
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FOREWORD

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UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2 USAREUR/CENTAG PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT (3-58)

OI OCTOBER 1958

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UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2 OI OCTOBER 1958

PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 3 - 58

Period Covered 01 July - 30 September 1958

Maps: 1/250,000

This publication will be regraded CONFIDENTIAL on 01 October 1961.

1. (SECRET) General Soviet/Satellite Situation

The period 1 July through 30 September 1958, was of interest principally as an advanced training phase for Soviet Bloc forces. That this training activity in peripheral areas to the Middle East also served as a hostile threat to the Free World during the political crisis in Lebanon illustrates a Soviet capability to exert substantial military pressure to augment their "cold war" offensives. This pressure, derived from the numerically superior Soviet military establishment, illustrates a basic advantage in the Soviet objective to maintain their forces in a high state of combat readiness, advanced technological posture and strength (albeit at the expense of internal economic considerations). The Soviet "sabre rattling" was confined to the Bulgarian - Turkish border area and the Transcaucasus Military District where extensive maneuver activity took place coincident with United States assistance to the Chamoun government. Elsewhere throughout the Soviet Bloc, there was little reflection of unusual military activity in response to the Mid-East "crisis."

The overall posture of the Soviet Bloc remained essentially unchanged despite such events as the Middle East and Taiwan Straits crises. Internally, the Soviet Union continued to press forward with the program of long range economic rationalization sponsored by Khrushchev, whose predominant position within the Soviet hierarchy remained unchallenged. Intra-Bloc economic integration continued to be pushed but with little prospect of any meaningful success in the near future. With the Yugoslav heresy successfully condemned, intra-Bloc relations have become stabilized; pressure on Poland appears to have subsided. Stability within Bloc countries is threatened only in Poland and East Germany where, in the former, a Church-State conflict of interest, and, in the latter, the continuing defection of large numbers of the population, have created ticklish and potentially explosive situations. In neither case, however, is significant violence expected. Externally the Soviets, followed without exception by the Satellites, have maintained, in Europe, the pressure for "coexistence" which has characterized past Soviet efforts to split the Western Alliance, create optimum conditions for the exercise of Soviet conventional arms, and shift the balance of power in their favor.

- 2. (SECRET) Soviet/Satellite Activities During the Period
 - a. Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG)
- exercises, with the annual fall maneuvers underway as the period ended. In the early part of the quarter, three major CPX's were conducted under GSFG control one in the

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northern and one in the southern part of East Germany, and the third, which was somewhat smaller, in the Jueterbog area. These were conducted during the initial reinforced regimental exercise phase of troop training and undoubtedly were used to test staff procedures prior to the fall maneuvers.

The most noteworthy activity that took place in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany during the quarter was the start of the annual fall maneuvers. The first major force to participate was the Twentieth Guards Army. The 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, elements of the 1st Motorized Pifle Division, plus army support units, maneuvered in the Letzlinger/Heide - Altengrabow area from 12 ~ 16 September.

This activity was followed by a possible maneuver in the Second Guards Tank Army from 15 to 19 September, and a confirmed maneuver by two divisions of the Third Guards Army (7th Guards Tank and 14th Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions) and the 6th Guards Tank Division in the Welzow - Jueterbog - Altengrabow areas from 22 to 26 September. Maneuvers by the remainder of the GSFG line divisions are expected to follow in the immediate future, with these activities being completed by late October.

There have been no new tactical concepts observed during the maneuvers thus far. Flexibility of command continues to receive a high degree of emphasis, as evidenced by the attachment of regimental sized elements to other line divisions. Dispersion, advance on a wide front, and rapid deployment of forces also appear as training aims. In addition to the emphasis on flexibility of command, a new thoroughness in training was noted throughout GSFG. Training at lower echelons progressed more slowly than in the past, and even at the conclusion of division level exercises and maneuvers, a reversion to regimental training was observed. These activities indicated action was being taken to correct deficiencies noted during these exercises and maneuvers, and reflects a more stringent training policy than that observed heretofore. This, in turn, suggests an increasing operational capability and portends an increased range of training activity.

Toward the end of September, preparations were noted for the annual troop rotation program, and the first shipments took place on 26 September. (See ANNEX 20, Logistics).

b. Northern Group of Forces (NGF)

Normal summer factical training constituted the only discernible activity in NGF during the period. There has been no indication that maneuvers above division level have been held, either within NGF or jointly with the Polish Army.

c. Soviet Forces Hungary (SFH)

Troop training in SFH continued to follow a normal pattern and progressed during the period from regimental training to division level exercises. There have been indications that a FTX was held involving two or three divisions, but few details are known.

The second reduction of SFH has also been completed during the quarter with the return of an unidentified motorized rifle division from the Esztergom - Budapest - Aszod area to the Carpathian Military District of the USS1. Although nominally only one division was withdrawn, elements of several divisions and service-support troops were re-shuffled and amalgamated to form the departing unit. The total troop loss is estimated at approximately 15,000, plus 2,500 security forces. The Soviets apparently are confident that the internal situation in Hungary has achieved a level of stability which permitted the

further withdrawal of troops. There is little risk to the Soviets, however, since the division is in a position to re-enter Hungary quickly in the event of further disorders. Furthermore, there are considerably more Soviet troops remaining in Hungary than prior to the 1956 uprisings and the ruthless determination of the Soviets to suppress any opposition to the Satellite regime has been convincingly demonstrated to the Hungarian people.

d. USSR

Unusually early inductions took place in the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts during July, which appeared to be more than the normal summer induction of previously deferred personnel and of reservists on short active duty tours. This action may have been taken to use these recruits as troop labor to assist in the grain harvest, necessitated by manpower shortages. The regular draft order for normal induction, however, was not issued by the Soviet government until early September.

Continuing sightings of tanks in the Baltic Military District increases the speculation that some of these divisions have been converted to motorized rifle or tank divisions, and at least two regimental size kasernes of armored troops have been repeatedly observed in the Riga - Dobele area.

Maneuvers were held in June, on the Karelian Isthmus, Leningrad Military District, and in the Turkmen and Transcaucasus regions, in July - August. A later maneuver was held during September, in the Turkmen Military District.

Two newly identified airborne regiments are now accepted in the Kaunas - Mariyampole area. Paratroopers were reported to be concentrating in the Odessa Military District during July, at the time Soviet border demonstrations were associated with the Mid-East crisis, and Soviet - Bulgarian air maneuvers were underway in Bulgaria.

e. Soviet Forces Rumania

The complete withdrawal of Soviet Army and Air Force elements from Rumania has been confirmed. The Independent Mechanized Army, consisting of the 22d Antiaircraft Artillery Division and the 25th and 32d Guards Mechanized Divisions, has been dropped from USAREUR Order of Battle holdings in Rumania. These units are now carried as unlocated in the Western USSR.

f. East German Army (EGA)

During the past three months, the East German Army has been involved in training activities which progressed to reinforced regimental level. By mid-September this phase of training had been completed. There are indications that East German Army elements were involved in the GSFG exercises in the Templin - Gross Schoenebeck area during 13 - 19 September, and in the Welzow - Jueterbog - Altengrabow area during 22 - 26 September. Participation by East German units in later maneuvers is anticipated.

After the fall maneuver period, the East German Army is expected to conduct refresher type training through the month of October, and maintenance of equipment and kasernes for the remainder of an training year.

g. Polish National Army (PNA)

Intensive training continued throughout most of the period, and in September, divisions completed intra-divisional field training and returned to their home kasernes, where the civil populace was turned out to welcome them.

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A further indication of the reorganization and modernization of the PNA was the conversion of the 19th Mechanized Division to the 5th Tank Division which changed line division totals to two tank, seven mechanized, and five infantry.

Modern equipment continued to appear in public displays and parades (e.g., the newest T-54 tanks, amphibious tanks and carriers, and helicopters), although it is not believed to be available in quantity in tactical units. In the past year, the Polish Army has unquestionably shown greater improvement than any other Satellite army.

h, Czechoslovakian Peoplets Army (CPA)

During July and August, emphasis was placed on field training in the major training areas. Czech Army units apparently completed summer training by the latter part of August, following which, some units were observed in home stations, while, as in previous years, others appeared to be assisting farmers with the harvest. The Czech Army probably will follow the training pattern of previous years, progressing to divisional level exercises during October. (This probability is supported by indications that the call-up of reserves has taken place.) These reserves will bring divisions up to strength levels necessary for division field exercises during which time the Czechoslovak Army attains its highest state of combat readiness.

Colonel General Vaclav Kratochvil has been removed as Army Chief of Staff, a position he had held since February 1952, and appointed Commandant of the Antonin Zapotocky Military Academy at Brno. General Kratochvic's assignment, although of lesser importance, reveals that the regime has confidence in his military ability and that he is considered politically reliable.

The new Chief of Staff is Lt General Otakar Rytir, a graduate of the Czech Military Academy, Class of 1937. During 1946 - 1947, he attended the Voroshilov Academy (Moscow) and upon his return was attached to the War College in Prague as an instructor. Following this assignment, he was named as Commander of the First Military District and later as a Deputy Minister of Defense.

i. Hungarian People's Army (HPA)

The reconstruction of the Hungarian People's Army continues, although progress toward development of an effective combat force is very slow. Efforts to provide a Soviet trained and thoroughly indoctrinated officer corps are evidenced by reports that the major portion of the third year class at the Kossuth Academy (Artillery School) has been sent to the USSR for a year of training. Conscription apparently will follow the previously observed pattern since the annual draft notices were posted in mid-August, as is the normal practice.

Troop training continues, primarily at small unit level in local areas, although signal equipment, observed recently with Hungarian troops, is indicative of an advanced training capability, possibly of division CPX level.

j. Rumanian Army

Although Warsaw Pact members announced in May 1958, that Rumania would reduce her armed forces by 55,000 men, there is only slight evidence that such a reduction has been implemented. Rumanian officer releases, reported during the period, are undoubtedly a part of the announced reduction and probably reflect the elimination of incompetent and politically unreliable elements. In view of the Soviet troop withdrawal, we anticipate continued, but unsuccessful efforts to align the Rumanian military forces with the Warsaw Pact concept.

k. Bulgarian Army

During the period 18 July to early August 1958, four unidentified infantry divisions and two tank brigades participated in a joint maneuver with Soviet air units in the Sliven-Yambol-Khaskove-Plovdiv-Stara Zagora area. From the beginning, this maneuver appeared to be poorly planned and disorganized, and was probably initiated on a crash basis because of the critical situation in the mid-east at that time.

1. Albanian Army

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Field tactical training up to battalion level was conducted during the early summer, with one small maneuver reported in the Lake Shkoder area in June. The Soviet military mission has been reduced to about 300.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Other Intelligence Factors

Developments of significance during the third quarter of 1958 included:

- a. East German retreat from Party Congress "hard line" policy in the face of exodus of physicians, teachers and students.
- b. Relaxation of Soviet pressure against Gomulka follows sharp Polish government Church encounter.
 - c. Rumanian regime instituted a new series of repressive measures.

(See Annexes 18 - 23 for a complete appraisal of above activity.)

4. (SECRET) Counterintelligence

The most important trend evidenced during the reporting period concerns an apparent change in collection emphasis of the non-German Satellite intelligence services. Satellite country emphasis on positive collection has been particularly apparent in relation to attempts to gather information on advanced weapons, pentomic reorganizations and emergency movement of USAREUR forces.

Most Soviet cases reported during the past quarter involved military intelligence (RU) operations against USAREUR/CENTAG Order of Battle, again with emphasis on advanced weapon units.

(See ANNEX 24, page 71, for a complete appraisal of the past quarter's counterintelligence activity.)

5. (SECRET) Soviet/Satellite Capabilities

Soviet efforts during the past quarter were emphasized by continued progress toward increasing the operational capabilities of both their national and Satellite forces. Training reached a uniformly high level and the re-equipment of ground forces with more modern material was evidenced generally throughout the forces in the forward area.

During the next quarter (1 October - 31 December 1958), the Group Soviet Forces, Germany will attain their optimum combat capability and offensive posture for an attack with a minimum period of warning for NATO forces. Culmination of

recent intensive training, followed by the fall maneuvers, the location of tactical units in forward training areas, and the considerable troop movements associated with training activities during this particular time of year, will provide the GSFG their most favorable conditions for combat employment.

It is during this next quarter also, commencing on or about 15 November 1958, that the GSFG is reduced to its minimum yearly training and offensive posture. It is following this approximate 15 November date that one-third of the seasoned, trained troops of the present GSFG troop establishment have been returned to the USSR and recruit personnel are in the line units. This troop rotation, while enabling two-thirds of a unit to be comprised of trained personnel at all times, reduces the GSFG offensive capability to the lowest level of the training year.

Soviet efforts appear to represent a phased progression in military improvement rather than preparations for hostilities in the near future.

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