

**Speech by the President of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, M. S. Gorbachev (Moscow, 7 June 1990)**

Once again, I would like to convey my greetings to the heads of state and government and all the members of the delegations of the Warsaw Treaty member-states who have come to this meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. Today's meeting is unusual in many respects. We are meeting in this configuration for the first time and, most importantly, we are meeting at a time of upheaval in European history. The postwar period will soon belong to the past and a new era is coming of age, an era that will shape the countenance of our continent possibly for many decades.

Some of the contours of the emerging new Europe are already visible, but much is still hidden by the veil of time. In our view, an important task of this meeting will be to make a common effort to shed light on the situation that has arisen on our continent, identify areas of common interest more precisely and, on this basis, attempt to coordinate our main goals and concerns for the future.

On this basis, I would like to address three matters.

The first is our assessment of the current situation in Europe and the changes that will result from this in terms of ensuring the security of our allied countries. Second, I would like to present some thoughts on how we see the prospects for the Warsaw Treaty itself and its military organization in the context of the enormous social and political transformations that are taking place on our continent and in the world. And third, I would like to acquaint you with the views of the Soviet leadership on the future of the USSR's relations with its friends and neighboring states that are present here today.

Finally, I consider it to be my duty to inform the leading representatives of our allied countries about the negotiations that have been conducted in Canada and the United States of America.

The second half of last year and the first half of this year were marked by enormous changes, which have affected the entire region of Eastern Europe. Recently, Yugoslavia and Albania have also been affected.

The scope of these changes is probably comparable with those that marked the first postwar years in European history. The influence of the Soviet transformation on the far-reaching social processes that led to such radical and precipitous changes is generally

recognized. The Soviet Union is currently undergoing a very significant phase in its development, and the processes underway in the areas of the economy, politics and the transformation of the Federation have, I would say, reached a critical point.

Whereas the past years were a time of analysis, of gathering knowledge during the first steps of *perestroika* and of giving shape to the policy of restructuring itself, we are now, based on what was done during these years, moving forward on the broad path of direct transformations in all these areas.

When we speak of the political process and of directing society, we are decisively breaking with the administrative system of command that had seized control over all areas of people's lives. On the basis of the principles of democratization and decentralization, on the basis of the principles of diversity and political pluralism, we are finding solutions to new problems and making the transition to forms of life in our society. As you know, since a few days ago, fundamental questions are being discussed in connection with the restructuring of the economic sphere. It is a vehement discussion, which is understandable, since, after all, it is a matter of making a choice now that will determine the face of our society for decades to come.

We believe that what we are doing is in keeping with the goals of *perestroika*: we want to humanize our society and develop it according to the real interests of the people; we want to democratize our society, and through a new type of political process, *glasnost*, we want to involve the workers, the people, as the most important protagonists in all of this. And finally, through significant economic reform and economic diversity, we want to unleash people's initiative, create effective stimuli for labor and economic development, and achieve a new level of productivity, new results, which will create the economic opportunities for solving the social and cultural problems associated with the renewal of our society.

In the coming months, what happens to us will be decided. We are resolved not to swerve from our chosen path, despite all difficulties, even though advancing further has now clearly become difficult. We can no longer postpone finding a solution to many of our problems. For if we depart from one system and still have not found new ways of living, we are submitting society to a certain destabilization. This is clear. There is no such thing as doing things a certain way one day and waking up to totally different ways of doing things the next – directing things in a different way, thinking differently, living differently. There must be a process, a period of transition.

We see how painful this is, to what extent this is affecting society, and have therefore decided to compress this period of transition. All processes of restructuring in terms of policy, all processes of transformation are to be accelerated. It is probably no great exaggeration if I say that here, in the Soviet Union, much is being decided today about how the situation in Europe and the world will look in the future. We understand this, and are therefore striving to take account of this in our actions, to realize the goals we have set for ourselves, to implement *perestroika* resolutely and energetically and, at the same time, in a balanced manner. Still, tense situations will be unavoidable.

It is also clear that in every one of the countries represented here, processes have been and are underway that on the whole, as we think, see and assess, have their own inimitable national nuances and, it seems to us, are leading to very diverse results.

We have said goodbye to the model that led our countries and people into a dead end and, on the basis of a sovereign choice made by each country, we have entered a new path of development. In the future, too, we will clearly be dealing with many different ways of coping with change and organizing economic, social and political life. The only thing that can probably be said with certainty is that the main vector in all of these changes, these far-reaching changes, is democratization, leading to a significant rearrangement of social and political forces, the emergence of new social structures and the implementation of new political regimes. Each country will undertake its own assessment of the changes that have been made, which will be characterized as revolutionary, as restructuring, or in other terms. These questions concern not only policy but also theory. But this is probably neither the time nor the place to discuss these questions.

During this meeting, we should, of course, concentrate on the following problem: What main changes, in terms of ensuring the security of our allied states, have resulted from the social and political transformations that have taken place? I would like to begin with a declaration in order to dispel any doubt among the leading representatives of the allied states. We respect the will of our neighboring countries, and we sincerely welcome the generally positive direction of the changes that have taken place. They are, for the most part, proceeding in a democratic and civilized manner, and we are not of the opinion that these changes are detrimental to fundamental Soviet interests. On the contrary, the true interests of the Soviet state consist in definitively overcoming the division of this continent and integrating ourselves into a unified Europe, together with our allies. This is actually one of the main goals of *perestroika* from an international perspective.

The fact that changes of this order require a sufficiently careful approach, so that possible negative consequences that could arise in addition to the wonderful opportunities they open up are not ignored, is a different matter.

We do not, in any case, wish to dramatize the situation. Currently, both in our part and in the Western part of our continent, reasonable and realistic voices and the desire to ensure a smooth transition from one state of the European commonwealth to another are predominant.

However, a responsible politician simply does not have the right to overlook the fact that already, nationalist emotions and political ambitions are giving rise to centers of unrest. Although the volume is not yet particularly high, all sorts of people who like to fish in muddy waters are raising their voices.

We must be prepared for all eventualities, for the price of the decisions to be made now is too high. If we make a mistake – I am referring not only to the leading representatives present here but also to our Western partners – then it will not be possible to correct them [sic] later on. I would like to tell you right now that the topic of the restructuring of Europe, the renewal of Europe was a central topic of my talks with the President of the United States of America. These matters certainly were given a central place, in addition to questions of disarmament and the future treaty on a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons.

Despite the positive attitude of our Western partners toward what is happening, and despite everything that one can say, without exaggeration, about their desire to contribute to the renewal of Europe, they still do not always stick to the fundamental approach that we have been so constantly demonstrating in recent years, not only in our statements but also in our actual policy. I am referring to the right of every nation to exercise its freedom of choice, and the inadmissibility of any interference in the affairs of others. We observe that, at this stage of change in Eastern Europe, our Western partners, although, I repeat, their general approach is positive and responsible, are nevertheless attempting to fish in troubled waters. I think that we must not ignore this, and did I not avoid this question in my talks with President Bush.

I will repeat what I have already said in Bonn, Paris and London: Europe has now entered a stage in its development that must be managed responsibly. Significant restructuring, a realignment of forces is taking place. New processes of integration are unfolding, not only within the framework of Western Europe but also on the European continent as a whole. In the years to come they will surely gain in strength. This requires that all of us

proceed particularly responsibly, so that the balance of interests is not destroyed by careless action and the positive processes leading to a strengthening of security are not undermined and endangered.

In a word, “God helps those who help themselves,” as the Russian proverb goes. We are open to cooperation, and all of us have already clearly demonstrated together our ability to act in the spirit of this very policy; we are turning our face towards the whole of Europe, towards the whole world, and this promises, overall, to bring significant, positive changes both to Europe and to the world; a historical process is thus unfolding, and euphoria and a frivolous approach are of course inadmissible here; we, in any case, are constantly keeping this in mind and are also trying to act accordingly.

There is a question that merits particular attention already now, it seems to me, within the framework of the discussion and analysis of the changes in Europe. I mean the question of Germany’s unification. I am certain that I am not telling you anything new when I repeat: We are absolutely in favor of the Germans deciding their future for themselves. This great people, which has made an enormous contribution to the development of civilization, possesses, as does every other people as well, the holy right to decide its fate independently. The Germans, both in the FRG and the GDR, have during all of the postwar years proven with their policy that they are ready (and they are acting accordingly) to cooperate with all European nations and to make their unique contribution to the shaping of Europe and the strengthening of international relations in the world. The slogan that was voiced by the FRG and also the GDR, that never again a threat for other nations should arise from German soil, continues to determine the policies of both these states in this crucial phase. We have no intention of misusing our right as a victor in the Second World War or perpetuating it. The settlement of the external conditions for Germany’s unification opens up real possibilities for the abolition of this right. But precisely in order to make this possible, it is necessary to firmly ground the supporting pillars of the postwar world, and above all to exclude any aggressive attempt to forcefully change the borders in Europe or anywhere else. The new Germany is arising within the borders of the GDR and the FRG, and must not raise any territorial claims against anyone.

Its creation must envision a responsible balance of interests, and a status for Germany that programs it for playing a peace-promoting role in Europe.

Germany’s unification, I assume this is clear for everyone, can either become a catalyst for the creation of a new Europe or open a “Pandora’s box” on the way to this goal. We have already expressed our views on this several times.

It is in the interest of all European nations and of Germany itself, that it does not link its future to a bloc structure, but instead, that it firmly anchors itself equally in the West and in the East of Europe and becomes a reliable partner for all Europeans without exception. It must be achieved that German soil ceases to be the place of an unprecedented concentration of the most modern armed forces and weapons. Clearly, an upper limit for the German army is required; it is necessary to ensure that its structure makes it incapable of attack and that the number of foreign troops in Germany is reduced in preparation for their complete withdrawal. In short, in solving this major political problem, we must see to it that a stable foundation for a peaceful future is laid from the beginning. I believe our German colleagues are also interested in protecting themselves from future surprises.

I encountered a similar approach during my most recent talks with the Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney and President Bush. I think they are also concerned about this: that there should be no surprises in solving the problems for the settlement of the external conditions for Germany's unification. I presented the question to President Bush as follows: further progress in Europe as a whole must be linked to a just settlement concerning the external conditions for Germany's unification. And this must be done in such a way that the strong and highly promising impetus towards restructuring all of European life on a new basis is not lost. We are not insisting that this must happen based on the version of the Soviet Union, or the Romanian version or a Hungarian or German or American version; we are saying that what is necessary is a version that is acceptable to all, that proceeds at a measured pace and in synchronicity with the European processes. Later, after we have gone through a period of transition, we will set up new structures for European relations, including in the area of security. A version is needed that ensures, on the basis of an exchange of views and a careful consideration of all factors, that the far-reaching changes on this continent and the profound process of integration can take place, which ultimately should lead us to a common European home and allow us to avoid everything that breeds mistrust and instability and thereby calls into question the positive process unfolding in Europe. That is everything, actually. Whose version will it be? The best would be a common version, which takes account of and includes the considerations of all interested States. And I do not only mean "2+4", I mean all neighbors of unified Germany and all Europeans, for this affects all of Europe. And if one takes into account that all that is happening in Europe has an enormous impact on the processes in the whole world, then fundamentally this is about where the world is heading. Clearly it must not be permitted that these processes be undermined or obstacles placed in their path.

Instead of insisting upon the membership of the future unified Germany in NATO, I told President Bush, let us rather think about how the politico-military blocs that still divide

Europe can be brought closer together. We would welcome changes in the military doctrine of NATO already at the next meeting of this bloc. This, incidentally, is a topic that I would like to outline at least very briefly. It seems to me that our Western partners, even only with difficulty, are nevertheless beginning to disengage themselves from the approach according to which it is only we, in Eastern Europe, who should change, and I mean change in such a way that we imitate their values, their forms of life and their models. That is a kind of presumption that is not in keeping with the new philosophy on the basis of which we are developing our new policy, our new thinking. At the same time, the fact that NATO intends to convene shortly and discuss questions of doctrine and of changing the structure and organization of this politico-military group testifies to the fact that in the West, too – even if belatedly and with delays – changes are underway.

If these changes were to become reality, then this would provide the framework for resolving the problem of unified Germany's security in a new manner. Let us say, on the basis of two pillars – the West and the East. As a preliminary consideration, one could think of some form of associate membership in the two blocs, as long as they exist.

Such a dual membership could become a binding element, a kind of precursor of new European structures. We are moving towards new European structures, a new common security system, which is based on a unified structure.

A unified Germany could declare that during a transition period all of its obligations inherited from the FRG and the GDR would be respected, that the *Bundeswehr* would continue to be subsumed under NATO and the armed forces of the GDR under the government of the new Germany. At the same time, Soviet troops would stay on the territory of what today is the GDR. And all of this could be complemented by an agreement between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, by a special agreement on this question. In this way, we would dispel the worries of many countries and stimulate the creation of future structures of European security.

The Americans are extremely worried about the self-esteem of a unified Germany, in relation to which they also measure the health of NATO. They are so worried about this that it makes them forget the self-esteem and the interests of the Soviet Union. And that serves neither stability nor predictability.

If, at any point in the transition period, the USA would get the feeling that the Soviet Union was trying to encroach upon its interests, Washington would be given the unconditional right to withdraw from this agreement and take corresponding unilateral measures.

On the other hand, one must see clearly that, if we, the Soviet people, get the impression that we are not being taken seriously with regard to the German question, then all of the positive processes in Europe, including the negotiations in Vienna, would become endangered. In Washington we said, and I would like to repeat it here, that this is no bluff. Our people quite simply are forcing us to hold back and look around. I think that they will be proved right. No government in the Soviet Union, no matter what its composition, could act differently.

I believe that the most important reason why the USA is worried consists in the fact that it considers its military presence in Europe to be a factor for stability that it wishes to maintain. And I told Bush that I also consider the American presence in Europe to be necessary. Europe is a natural center of world politics. And if shifts were permitted here, these would affect the whole world. Soviet-American cooperation is one of the pillars supporting the European political space. Therefore, we are in favor of an American presence in Europe. And that is not just a political game, it is simply reality.

A different approach, an approach that would create difficulties for America, would give rise to processes that would have negative consequences for all concerned. But we expect that the Americans, for their part as well, view the participation of other countries and, of course, the Soviet Union, in the same manner. However, we would consider it to be a serious miscalculation if the American presence were exclusively linked to NATO and if the withdrawal of the FRG or a unified Germany from NATO were to mean the beginning of the end of the American military presence on the continent. This is the crux of the matter, as I was able to verify for myself in quite extensive discussions with the President.

We are not in agreement with its reasoning, but we understand the USA's concern. Especially given today's realities.

Now, let us move on to the question of what we understand in terms of a final settlement of the problems with regard to Germany. We are being asked: is a unified document really necessary? Perhaps individual agreements on various levels would be preferable? Of course, the settlement of the external aspects of the unification will consist in a number of agreements on individual concrete issues. However, if this is not bound up in a common package, subject to approval by the entire European community, there will be no guarantees of strict adherence to it as a complex whole.

We are in favor of a settlement that includes all foreign policy aspects of German unification – the borders of Germany, provisions regarding its armed forces and foreign troops on its territory, confirmation of the commitment not to possess weapons of mass destruction and a prohibition against a renaissance of revanchist ideologies. If these agreements are adopted by all the states participating in the CSCE, they would form a comprehensive package for a final settlement under international law.

In a word, it is important that the process of merging the FRG and the GDR not become a bone of contention but rather serve as a sort of precursor for a peaceful unification of Germany. The solution of this problem is no utopia; the political conditions and a basis for negotiations exist. We are going into the second meeting of the foreign ministers of the “group of six” in Berlin, conscious of our great responsibility for the security of the Soviet Union and all the allied countries, and we will also continue to consult with you and jointly seek solutions that strengthen peace and stability in Europe.

Obviously, I have additional material here, which was used in Washington, and I would like to use some of it to explain in more detail how things stand in terms of the different models of relations that already exist in NATO today. I would like to remind you that within the NATO bloc itself, there are at least five or six different types of membership. There is the French model; the Danish-Norwegian model, which excludes the stationing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons in peacetime; the British model of participating in the military organization without placing Great Britain’s nuclear forces under the Supreme Unified Command; the West German model of full integration with renunciation of a supreme national command – with extremely strict limitations on sovereignty, especially with regard to the use of its airspace – the American model, and others. Thus, the search for new models within the framework of the considerations about which I spoke is not just idle imagination; it is quite normal. Reality is changing, the context is changing, and the approaches can change as well. Not only can we act effectively within the framework of such a context, it is precisely what we must do.

On the Vienna negotiations. The things that are happening and developing in Vienna will be of enormous significance for building a new Europe. And all of us have an interest in the success of the Vienna negotiations. The contours of future agreements are becoming visible, which will be concluded already this year. But by far not all points of contention have been cleared up.

Evidently, closer mutual cooperation between the representatives of all of our states could also make it easier to reach mutually acceptable agreements in the negotiations.

It is important to give more substantial consideration to mutual interests and the possibilities open to each side, including the fact that the Soviet Union carries the brunt of the burden of reductions and troop withdrawals. The extent of the steps that we can take is also objectively determined by the demands of sufficient defense and factors such as finances, construction projects and the social and ecological side of the matter.

It is advisable to view the so-called “ongoing” disarmament issues from a broader, more conceptual perspective in connection with the political reconstruction of Europe. After all, the Vienna negotiations were conceived on the basis of a political and military situation different from today’s. It might be useful in this connection to ask our military people and diplomats to get together to specify their positions in the Vienna negotiations and, where necessary, to correct them. Also on the creation of a really permanent system of collective security on the continent, and the elimination of the confrontation between the military blocs. In this connection it is also worth discussing the question of the Warsaw Treaty, which is point two on the agenda.

To what extent are the structures and forms of our alliance appropriate to current challenges, and in what sense should they be restructured? Perhaps it is time to unilaterally declare the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty, or at least of its military organization, altogether. These are questions for which we must find answers or about which we should at least exchange views.

I will tell you right away: for us, the Warsaw Treaty is not an end in itself. Nevertheless, we still consider it today to be a significant, primarily political factor, which contributes to continued equilibrium and stability in Europe and thereby serves the most urgent security interests of the treaty’s member-states.

In a word, we have entered a transition period – in and of itself a difficult situation. It could become even more complicated, if the rate of restructuring increases and the existing supports for the security equilibrium become hollowed out before we succeed in setting up new ones. We are convinced that if the Warsaw Treaty is restructured and adapted to the new realities, it can act as an additional safeguard and as an instrument for a smoother and more peaceful transition to a new, all-European security system. Despite all the allergic reactions to this alliance inherited from the past, there is also understanding in the West for its role as a certain stabilizer of the situation. Both President Bush and Foreign Minister Baker base all of their talks with us on the assumption that the Warsaw Treaty exists and will be present in the European process at least during the transition period. It is not as though they were particularly enthusiastic about the Warsaw Treaty. If one wants to be a realist in politics, one simply has to come

to this understanding in one way or another. The self-elimination of the Warsaw Treaty from the European stage would not make the all-European process any easier; on the contrary, it would make it many times more difficult. Especially with regard to the core aspects of security and disarmament. After all, as we all know, all agreements in the negotiations on conventional weapons and on confidence-building measures, their mandates and conception, are based on the premise of the existence of two politico-military alliances and their military organizations in Europe. A precipitate elimination of the Warsaw Treaty would also make the process of arms control and disarmament more difficult. It is without a doubt easier to maintain such control on a multilateral basis. I repeat, the activity of the Warsaw Treaty in its entirety is in need of serious reform. What approaches are possible here? What are our ideas on this? For a variety of reasons, the Treaty cannot in the new situation be an alliance of the ruling parties, as it was sometimes called, although the congruent national and state interests remain a real basis for collaboration. Our alliance could take a useful initiative in working out and coming to an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures on the continent as well as in such a difficult matter as the conversion of the armaments industry, where the mutual dependence of our countries can be felt particularly strongly. The development of concrete, agreed recommendations concerning the Warsaw Treaty's modernization could surely be undertaken by a group of experts under the leadership of the future General Secretary of the Political Consultative Committee, the representative of the ČSFR.

Ultimately, the Warsaw Treaty and also NATO are likely to be absorbed into an all-European security system. How do we imagine such a prospect?

One possible way would be through contacts, mutually approaching one another and transforming both NATO and the WTO, creating intra-bloc bodies, developing relations between the General Staff and the Defense Ministers of all the participating European countries, the USA and Canada. One could propose a dialogue on problems of the confrontation of the military doctrines, the joint development of concepts of coordinated action for the maintenance of peace in different regions and in Europe as a whole, assistance in dealing with large-scale terrorist operations as well as natural disasters or other disasters. All of this is just thinking out loud, for the future, of course, but the processes are unfolding so quickly that the future is almost at our doorstep. Already now, we must think about it and prepare for it. As first practical steps in giving shape to this system, one could already now begin with creating joint or parallel structures for permanent contacts between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. It would be worthwhile to submit proposals of this kind officially to the command bodies of NATO. In the talks with President Bush, we were looking for a mutually acceptable basis for negotiation, which would settle relations between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. I must tell you that

we are also receiving other information. In particular, some would like to incorporate the countries of Eastern Europe, or at least some of them, into NATO and use this organization as a kind of political instrument for their own purposes, in order to implement their policy for the restructuring of Europe, which would be far from the idea of a common European home, already recognized by politicians as well as by social circles and nations. In short, this is an attempt to realize the conception that Kissinger proposed on several occasions. Now, he has more or less abandoned this position, but formerly he spoke about overcoming the division of Europe, in favor of its unification, but from the Atlantic up to the borders of the Soviet Union.

The ulterior motive and the goal of such a conception are understandable – to further expand the functions of NATO in Europe and beyond. But this is clearly far from being any new thinking; rather, these are attempts to achieve objectives that were already set during the “Cold War,” during which the situation and perhaps even the elements of instability and weakness in the positions of some states were exploited.

Esteemed colleagues! You are familiar with the position of the Soviet Union regarding relations between the peoples of our countries. We are in favor of complete and unconditional adherence to the principles of equality, sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, for the recognition of the right of the people of each country to freely choose the path of its development. In our country, a modern civil society and the rule of law are developing, new structures are arising and asserting themselves, but not without pain. But can one confuse the beginning with the end? We have enough strength and common sense to emerge from the present stage of development in the process of radical reforms and the fundamental renewal of our federal state.

We are aware of our responsibility for seeing to it that *perestroika* proceeds at a healthy rate and that the forces of the past do not gain the upper hand. This is in the interest of all peoples. We are confident that in cooperation with our neighbors and friends, with all the participants in the all-European process, we will consistently advance down the path toward the development of a new, flourishing Europe, free of fears for its future.

I am of the opinion that we must also implement the agreements that were reached at the last meetings of the Executive Committee of the CMEA – i.e., the agreements on the restructuring of our economic relations based on the new realities and all countries’ development in the direction of cooperation with all the countries of the world, towards a world economy. Without this, the integration processes in Europe will hardly be successful.

A few more words on the talks with the President of the USA. Above all, I would like to stress that the question of the position, the role of the USA in the current situation is central.

What is very important is the fundamental change in how we view each other that has occurred in recent years. From my side, President Bush was told that on the basis of a realistic assessment we are of the opinion that despite all its power, it is difficult for the United States today to maintain its leading role in the world. And that it should base its international policy not on this but rather on cooperation, not least of all with the Soviet Union.

It seems to me that our partners in the United States have yet to realize this, although they are clearly moving toward an understanding of this situation and their role and are taking account of the emergence of new centers in the world.

The "Cold War," which brought so much suffering to the world, was waged mainly between the two strongest powers. And they bear the responsibility for ridding the world of its consequences and for making a decisive contribution to the construction of a new order based on peace.

On this basis, I asked a natural, in my opinion an organically connected, additional question, a cardinal question: How would the Soviet Union like to see the United States, and the USA the USSR?

As far as we are concerned, we are of the opinion that a weakened USA with a reduced role in international affairs would not be to our advantage. That could only mean instability in the world.

I am convinced that in political circles of the USA, too, the understanding is growing that it would be advantageous for America if the Soviet Union were a strong, democratic, modern state, integrated into the world economy, into civilization.

The new thinking strives to take into consideration the legitimate interests of the USA. That is our conscious choice. Having made this choice, we are striving to maintain the support of all the strata of our population. That is not always easy. But we have already achieved much: a new attitude towards America is emerging; the feelings of animosity towards the USA are vanishing.

President Bush assured me that in the USA there has been a radical change in attitude toward the USSR in the past year, although mistrust persists in some circles. On the whole, Soviet *perestroika*, the Soviet Union of today, enjoys support and sympathy. This was born out by the atmosphere of the visit.

Both of my trips following the talks in Washington and Camp David, to Minnesota and also to San Francisco, showed us, on the whole, a different America and gave us the possibility to see this, if we compare it with what we saw just a short time ago. Serious, far-reaching changes are taking place.

It seems to me that Bush's position evolved, both in Malta and also in the period between Malta and Washington, and in Washington, for there were questions up to the very last day, up to the last hour of the talks, on which neither the President nor the Administration took a definite stand. In the end, under the influence of the – in any case – quite serious, deep and positive positions of sympathy for the Soviet Union and the matters with which we are dealing, they took a corresponding position. The situation is simply such that the administration cannot ignore what is happening in American society.

An objective process of convergence between our value systems is taking place. And the most dangerous thing now would be to try to play a dishonest game. If even the slightest doubt arose in this regard, and the people sensed the deception, this would throw us far back.

In all of this, a new reality is prevailing. There is agreement concerning the main thing: in a time of far-reaching change – in which Europe has been set into motion, the Soviet Union is changing radically and changes are taking place in the USA – Soviet-American collaboration is an irreplaceable factor for predictability and stability.

This conclusion, I told Bush, is no idealism, no glossing over of differences of opinion and different concerns; there are many of these, our societies are different and they will hardly become similar. This conclusion is the source of the confident development taking place in each of our states.

We also spoke about how relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America are perceived by others. Here we discovered a paradox. When Soviet-American relations are tense, the other countries want us to normalize or even improve them, and they urge this from all sides, which is fully understandable, for animosity between states, states such as the United States and the Soviet Union, always impacts the whole world situation.

We only need to begin approaching one another, and immediately the suspicion arises that we are concluding agreements at the cost of others, at the cost of our allies, that we are betraying them. I must say, that nothing is coming out of what happened in Washington and Camp David in these days during the visit. It was about our mutual relations, indeed in the context of our mutual relations both with our allies and with all states in Europe and the world. There is this understanding, and that is, as I see it, also a very substantive element.

Regarding the negotiations in Washington on the reduction of nuclear and conventional arms: basically, there was a successful summary of the extraordinarily intensive work done by the sides on various levels. On the complicated matters, the disputes lasted up to the last moment and during the actual meeting with President Bush. On the whole, I think, the result is positive. Fundamental points were agreed upon regarding a treaty for a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons, which will be signed at the end of this year. This is actually the goal. Important problems concerning the counting and limitation of the loading of air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers were solved; this was a very complicated problem, and the first versions, upon which the Americans insisted, would have allowed them to take advantage of a loophole and given them the possibility of having more warheads. Now, a solution has been found that does not undermine the basic foundations of this treaty.

The issue of sea-launched cruise missiles has also been resolved, for if this issue had not been resolved, possibilities would have opened up for devaluating what we wanted to achieve with the 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms at the expense of the sea-launched cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. On these two matters, there were particularly strong disagreements.

It was not easy to reach agreement regarding the future negotiations on strategic arms and the achievement of a higher level of strategic stability – i.e., regarding how to proceed after the signing of the treaty on the reduction of offensive strategic weapons by 50%. For then, the most sensitive series of reductions in strategic offensive arms will also commence. For then, in our opinion (and there has been an exchange of views on this, particularly in Reykjavik), already in the stage following the 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms the other members of the nuclear club should also be included in the process of nuclear reductions. You will remember that we even made an enormous concession in Reykjavik when we said that we would leave the issue of England's and France's nuclear weapons to one side until after the 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive arms. China has also reacted, and the Chinese have even declared that if there is

a larger reduction in nuclear weapons, of strategic offensive weapons, they would also join the process. To my knowledge there was a direct statement on this by Mrs. Thatcher as well. She will be here with us tomorrow, and I will learn more from her then. We have succeeded in agreeing that strategic weapons must be reduced in a balanced manner, taking into account the constant equilibrium of national security at decreasing levels of armament. Furthermore, we agreed to include additional confidence-building measures and measures to ensure the predictability of military activity, to exclude the possibility of a nuclear war, in the future treaty. The position of the Administration on the issue of non-circumvention of the treaty on strategic offensive arms was subjected to serious criticism from our side, particularly in connection with the new aspect of English-American cooperation in this area. I don't know if you were aware of this, but we assumed – as was generally recognized, also by the Americans and the English – that the Americans were going to help renovate the nuclear weapons on England's submarine fleet by replacing the "Trident-1" with the "Trident-2," and nothing more. Now, a different way of proceeding has suddenly been revealed by the Americans. They are raising the issue that there should be no limitations on their cooperation with England in the area of nuclear weapons. But then, one can assume that American nuclear weapons will also be stationed in England. Then, it becomes possible that whatever is reduced in the USA gets stocked up elsewhere. And that would indeed create a very serious danger for all; it would undermine and complicate the situation. We, for our part, declared that we definitely rejected such action and considered it unacceptable. An agreement to eliminate and refrain from producing chemical weapons was signed. This is important in itself and has prepared the way for the multilateral convention on which we have been working for many years. The signing of the protocols to the treaties to limit underground nuclear tests and regarding underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes smoothed the way to the ratification of these treaties.

Agreement was reached regarding measures against the further global proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, combat missiles that can carry such weapons, and missile technologies. This problem was discussed in great detail. It is natural that the farther we advance down the path of disarmament within the framework of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the more acute these problems become. We have information to the effect that these issues are becoming particularly urgent now, for many countries are on the threshold or even have the possibility to possess nuclear weapons already and have mastered missile technology.

The issue of reducing armed forces in Europe was dealt with separately. Realistic conditions were created for preparing the treaty for signature by the end of the year. As you know, what is standing in the way of this is NATO's position on the reduction of air

forces. We are being asked to include land-based naval forces in the Vienna negotiations, although they will be the subject of future negotiations on reducing naval arms. Otherwise, the aircraft of our naval forces would be included, but whatever is stationed on aircraft carriers would be disregarded by the treaty. I repeat, on the whole, important results were achieved in Washington regarding arms reductions. It is also important that the principles established for negotiations in upcoming years were a good preparation for the future.

I could speak in more detail, but I don't want to abuse your patience and time. However, I would still like to briefly say the following. The whole day in Camp David was dedicated to the discussion of regional problems, during which besides the President, only the Foreign Minister took part.

It was an extremely open, even confidential conversation. Up to now, we have not had such a constructive exchange of views. And that testifies to the fact that a new type of relationship has developed, or at least is in the course of developing. One can say that here we have put an end to approaching regional conflicts as a matter of rivalry between us. If one excludes the position of the USA on Cuba, which remains full of "Cold War" complexes, then one can say that all other issues – Afghanistan, the Middle East, Korea, Cambodia, South Africa, Ethiopia – were dealt with based on the criteria of the new thinking.

There was an understanding, for instance, on Afghanistan, on promoting an end to the civil war. We agreed to support the holding of elections, whose results will determine the nature of the regime. So much in brief, without going into detail.

On the Middle East, there was a very detailed exchange of views. Israel is a cause of great concern not only for us but also for the Americans. Baker said, for instance, that he did not manage to make a declaration saying that the USA is against the settlement of Palestinian land by immigrants, when Shamir announced the creation of ten further settlements in this area the other day. The Americans, he said, are not enthusiastic about their relations to Israel. However, the Administration is heavily curbed by the Jewish lobby, particularly in Congress. Precisely for this reason, their actions are inconsistent, and also with regard to an international conference on the Middle East, indecisiveness remains, even though the USA understands its significance.

Concern was expressed regarding the recent flaring up of terrorism, which in the opinion of Bush and Baker could seriously weaken the position of Arafat. Nevertheless, we agreed to act in such a way as to ultimately arrive at an international conference. In this

connection, we expressed many ideas, in particular the idea that both the Soviet Union and the USA could become guarantors of the security and the sovereignty of the Israeli state and also the other states of the region, and this would be very important in itself. We, for our part, observed that especially given the current understanding that exists in Western and Eastern Europe as well as in the Arab world, and given that a rapprochement of positions can be observed, a way out in terms of solving this protracted regional conflict is possible, and that, if we miss this chance, we will have to start from scratch, and all of that is very difficult. Our American partners are of the same opinion. We drew attention to the fact that it was not easy for Arafat to reach the positions that he is defending today. This also goes for Assad and Mubarak. These are all elements and factors that make it possible to attain a de facto solution to the problem. In any case, the exchange was very detailed. We, for our part, stated that the first steps in the international process will permit us to re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel and that this understanding exists not only in the Soviet Union but is shared already also by our partners in the Arab world. It is very important that in the Bush Administration – in contrast to the preceding one, which only recognized the necessity of cooperation at the end of its term – there is, from the beginning, an understanding of the necessity to cooperate, to resolve these problems on the basis of multilateral cooperation. On the whole, I repeat, the exchange of views was very lively.

On southern Africa, there were practically no differences of opinion regarding our approaches. I must tell you that on the eve of my visit to Washington there was a signal from Ethiopia, to the effect that the Ethiopian leadership would welcome an appeal in the name of the two Presidents, a call for initiating a political settlement with the separatists and for moving away from trying to solve this problem by military force towards a peaceful, political approach. And, as you know, a declaration to this effect was made. We declared that we will work together: we are providing planes, the Americans foodstuffs, in order to help those that are in an emergency situation in several regions of Ethiopia.

On Korea: The Americans expressed their suspicions in connection with the refusal of Pyongyang to join the IAEA, and the excessive militarization of North Korea. We showed understanding regarding the issue of the IAEA, but suggested trying to find a way out, above all by means of the removal of American nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula.

As you know, I had a meeting in San Francisco with Ro De U. The U.S. Administration agreed to the meeting, since the Korean President had asked for their permission, let's put it that way. We informed our friends in the North that a contact of this kind is possible but that it does not mean that the issue of establishing diplomatic relations is thereby

solved, that it only means a further contact within the framework of the development of our views, of the new thinking in this region as well, also in the interest of conducting a broader dialogue on the problems of the Korean peninsula

Ro De U, of course, wanted to bring us to agree to diplomatic recognition as soon as possible. We linked the question to the general process on the Korean peninsula and urged him to undertake a constructive search for a solution to this problem.

There was a conversation about Cuba. Here, there are some differences between the positions of Baker and Bush. Baker reduced everything to saying that, if the Cubans gave up armed support for the insurgents in El Salvador, contact could be established with Cuba. The President is of the view that this is not sufficient, that the “dictatorial” regime itself – as he expresses it – must be changed, in line with the formula according to which the Sandanistas in Nicaragua transitioned to holding elections. That is, here there was an ideologically aggressive approach. We resolutely stated that in all of this they are coming up against their own intolerance, their own prejudices, clichés from the past, and that it is time for the United States to break with this line of thinking and perhaps first of all to propose an indirect contact with the Cubans. I am convinced that the Cubans will react.

I also had to explain why we buy sugar in Cuba at a price that is higher than the world market price; I had to dispel suspicions in this regard.

On Cambodia, our positions actually agree. There is a possibility for cooperation.

So, to sum up this part of the summit meeting, on the whole one can say that in our approach to conflicts, we have already progressed from rivalry to mutual understanding, and now already to cooperation.

Regarding bilateral relations between the USA and the USSR, all is known. A whole package of larger agreements and protocols was signed. They have been referred to in the press.

I would particularly like to stress the trade agreement. It was not easy to reach it; up to the last moment, it was uncertain if the Americans would approve its signature. Nonetheless, Bush did give his approval and even suggested that the Presidents should sign.

I value this fact very highly, for this is not so much a matter of the economic side. In the next while, the trade agreement will not bring our economy anything; up to now, it has

had no practical significance. And we will not be able to enjoy the advantages that this trade agreement provides in the near future. The main thing is the political significance of this act at the present concrete point in time, during an acute, tumultuous phase of *perestroika* in the Soviet Union. For Bush, this was something of a courageous act, and the President gave precedence to what was most important in world politics and did not give way to considerations regarding the current, temporary economic situation, although many were trying to press him in this direction, including in connection with Lithuania.

And one more thing. In the course of the visit, I met very many representatives of American business and American science. Among them were also outstanding, well-known personalities, people with great influence both in the global economy and in American politics.

And I can say, without fostering illusions: this highly regarded part of American society clearly showed not only great but also practical interest in developing relations with us. They are looking for ways to cooperate concretely and objectively. This is a very essential point and also proof of a switch in American society's attitude towards us, of the growing trust that today's Soviet Union is eliciting in the West.

I must say that not only Bush, but also those close to him, negotiated with us in a respectful way, calmly, in a pleasant atmosphere, with comprehension of the great significance of Soviet-American cooperation in the current stage of global development.

The business world, American science, public circles, the simple people are taking note of the Soviet Union, of the great deal of work that is being done for the renewal and reform of our society.

With this, I end my report. If there is a wish that something be clarified, I will be happy to answer the questions that have arisen among our friends. I thank you for your attention and ask that you excuse me for not having been brief after all, although I have tried to speak on all issues as briefly as possible. Thank you.

[Translation from the German by Ursula Froese]