processes with concerted action. We all have the right to take the initiative, and we can count on the Soviet Union's support.

The meeting was closed by the presiding chair, Comrade Ceaușescu, who voiced satisfaction in the name of the Romanian delegation and all the other participants regarding the successful outcome of the meeting.

Right after the meeting was adjourned, the first secretaries and the prime ministers sat down for a brief discussion at Comrade Brezhnev's initiative. During this meeting, Comrade Brezhnev recommended that in three months the Executive Committee of the Comecon work out a common position regarding our relations with the EEC. The governments of the member-states should instruct their permanent representatives accordingly. The participants agreed to the proposal.

The Central Committee and the government of the KPČ² hosted the participants for lunch. Comrade Husák proposed a toast, and Comrade Brezhnev did so as well on behalf of the guests.

Budapest, January 28, 1972.

Report compiled by Mátyás Szűrös; Approved by János Kádár, Jenő Fock

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² Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.