


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ELEMENTS FOR A PAPER OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
TO THE COUNCIL RELATIVE TO THE FUTURE TASKS
OF THE ALLIANCE



Introduction

After my informal contacts with Delegations on the above subject, I have thought it useful to submit to you a tentative outline on the substance and procedures of the study which Ministers have entrusted to the Council. The present paper, like those already, or still to be, submitted by Delegations, is, of course, of a preliminary character. It may, it is hoped, stimulate the discussion, and it should be seen as a small contribution to the thinking and eventually the decisions of the Council on this important subject.

General Considerations

2. The Resolution, which is the basis of our exercise, states that the Council undertakes to study the future tasks of the Alliance, and its procedures, "in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for a durable peace". This means, in my opinion, that we start from a common conviction that the Alliance is necessary both now and in the future. Although the purpose of our exercise is to test the validity of our convictions in the light of a new assessment of international developments, it must be our aim, taking into account present realities, to justify and reaffirm our political solidarity in a practical way.

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3. This being our aim, we must objectively examine the validity of the reasons which suggest the continuation of our Alliance. Its fundamental aim is to ensure peace, freedom and security in the Treaty area, as laid down in the Treaty and the Paris Agreements of October 1954. We must carefully examine whether the main changes in the world political situation affect our basic purpose and, if so, in which sense. Again, since the very essence of our Alliance has been the solidarity of the two sides of the Atlantic in the face of the threat posed - at least hitherto - by countries ^{pursuing} ~~pursuing~~ an unfriendly policy, we must examine the future validity of this basic concept.

4. It also seems to me that we must make an effort to carry out this exercise and present its results in such a manner that public opinion will feel associated with it and be able to understand its meaning and message. When the time comes to write our report, it should be remembered that certain terms frequently used in international relations and which may be familiar to us need, from time to time, to be re-explained and reinterpreted in accordance with ~~the~~ changing international realities.

5. We should, for instance, rethink the meaning of the word "threat". When we use this word, do we refer to an actual threat or only a potential one? To an imminent military attack or only military pressure? Does it refer to a policy hostile to us on a world-wide basis or only in certain regions? Finally, can we use this word if it only refers to the effects of the normal competition for power between sovereign states?

6. Again, what is meant by the word "détente"? Is it the effect of Western goodwill efforts aiming at promoting commercial, cultural, scientific and touristic contacts between the West and the East, as well as political contacts with the purpose of reaching a better understanding of respective positions, requirements and pre-occupations?

...

Or should the word only be used once satisfactory agreements ending the political struggle for supremacy between the major powers have created a stable situation of mutual confidence and understanding? Finally - a third example - we should examine the meaning and role of the concept of the balance of power both in the recent past and in the future. Does it refer to actual military power, or rather to potential power in a more general sense, including economic, social and ideological elements? Geographically, is it regionally limited or does it refer to a world-wide situation including the United States and Canada? If the latter is the case, we should examine whether this is also true in the future and whether a European security system would make any sense without the participation and support of the United States and Canada.

Substance: the Studies to be Undertaken

7. Turning now to the work to be done under the Ministers' directive, it will be readily conceded that a detailed description of international developments since 1949 is not required for our purposes. Our efforts should rather concentrate, first, on the identification of the major changes affecting the Alliance in the last twenty years and, second, on the analysis of their specific impact on the future action of the Alliance. Accordingly, the following work programme, comprising the two elements of identification and analysis, might be suggested. First, the areas to be studied:

- A) The internal and external situation of the Soviet Union, with special reference to Sino-Soviet relations and such other factors as determine the policy options open to that country.

- B) The field of European security and the German problem (including developments in Eastern Europe).
- C) Western Europe and the relations between the European and overseas members (the United States and Canada) of the Alliance, including past and current ideas on those relations.
- D) Regions outside the NATO Treaty area, not excluding such economic developments as may be related to political security.

Having thus identified the major developments, their future impact might be assessed in terms of:

- I) The security of Alliance countries and the role of the Alliance, including the problem of European security and its connection with the United States or Canada in the circumstances prevailing before and after a possible political settlement with the Soviet Union.
- II) The general structure of the Alliance with special reference to the place of European members in the Alliance. Here it is desirable to examine how far the theory of the two pillars of the Alliance should be accepted and implemented; could the Western European Union be utilised in this context and transformed into the European pillar of the Alliance, or should a new special group of European countries be created? Which would be the best ways of avoiding risks of split within the Alliance?

- III) Political action (including information policy) of the Alliance with special reference to the problem of Germany and to the possibilities in East/West relations (initiatives and peace plans), and disarmament and arms control.
- IV) Consultation within the Alliance, its principles and practice, extent and implications, with special reference to its role as an instrument to implement the basic purposes of the Alliance and to achieve coordination of policies.
- V) The North Atlantic Treaty, its articles, in particular 4 and 5, their historical interpretation in the light of present dangers and new circumstances; the links between Treaty and Organization.
- VI) The role of the members of the Alliance in peace and war outside the NATO area and the problem of commitment in those areas.
- VII) Mutual aid within the Alliance and of aid to countries outside the Alliance with special reference to Article 2 of the Treaty as a source of alternative purposes of the Alliance.
- VIII) The review, and adequate re-presentation, of those parts of the Political Directive and Guidance to the NATO Military Authorities as may allow us publicly to reassert the defensive purposes of the Alliance and its determination to withstand aggression.
- IX) Prospects of the Treaty after 1970.

Procedures

8. Having regard to both certain precedents in the history of NATO and the many-sided character of the present exercise, there is no question in my mind but that the Council should be in command of the studies to be undertaken. However, in view of the many commitments of Permanent Representatives in present circumstances, they may wish to entrust the actual conduct of the exercise to an open-ended Group composed of governmental representatives, preferably of sub-ministerial level, and/or Permanent Representatives. If the Group is to remain closely associated with the Council, as seems to be the prevailing opinion in Delegations, it should, in my opinion, meet under the chairmanship of the Secretary General and report regularly to the Council on its progress and, when necessary, the special problems encountered in its work.

9. The organization of its work should, in my view, be left to the Group, it being understood of course that it would be free to establish sub-groups, either open-ended or restricted in numbers, to deal with certain aspects of the problems to be examined. The Group may be assisted by the International Secretariat as required.

10. I would, in conclusion, stress one aspect of procedure, recalling my earlier observation on the need for this study to be welcomed and understood by public opinion. One particular way to ensure this would be to authorise the Group to inform itself, by appropriate means, of the views of competent Organizations and persons (Parliamentarians, etc.). In view of the dangers attached to publicity, the Council may wish to recommend to the Group that the views thus obtained remain private and be confined to specific questions.

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However, there may be advantage in making known, on a discreet and selective basis, that the Group in preparing its report is ready to examine non-governmental views and submissions.

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