

Secret

INFORMATION

About the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States

On November 22-23, 1978, the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member-states took place in Moscow.

The meeting dealt with two agenda items:

1. Further steps in the struggle to halt the arms race, to liquidate the danger of nuclear war, to consolidate détente and to resolve successive problems with regard to European security.
2. A report by the Supreme Commander of the WTO's Unified Armed Forces about the status and development of military cooperation among the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty member-states.

At the meeting an assessment was made of the current international situation, the positive and negative tendencies in its development; proposals were formulated in response; and a program of activity for the near future was delineated. The program that was adopted for the further activity of the Warsaw Treaty states, as expressed in the Declaration, has far-reaching importance for the further development of the situation in Europe and in the world. The Moscow meeting also has very important significance for the situation in the Warsaw Treaty alliance.

The discussion and the declaration that was adopted focused on the following questions, which will be decisive for the further progress of détente:

- Political dialogue and cooperation in Europe;
- Halting the arms race and initiating true disarmament;
- Support for national-liberation movements and for states with a socialist or progressive orientation;
- The stance of the socialist states regarding problems connected with human rights;

- Cooperation between the states of the socialist commonwealth and their collaboration in the international arena.

The leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries stressed in their speeches the basically favorable development of political contacts and cooperation in Europe, which has been better at the bilateral than at the multilateral level. The positive attitude of especially France and the FRG with regard to détente was noted. A network of agreements and consultations has arisen among the European states. Western Europe is tending not to give in to every vacillation in the USA's policy toward the USSR and the other socialist states. It was confirmed once more in the Declaration that the fundament for European security and the basic precondition for the détente process is the unconditional acceptance of the current political and territorial order in Europe. During the discussion, this question was posed most forcefully by the PRP's head of delegation, First Secretary of the CC of the PUWP, Cde. Edward Gierek.

The leaders of the Treaty countries stressed the importance of Soviet-American relations for the deepening of the détente process. The General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, Cde. Leonid Brezhnev, voiced his conviction in this regard that if some new turn does not come about in President Carter's stance, then the second treaty on the limitation of offensive strategic arms should be signed in the near future and may lead to a meeting of the two leaders.

The meeting simultaneously supported the necessity of further struggle for the complete and integral realization of the Final Act signed in Helsinki. Stressed in this regard was, among other things, the need to prepare well for the meeting of the representatives of that Act's signatories in Madrid in 1980.

At the meeting, the most attention was devoted in the speeches and the documents to halting the arms race and initiating disarmament. In the discussion, it was pointed out that NATO's drive to realize its programs for the quantitative and qualitative intensification of the arms race represents the greatest threat to the future of détente. This thesis was illustrated, among other things, by the resolutions of the Washington session of NATO and President Carter's decisions to start production of the neutron bomb. Several speakers pointed to NATO's intensification of military activity, which has sometimes assumed the character of a demonstration to the socialist states, and the constantly growing role of the *Bundeswehr* in NATO's armed forces.

Despite the meager results in the disarmament negotiations, the speakers stressed the need for our countries to maintain the initiative in this field. We should intensify our political and propaganda activity in order to win new allies for our struggle to halt the arms race. At the same time, a need exists to insure greater effectiveness in the disarmament talks being held at various levels.

The topicality of the entire group of initiatives by the socialist states announced in recent years was confirmed, and some of them were renewed in the Declaration. At the same time, new, important ideas were put forward.

The Declaration asserts that the WTO states support the initiation of SALT-III negotiations, in which other nuclear powers should be included alongside the USSR and the USA;

The readiness of our states was expressed to enter into negotiations and agreements on the basis of reciprocity with regard to every type of armament and weapon that have not yet been the subject of talks. This has to do mainly with intermediate-range missile weapons, or the so-called “gray area.” Cde. Brezhnev stressed that this problem must be considered together with the issue of American bases in Europe;

Cde. Brezhnev proposed that the proposal to conclude a treaty between the CSCE states on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons be supplemented with an obligation to the non-use of conventional weapons as well – i.e., the conclusion of a sort of non-aggression pact;

It was stressed that a constructive response by the West to the June proposals of the socialist states is needed in order to overcome the impasse at the Vienna negotiations. It was noted that real progress in these negotiations is currently being held up mainly by the FRG.

With regard to the issue of national-liberation movements and the social changes in the Third World, it was stated that the WTO states have not resigned from their class-based policy of supporting progressive movements and forces, especially in Africa, despite the complaints and threats of the West that this might hinder the détente process. At the same time, Cde. Brezhnev stressed that we must act in such a fashion that we do not aggravate the general international situation. He also proposed that the issue of coordinating assistance for progressive countries, especially those with the most consistent socialist orientation, be considered by the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The declaration includes a separate, aggressively-formulated passage dedicated to our stance on the issue of human rights. In the discussion, this problem was most broadly posed by Cde. Edward Gierek, who at this point thanked the fraternal countries for supporting the PRP's initiative, brought to the forum of the UN, regarding a Declaration on Educating Societies in a Spirit of Peace.

At the meeting, cooperation between the countries of the socialist commonwealth was broadly discussed. The enormous significance of economic cooperation within the CMEA for the resolution of key problems of every country's socioeconomic development was stressed, along with the ensuing necessity of overcoming the current difficulties and fully realizing the program for socialist economic integration. The necessity of improving the mechanisms for cooperation and increasing their efficiency was noted in particular. Cde. Brezhnev underlined the significance of last year's CMEA meeting, which assessed the Council's thirty years of activity and the realization of the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration and also adopted a series of important, long-term decisions. He also noted a need to coordinate the policy of the socialist states in the matter of economic relations with the West, which is guided by certain political goals in this area as well.

In discussion, the significance of regular meetings was stressed, beginning at the highest level, along with cooperation between the parties in the party, ideological, political and international realms.

The leaders of the fraternal countries strongly emphasized the issue of the further improvement of the mechanisms for political collaboration within the Warsaw Treaty, especially given the decisive influence that such a coordinated policy on the part of our countries has upon the deepening of the détente process in the world. Among other things, a proposal was put forward for convening the PCC every year, for more frequent meetings of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and for specifying in more detail the functions and work procedures of the Unified Secretariat.

The declaration did not touch upon the matter of the PRC's foreign policy for well-known reasons. Nevertheless, every leader – except Cde. N. Ceaușescu – subjected Beijing's current course to strong criticism. It was stressed in general that Chinese foreign policy is one of the main factors disturbing the international détente process and making disarmament negotiations difficult, and it is antisocialist in content. Cde. Brezhnev stated that one cannot preclude a dangerous alliance between U.S. imperialism,

Japan, and militant Chinese chauvinism. An additional form of criticism toward China's policy was every delegation's expression of solidarity with the DR Vietnam.

The far-reaching significance of the recently-concluded Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRV was stressed in this regard as a reconfirmation of socialist internationalism.

The concurrence in the basic directions, content and evaluations contained in the addresses of the six countries leaders' should be underlined.

Cde. L. Brezhnev's address contained a deep analysis of the current international situation in its entirety and the prospects for its further development. It was a clear confirmation of the Soviet state's course toward developing and strengthening the détente process.

Cde. E. Gierek's address constituted the fullest possible support for the CPSU's Leninist policy. At the same time it contained a broader presentation of Poland's stance regarding such key matters as the Soviet-American dialogue; consolidation of the political and territorial order in Europe and opposition to the tendencies being developed by the FRG and several of its allies toward the so-called unification of Germany; the necessity of not permitting the introduction and stationing of the neutron bomb in Europe; joint opposition to the course of China's leadership; and a more aggressive approach to the issue of human rights and other matters.

The leaders of the other countries also gave full support to the coordinated stance of the Warsaw Treaty.

Cde. Ceaușescu's address differed in a fundamental fashion regarding a majority of issues.

The first point on the agenda was the unanimous acceptance and signing of the Declaration, whose text would be published in the press.

A group of experts and deputy ministers of foreign affairs of the WTO states worked to obtain a coordinated position on the draft declaration.

Already before the work began, the Soviet comrades added a series of amendments to the text proposed by the various countries, including a majority of the suggestions presented by Poland (e.g., regarding the consolidation of the political and

territorial order in Europe and the importance of bilateral summit meetings for the development of European cooperation).

Basic difficulties arose in achieving a coordinated position on the Declaration as a result of the Romanian delegation's stance. Alleging the Warsaw Treaty's supposed incompetence with regard to a majority of international matters, Romania questioned the structure and contents contained in the Declaration. Finally, they agreed to accept the Soviet draft as a basis for discussion, but they still tried to force their views and assessments into it with regard to a series of key international problems.

In general, Romania categorically opposed any passage in the Declaration regarding our support for Vietnam and also did not agree to a negative assessment of the separatist understandings between Israel and Egypt.

The six WTO states published a separate declaration regarding the latter issue that contains our principled stance regarding Camp David and the conference in Baghdad.

With regard to several other matters – e.g., disarmament problems, support for national-liberation movements, human rights, etc. – a compromise formula was approved, but without harming our principled stances.

Under point 2 of the agenda, the meeting listened to the information presented by Marshal Kulikov and considered the draft resolution regarding the improvement of the mechanisms of military cooperation, as well as potential tasks in terms of strengthening the WTO states' defenses in light of the arms race being pushed by NATO.

Cde. Ceaușescu questioned the assessments and propositions contained in the materials from the WTO's Unified Armed Forces' Command and demanded a renewed discussion of the draft resolution regarding this matter, in order to practically deprive it of any contents.

The leaders of the other six states approved the information and the draft resolution presented by Marshal Kulikov. The Romanian delegation's stance was rejected. At this point, Cde. E. Gierek stressed that our countries insured the last 34 years of peace above all else by uniting and building up the necessary defensive potential.

Romania's delegation refused to sign the resolution regarding military matters.

The stance of Romania's delegation at the Moscow meeting of the Political Consultative Committee confirmed in a particularly glaring fashion the Romanian leadership's growing deviation over a longer period of time from the common line of the Warsaw Treaty states. This found expression in the speech of RCP General Secretary N. Ceaușescu, in the stance of the experts during the work on the PCC's declaration, and also – above all else – in the refusal to sign the resolution on military matters and the minutes of the meeting.

Cde. Ceaușescu questioned the data cited by Marshal Kulikov regarding NATO's arms expenditures and asserted that the proposals contained in the document aimed at having the WTO states push the arms race forward. He asserted that their acceptance would "negate" the significance of the WTO's declaration on détente and the tendency toward disarmament.

Cde. Ceaușescu stated that he considered the adoption of the resolution without Romania to be in violation of the principle of unanimity contained in the Warsaw Treaty and thus considers it to be illegal. Cde. Ceaușescu declared that he would inform the CC of the RPC, the National Assembly and the Romanian nation about this fact.

The Romanian delegation also refused to sign the meeting's minutes because of the six delegations' opposition to the inclusion of Romania's assessment and interpretation of Romania's not signing the military document.

We should point out that in order to obtain an approved Declaration from the PCC, the Soviet delegation, as well as the other delegations, made several concessions to Romania's position. These had to do with the principles of inter-state relations, several matters regarding disarmament, and others. Also left out were passages regarding support for the DR Vietnam and its admission into the CMEA, about CMEA-EEC talks, and also a condemnation of the Camp David accords.

An analysis of Cde. Ceaușescu's speech and the position adopted by the experts during their work on the PCC's Declaration leads one to the conclusion that the so-called Romanian deviation consists of deep differences with regard to many key questions. It has to do with the following thematic groups:

1. Relationship to the PRC. The six WTO states decisively condemned Beijing's course. Romania supports "the development of relations with all socialist countries, including China." In an improvised statement, Cde. Ceaușescu stated that the leaders in Beijing want to develop relations with the USSR and all the other socialist countries. He

referred uncritically to China's foreign policy. One could thus understand the subtext to mean that the Soviet Union bears responsibility for the current state of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Cde. Ceaușescu also voiced objections to the reporting on the Chinese visit to Romania by the press of several socialist countries. He even declared that the divergences between the socialist states "have degenerated into support for counterrevolutionary elements inside several countries." One can presume that he had in mind the Cambodian accusations directed against Vietnam, the existing frictions over nationalities between Romania and Hungary, and other, similar matters.

2. Position on the arms race and disarmament matters. Romania is assuming a non-class-based attitude toward the arms race and is even demonstrating a tendency toward making the Warsaw Treaty co-responsible for it. Although Romania agrees that halting the arms race is the most important task, it has assumed a deviating stance on a series of particular questions. It considers the most important result of the UN special session on disarmament to be the change in the negotiating mechanisms. It is opposed to a gathering of the five nuclear powers to initiate talks regarding a ban on the production of these weapons. Romania voiced doubts about SALT III and the talks on so-called gray areas of armament under the pretext of a lack of knowledge regarding these matters. It is tending toward treating disarmament proposals in the realm of nuclear weapons (our priority) the same as those regarding conventional weapons (the West's priority). Romania has called into question any achievement of the disarmament negotiations to date and has raised numerous proposals of its own. In addition to the well-known proposals regarding the reduction and freezing of [military] budgets and existing numbers, the liquidation of bases, a ban on multinational maneuvers and demonstrations of force near borders, etc., Cde. Ceaușescu put forward a proposal that the socialist countries unilaterally – independent of the realization of a general understanding on disarmament – reduce their armies and military expenditures by at least 5% and withdraw several units from the territory of other countries (while, as we know, NATO has adopted a decision to raise their military budgets by 3% in real terms each year).

3. Position regarding the developing countries and its vision of the world. Romania believes that the international situation is characterized by two tendencies: the struggle of nations for the right to independent development, without outside interference, and, on the other hand, an intensification of imperialist policies and a trend toward the world's division into spheres of influence. There were attempts to formulate the aforementioned thesis ambiguously so that it might be interpreted as being directed against the USSR. The world is dividing, according to the Romanians, into the rich and

the poor, which constitutes a threat to peace. In these aforementioned theses one can sense the influence of China, as well as the positions of a series of non-aligned countries (e.g., Yugoslavia). Romania did not agree to the inclusion of a passage in support of Vietnam, Angola, Laos, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, or even a passage on Chile, Nicaragua, and other terrorist regimes, under the pretext that these matters extend beyond the territorial competencies of the Warsaw Treaty.

4. The Middle East. Romania did not agree either to condemn the Camp David Accords or to support of the results of the Baghdad Conference. (It should be remembered that last year, Romania played an unclear role in Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.)

5. Europe. Cde. Ceaușescu considers the situation in Europe still to be the most complicated, and the goal of détente has not been realized in a proper fashion. The goal should be the elimination of blocs, and practical steps should be taken in this direction.

6. The principles of relations. In keeping with its well-known approach, Romania selectively emphasizes four principles: independence, sovereign equality, non-intervention in internal affairs, and non-use of force. They agreed to our inclusion of the principle of the inviolability of borders as a result of its linkage with the other principles that Romania sought. Cde. Ceaușescu voiced a desire in his speech to develop relations – especially the initiation of long-term programs of cooperation – but at the same time called for the initiation of broad discussions in order to diversify cooperation and “prove in practice” socialism's superiority as a societal formation and as a new type of relations between states. This undoubtedly has to do with securing for themselves useful supplies of raw materials and energy, in which Romania has a vital interest.

Overall, the Moscow meeting confirmed that Romania's stance regarding many international questions has undergone a further, negative evolution; the existing divisions are deepening. Romania is conducting ever more clearly a foreign policy contrary to the principles of socialist internationalism.

This is above all else the result of a growth in nationalistic tendencies and the disappearance of class criteria in Romania's foreign policy. Nationalism and a non-class-based approach to international problems – these are the main sources of Romania's current course, the main causes of its deviation from the common line of the WTO countries.

Cde. Ceaușescu's refusal to sign the resolution on military matters has great significance, for it will lead to the further weakening of Romania's ties to the Warsaw

Treaty's military structure. We can assume that Romania's goal is to maintain the political and security benefits flowing from membership in the Warsaw Pact while not assuming duties in the sphere of military cooperation – that is, as it further loosens its ties to the WTO's Unified Armed Forces.

We should note that this is occurring at a moment when NATO is strengthening its military structures (France's greater military cooperation with NATO) and the possibility exists of NATO's expansion to Spain.

Contacts with Beijing are undoubtedly having an influence upon the negative evolution of Romania's position, as well as its playing upon Sino-Soviet divisions in its policy; Romania's long-observed gravitation toward the non-aligned movement, its attempt to join this movement, is also playing a role.

Complicating the situation is the fact, though, that Romania is realizing in a veiled form Cde. Ceaușescu's announcement about informing the nation about the divisions that existed at the PCC in Moscow. This is providing ammunition to the imperialist forces accusing the Warsaw Treaty of accelerating the arms race. It is also a glaring manifestation of the lack of unity within the Warsaw Pact and is creating a dangerous precedent in terms of disclosing matters of our alliance with great military and political significance.

There can be no doubt that Romania's stance will also be exploited by anticommunist forces in their propaganda conducted against Poland and the other socialist countries.

Currently, it is particularly important to develop a broad propaganda campaign with regard to the Declaration adopted at the Moscow meeting and with regard to the foundations of unity and collaboration of the commonwealth of socialist states as a fundamental condition for the security of each of its countries and for security and peace in Europe. As always, it should stress with particular force the key significance of the indissoluble alliance and close cooperation with the USSR as key prerequisites for the PRP's independence, security, and propitious development.

[Translation from the Polish by Douglas Selvage]