

**Resolution No. 3185/1974 of the Council of Ministers on the
Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee
April 17-18, 1974 in Warsaw**

Top secret

Made in 49 copies

To be received by: Members of the Council of Ministers and Comrade András Gyenes

1. The Council of Ministers approves the report by the Hungarian state and party (in the original: party and state. And this of course is not a coincidence given the primacy of the party over the state.) delegation to the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw on April 17-18, 1974.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should keep the concrete tasks mentioned in the report on the agenda and prepare a relevant work plan; it recommends that these points be included in the work plan.

Budapest, April 26, 1974

Signed: Jenő Fock, President of the Council of Ministers

**Report on the the Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's
Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw, April 17-18, 1974.
Top Secret
Made in 9 copies**

On behalf of our Party and Government a three-member delegation participated in the meeting: Comrade János Kádár as head of delegation and Comrades Jenő Fock and Frigyes Puja as members of the delegation. (At Soviet initiative – supported by the member-states – the ministers of defense did not take part in the meeting.)

I.

In accordance with the preliminary agreement, there were three points on the agenda: the current phase in the struggle for European security and the relaxation of international tensions; preparation for the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty; a report by the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces Command.

The Political Consultative Committee accepted four published documents that were signed by the first- and general secretaries as well as the prime ministers: a communiqué on the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty's Political Consultative Committee, a declaration on Indochina, and a declaration on Chile.

In addition to these documents, the PCC approved a resolution proposed by the GDR on preparations for the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty. This document has not been made public, but it was made a part of the record.

A resolution was also approved regarding the report on the agenda made by the Supreme Commander; it was signed at the level of the first- and general secretaries and prime ministers. The meeting's atmosphere was characterized by a desire to deepen the unity and mutual understanding among the allied states. The Romanian delegation represented a divergent attitude regarding some of the questions that we discussed, but its speech was in a better spirit than before and did not ruin the comradely atmosphere. The GDR and the Polish delegations criticized the Romanian position because the proposal they made diverged from the joint position presented at the [European] security conference and at the disarmament talks in Vienna.

In addition to European questions, the participants focused on the Middle East and the development of a system of cooperation and consultation within the Warsaw Treaty. With the exception of the Romanians, the member-states' delegations condemned the extremely harmful international activity of the Chinese leadership.

II.

We will briefly summarize the speeches in their order of delivery below. We will provide a more detailed summary of Comrade Brezhnev's speech, and we will underline new or divergent parts in the rest. We have attached the full text of Comrade János Kádár's speech to the report. (The Hungarian translation of Comrade Brezhnev's speech will be available at the CC secretariat.)

First of all, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized the significance of the top-level meetings (PCC, Crimea meeting) and the success of our coordinated foreign policy. Nine years ago – also in Warsaw, at the meeting of the PCC – we were discussing how we could achieve a radical turn to ameliorate the political atmosphere in Europe. At that point the Cold War was still raging, and we set ourselves one concrete task: to foil the plan for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force with German participation. Today, we can safely say that we have essentially solved the problems that we linked to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. We managed to conclude the postwar settlement of Europe that had dragged on for three decades.

The approach toward international détente that has unfolded in the past few years – among other things, in connection with the Middle East – has survived the test, and the counterstrikes of the imperialist cold war circles have failed in attempting to reverse this process. We can rightly call this the most important result.

An important feature of the present international situation is that the conflict between the main competing centers of the imperialist powers – the United States, Western Europe and Japan – has exacerbated, and the economic conflicts are coupled with political differences.

Under the conditions of international détente, the inner stability of the capitalist countries has weakened. In the United States this has found expression in the serious difficulties being experienced by the Republican administration, and in England and Italy, in political and economic turmoil and governmental crisis. An uncertain equilibrium has come about between the government and opposition parties in the FRG, Canada, Sweden and other Western countries.

The struggle of the working classes of the capitalist countries for their social interests and rights is intensifying, and this enables the communist parties to initiate a broad range of activities against imperialist policies and to deepen the process of détente.

Comrade Brezhnev devoted the most time to issues of European security. He stressed that imperialist circles are making renewed attempts to halt the process of détente. They are focusing their attacks primarily with regard to such issues as the principle of the inviolability of borders, issues of military détente, exchange of information, the problem of humanitarian contacts and the level of participation in the third phase of the [European] security conference. The Western delegations (in the

original: partners) are creating increasing difficulties in discussing these issues at Geneva. The Soviet Union has taken decisive steps to foil these cold war measures. In public speeches and in talks with President Pompidou, Secretary of State Kissinger and West German Federal Minister Bahr, they have criticized the Western policy of procrastination. The positive effect of these Soviet steps can already be felt. We managed to consult in a preliminary way regarding the principle of inviolability of borders; to make a certain amount of progress toward clarifying problems related to the third point of the conference's agenda; and to line up arguments for holding the closing part of the conference at the highest level.

In determining our future political line regarding Europe, we must take into account such important factors as the appearance of the group of "Nine" in the political arena of our continent. The collaboration of the "Nine" in the political field is often directed toward taking a stance against the initiatives of the socialist community. At the same time this group is also turning against the interests of the United States. At present, such activities are loosening up NATO or are at least enfeebling the US positions on the continent. But at the same time, we cannot disregard the fact that the "Nine" are planning to form a new military bloc under the aegis of the Common Market.

The success of our European policy depends greatly upon our bilateral relations with individual capitalist countries. We must continue to devote particular attention to the FRG. The difficulties of the Social Democrats, of the Brandt Government, have been aggravated; the Social Democrats have lost many votes in local elections.

The Brandt Government's foreign policy is inconsistent, and its domestic policies are far from being progressive. But in the given circumstances, we are not interested in weakening the position of the Brandt Government, and it is therefore expedient to support him. This will be the starting point of the Soviet leadership as it prepares for the meeting with Chancellor Brandt to be held this summer.

Relations between the socialist countries and France have had a palpable impact upon European affairs. During his latest visit to the Soviet Union, Pompidou emphasized that cooperation with the Soviet Union and securing understanding between the two states are a basic element of French foreign policy. Personnel changes at the helm of French foreign policy will presumably not alter this political line.

The Soviet leadership is considering whether it would be worthwhile to realize a meeting with Wilson at an appropriate moment. This would help us survey the real intentions of the Labour Party government.

Some time ago, we agreed to establish ties between Comecon and the Common Market. In March, it was announced at the session of the European Parliament that the Common Market has stressed its interest in ties to Comecon. This necessitates the Comecon's working out specific proposals about the nature of a potential agreement with

the Common Market, taking into account our collective interests and the interests of individual countries as well.

All in all, it can be said that the situation in Europe is conducive for the successful assertion of our interests in the current phase. Practically everything that we planned in the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty has been realized or is now being realized. The task now is to establish concrete steps to take with regard to European security and to advance cooperation in the next phase of our struggle. This is the next task for our foreign ministers.

The main tendency in the development of Soviet-American relations is reflected in the implementation of measures to diminish the chances of nuclear war and to control the nuclear arms race. There are already significant results in this field. Talks with President Nixon are dedicated primarily to this end. The U.S. President is expected in the Soviet Union this June.

Questions related to averting a nuclear war were at the top of the agenda during Kissinger's Moscow talks as well. Concretely, this involves the following issues:

- The agreement signed in 1972 on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms is provisional and will expire in 1977. Given the long-term nature of the development of strategic weapons, we must already work out an appropriate position for the future. Therefore, it is expedient to make the provisional agreement permanent or to extend it. In principle the Americans are not opposed to this, but they have certain reservations.
- The Soviet leadership is also considering whether the Soviet Union and the United States could initiate new measures to limit antiballistic missile systems in further development of the 1972 agreement. It now seems that there is a prospect for this.
- The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. The Soviet side has recommended to the US that they sign an agreement banning underground nuclear tests as well.
- The Soviet side is also recommending that the United States and the Soviet Union initiate an international agreement to ban environmental pollution -- among other things, with military means.
- In order to ban chemical weapons the Soviet Union has put forward a proposal for an incremental solution to overcome the impasse. First of all, the production and use of the most dangerous and deadly chemical weapons should be banned.

- The Soviet side has also proposed to the United States the mutual withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea of American and Soviet submarines armed with missiles, cruisers armed with missiles, and aircraft carriers. Even a sketchy enumeration of these proposals demonstrates the magnitude of the Soviet initiatives.

The main problem in Soviet-American economic and commercial relations has been caused by discriminatory restrictions. The US government and Nixon have taken a consistently positive stance on this, but the reactionary circles are opposed to it. According to Kissinger, this problem will hopefully find a positive resolution by mid-year with the granting of most favored nation treatment [to the Soviet Union]. Nixon's domestic political difficulties can be explained in a large part by the fact that influential, reactionary circles in the US – notably, the military industrial complex and Zionist circles – are dissatisfied with Nixon's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Although we are not linking our policies to people, Nixon's removal from power would not be in our interest. Nevertheless, we are in contact with prominent representatives of the Democratic Party. For example, E. [Senator Edward] Kennedy is just about to visit the Soviet Union.

Japan has a prominent place in Soviet foreign policy. The interests of Japanese capital are increasingly in conflict with the interests of American and West European capital. To some extent, the initial, intensive development of relations between the People's Republic of China and Japan has slowed down as well. These conditions, coupled with the serious energy crisis, have increased Japan's interest in developing economic relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Japan links a peace treaty with territorial claims against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union has not urged talks about the peace treaty, but it is developing its cultural, economic and political relations with Japan in a cool and methodical manner.

The Middle Eastern region is still one of the most dangerous seats of conflict in the world. This geographical region is still influenced by the October 1973 war. We have already evaluated the war's outcome and its new traits [at the meeting] in the Crimea. We should remind ourselves of the fact that due to the position of the West European capitalist states, conflict between the United States and Western Europe has been exacerbated. The Middle East has become one of the loci of competition between the US and the "Nine". This is a phenomenon that our policies need to take into account.

In the period after the cease-fire, when the separation of armies was put on the agenda, Kissinger engaged in feverish activity, which gave Egypt the chance to rid itself of the consequences of its military misfortune, but it had to pay a dear price for it. Sadat had to undertake an obligation not to put military or semi-military measures into effect against Israel for the sake of a permanent settlement of the Middle East problem. Thus,

Israel was given a chance to freeze the situation – that is, to draw out endlessly the complete withdrawal of its troops from Arab territory. Circumventing the Geneva Conference, where the Arabs' friends are participating, Sadat made a separate agreement with Israel and the United States. In this way, he brought Egypt politically and Syria militarily into a difficult situation. The Arab unity that had come about in the October war was thus significantly weakened again.

American diplomacy would like to bring Syria into a similar situation. But the Syrian leadership has demonstrated a consistent attitude and is pursuing a decisively anti-imperialist line. In this situation the Soviet leadership has openly expressed its views on the Egyptian-Israeli troop separation and its deficiencies to Sadat. At this point, Sadat strove to assure the Soviet Union of his friendship. His latest declarations are in stark contrast to this, and are meant to "lay the foundations" for his pro-American line.

The Soviet Union is now paying special attention to Syria, as talks on the Israeli-Syrian front are just about to begin. During his talks in Moscow, President Assad emphasized that they would agree to troop separation within the framework of the Geneva Conference with the participation of Syria, Egypt, the Soviet Union, the United States and Israel.

The Soviet side mentioned to Kissinger the harmful effects of unilateral American activity and stressed that if the United States goes it alone regarding the Middle East, the Soviet Union will also go it alone. This aroused Kissinger's anxiety.

There is still a long struggle ahead in the Middle East question. In the framework of this struggle, it is important for us to strengthen and develop our multilateral relations with those countries that take a consistently anti-imperialist line in this region, while we must not surrender Egypt either.

With regard to the separatist line of the Chinese leadership, Comrade Brezhnev stressed that hardly any new traits can be perceived in it. To some extent, new developments are taking place in China's domestic life. But these are so complicated and contradictory that it is too early to provide any kind of realistic appraisal of them. He spoke briefly about Vietnam, underlining the importance of implementing the Paris Agreement. Finally, Comrade Brezhnev stressed that the unchanging guarantee of our further international success is reinforcement of the unity and common purpose of our socialist community and the coordination of our policies.

At the last meeting in the Crimea, there was an appraisal that conditions for a new meeting of the communist and workers parties are ripening. Since then, the idea has taken root internationally. Twenty-six fraternal parties -- that is, the vast majority of the European fraternal parties -- have taken a stand in favor of a meeting of the European communist and fraternal parties. The time has come for us to begin practical preparations for a meeting of the European communist parties. Several fraternal parties believe that the conference can be held as early as 1975.

The convocation of a world conference of the communist and workers parties is also becoming timely. There are 58 fraternal parties that already support the idea of an international meeting. Its convocation is not yet on the agenda, but we must gradually think about its aims, tasks and ways of preparing for it.

Comrade Erich Honecker, following our common line in every respect spoke, about a broad range of issues in international politics. In his speech, it was noteworthy that he criticized the stance Romania has taken at the security conference and at the disarmament talks in Vienna.

Comrade Honecker said verbatim: "I would like to ask the Romanian comrades – taking into account the necessary interests of solidarity among our countries – to desist from steps in the future that are not in line with our common position regarding important questions. It is no secret that the proposals of the Romanian Socialist Republic regarding the issue of so-called confidence-building measures and renunciation of force are in tune with the intentions of the NATO countries, which are directed toward complicating and drawing out the talks."

Comrade Zhivkov's speech contained no new elements. He referred to the fact that the anniversary session of the Comecon will be held in Sofia this year, and in keeping with Comrade Brezhnev, he recommended that the prime ministers determine the range of tasks to be addressed.

Comrade Ceaușescu's speech was delivered with a more positive attitude than previously, although he followed the well-known Romanian position. He praised the Soviet Union's outstanding role in the international arena, but he also gave a positive assessment of China's role as a vast socialist country.

He reacted to Comrade Honecker's critical remarks by emphasizing that the Romanians acted in accordance with the jointly-approved documents when it made its recommendations in Geneva and Vienna. The German comrades are inadmissibly interfering in Romania's internal affairs, and this method is not conducive to a spirit of cooperation and understanding. The only thing, Comrade Ceaușescu said, that prevents him from providing a more resolute answer to the German comrades is his profound respect for the party of Thalmann and Pieck.

For the sake of more regular consultations within the Warsaw Treaty, he stated that the leadership of the RCP – having deliberated on the question – considers it expedient to establish a consultative committee of foreign ministers. The committee of foreign ministers could sit two or three times a year. Basically, the Romanians accepted our earlier proposal.

In connection with the international meeting of the communist and workers parties, Comrade Ceaușescu explained that they agree with the idea in principle, but their party organs have not yet dealt with the question; thus, they don't have an official standpoint yet. The aims for convening meetings of the communist parties must be

clarified, as well as how they are prepared. Preparation of the international meeting must contribute to the consolidation of the unity of all fraternal parties. If the convocation and preparation proceeds in this spirit, the RCP will pass a resolution in due course supporting these aspirations.

He supported Comrade Brezhnev's proposal that the prime ministers discuss economic cooperation with the participation of the CC secretaries. Moreover, he stressed that bilateral meetings of the first secretaries are also necessary regarding economic cooperation. (It is likely that he wants to use this as a pretext to meet with the first secretaries who have refused to meet him bilaterally).

Comrade Edward Gierek, like Comrade Honecker, deplored the fact that the Romanian proposals at the disarmament talks in Vienna differed from the common position.

He expressed his thanks to our party and government for the close cooperation of the Polish and Hungarian sections of the International Control Commission for Vietnam. Just like Comrade Brezhnev, he especially praised the meetings in Moscow of the CC secretaries for ideology and party organization of the fraternal socialist countries.

The Polish fraternal party, he emphasized, firmly supports the convocation of a new meeting of the European communist and workers parties. It also considers it necessary to gradually prepare the world meeting of the communist parties.

Comrade Gustav Husak's speech did not contain any new elements. He dealt in detail with the normalization of Czechoslovak-West German relations and repeatedly thanked the Soviet Union for its support and Hungary and Bulgaria for their internationalist solidarity.

III.

With regard to the second question on the agenda, only Comrades Gierek, Brezhnev and Honecker delivered brief speeches. In keeping with the draft proposal put forward by the GDR's delegation, Comrade Gierek recommended that the Unified Secretariat, established by the current PCC meeting with the general secretary at its head, should work out an appropriate draft document and recommendations in preparation for the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty's defense organization and that this should be put before the Central Committees of the fraternal parties for approval. The anniversary meeting should be held in May 1975, and the venue should be Warsaw since the treaty was born there and Warsaw lent its name to it.

Comrade Brezhnev recommended that at the 20th anniversary meeting of the signing of the Warsaw Treaty, a declaration should be worked out on the political and military role of the defensive organization, emphasizing that in the traditional sense the

Warsaw Treaty is not simply a military-political grouping but also a fraternal alliance of socialist countries. Drafting such a political declaration would have political significance.

Comrade Ceaușescu stated that from a political and propaganda standpoint, it would be very positive if at the 20th anniversary [meeting] we renewed our proposal regarding the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. In contrast, others, taking the present situation into account, emphasized the defensive nature of the Treaty.

The Unified Secretariat held its first meeting regarding preparations for the 20th anniversary; they agreed that the member-states would send their proposals and ideas to the Polish comrades by July 1.

IV.

On April 17, there was a separate meeting between Comrades Leonid Brezhnev and János Kádár that lasted almost two hours. They briefly reviewed some contemporary international questions. We underlined one concrete question from the conversation, regarding bilateral cooperation:

Answering L. I. Brezhnev's question, Comrade János Kádár told him that we would like to have the visit of our party and government delegation in September. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev agreed.

At the Polish comrades' initiative, on May 18 [sic], there was also a bilateral meeting between Comrades János Kádár and Jenő Fock on one hand and Comrades Edward Gierek and Piotr Jaroszewicz on the other. During the friendly conversation, they briefly informed each other about the domestic situation and exchanged views on some international matters. Regarding our bilateral relations, they underlined that the most important task in terms of deepening economic cooperation is the practical implementation of the proposals approved at last year's meeting of party and governmental leaders and in the prime ministers' discussion.

Brief communiqués on both meetings were published in the press following both meetings.

Draft Resolution

1. The Council of Ministers approves the report of the party and government delegation.
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should implement the concrete tasks in the report that require action.

The report was approved by: János Kádár, Jenő Fock

The report was prepared by: Mátyás Szűrös

[Translation by László Borhi]