

Contents

PREFACE	X
ABSTRACT – SUMMARY	XI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	XIII
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND UNUSUAL TERMS IN THE TEXT	XVI
1. INTRODUCTION	21
1.1 Aim and significance	24
1.2 Avenue of approach	26
1.3 Scope, terms and sources	30
1.3.1 <i>Scope</i>	30
1.3.2 <i>Terms</i>	31
1.3.3 <i>Sources</i>	34
1.4 Structure	39
2. BACKGROUND FACTORS	41
2.1 Neutrality	41
2.1.1 <i>Formal aspects</i>	41
2.1.2 <i>Historic roots and record</i>	43
2.2 The Scandinavian legacy, and other factors	48
2.2.1 <i>The Scandinavian Defence Committee (SDC)</i>	48
2.2.2 <i>A pattern of semi-independent action</i>	50
2.3 Western policies towards Sweden during the Cold War	51
2.3.1 <i>The United States</i>	52
2.3.2 <i>The United Kingdom</i>	58
2.3.3 <i>Nato</i>	60
2.3.4 <i>Were there war plans?</i>	61

3. DECLARATORY DOCTRINE 1949–1969	65
3.1 Aim and approach	65
3.2 The early years – pragmatic non-alignment	66
3.2.1 <i>Debate over limited technical cooperation</i>	68
3.2.2 <i>The 1950 declaration on foreign policy</i>	70
3.3 The Hjalmarson affair – credible neutrality made paramount	74
3.3.1 <i>Background and events</i>	74
3.3.2 <i>A more restrictive doctrine</i>	75
3.3.3 <i>The end result</i>	79
3.4 The 1960s – a period of transition	81
3.4.1 <i>National security doctrine – mixing reassurance and deterrence</i>	81
3.4.2 <i>Sweden's role in the world – from caution to activism</i>	89
3.5 Summary and Analysis	98
3.5.1 <i>Motives/aims</i>	99
3.5.2 <i>Nature</i>	99
3.5.3 <i>Sweden's place in the world</i>	102
3.5.4 <i>Wartime help from abroad</i>	103
3.5.5 <i>Neutrality in wartime</i>	104
3.5.6 <i>Peacetime preparations for wartime cooperation</i>	104
3.5.7 <i>The limits of permissible debate</i>	106
4. DECLARATORY DOCTRINE 1970–1989	111
4.1 Palme's first period as prime minister, 1970–1976	111
4.1.1 <i>National security doctrine</i>	111
4.1.2 <i>Doctrine on Sweden's role in the world</i>	119
4.2 The non-socialist governments, 1976–1982	122
4.2.1 <i>A slightly more sober doctrine</i>	123
4.2.2 <i>The Second Cold War</i>	126
4.3 Palme's second period in office, 1982–1986	128
4.3.1 <i>The political context – controversy over security policy</i>	128
4.3.2 <i>Doctrinal developments</i>	133
4.4 The final years, 1986–1989	138
4.5 Summary and Analysis	140
5. PREPARATIONS 1949–1966: THE FORMATIVE AND EVOLUTIONARY YEARS	147
5.1 The formative years, 1949–1953	147
5.1.1 <i>Scandinavian cooperation</i>	148
5.1.2 <i>Contacts and cooperation with Britain, America and Nato.</i>	156
5.2 The evolutionary years, 1954–1966.	161
5.2.1 <i>The extent and intensity of preparations</i>	162
5.2.2 <i>The saliency of the Western factor</i>	175
5.2.3 <i>Those in the know, and how they handled it</i>	180

6. PREPARATIONS 1967–1978: THE YEARS OF STAGNATION	189
6.1 Aim, scope and structure	189
6.2 Scandinavian contacts, plans and preparations	189
6.2.1 <i>DNS-planning</i>	189
6.2.2 <i>SveNorDa</i>	192
6.2.3 <i>The Trondheim trail</i>	192
6.2.4 <i>Other contacts and cooperation</i>	193
6.2.5 <i>Intelligence cooperation</i>	194
6.3 Contacts, plans and preparations for cooperation with the US, the UK and Nato	194
6.3.1 <i>Contacts</i>	194
6.3.2 <i>Operational plans and preparations</i>	199
6.3.3 <i>Liaison and communications.</i>	201
6.3.4 <i>Equipment and supplies</i>	203
6.3.5 <i>Intelligence and stay-behind</i>	205
6.4 The Western factor in strategy and plans	207
6.4.1 <i>Overall strategy and operational principles</i>	208
6.4.2 <i>War plans</i>	210
6.4.3 <i>War games and studies</i>	211
6.5 Management and political oversight	214
6.5.1 <i>The military level</i>	214
6.5.2 <i>The military-political interface</i>	221
6.6 Assessing the years of stagnation	227
6.6.1 <i>The extent and intensity of preparations</i>	227
6.6.2 <i>The saliency of the Western factor</i>	228
6.6.3 <i>Those in the know, and how they handled it</i>	229
7. PREPARATIONS 1979–1989: THE DECLINE AND END OF AN OPTION	233
7.1 Aim, scope and structure	233
7.2 Scandinavian contacts, plans and preparations	233
7.2.1 <i>DNS-planning</i>	233
7.2.2 <i>SveNorDa</i>	236
7.2.3 <i>The Trondheim trail</i>	237
7.2.4 <i>Other contacts and preparations</i>	237
7.2.5 <i>Intelligence cooperation</i>	238
7.3 Contact, plans and preparations for cooperation with the US, the UK and Nato	239
7.3.1 <i>Contacts</i>	239
7.3.2 <i>Operational plans and preparations</i>	241
7.3.3 <i>Liaison and communications</i>	243
7.3.4 <i>Equipment and supplies</i>	245
7.3.5 <i>Intelligence and stay-behind</i>	246

7.4 The Western factor in strategy and plans	248
7.4.1 <i>Overall strategy and operational principles</i>	248
7.4.2 <i>War plans</i>	249
7.4.3 <i>War games and studies</i>	252
7.5 Management and political oversight	253
7.5.1 <i>The military level</i>	253
7.5.2 <i>The military-political interface and the political level</i>	255
7.6 Assessing the final years	258
 8. CONCLUSIONS	 261
8.1 Introduction	261
8.2 Comparing the patterns	262
8.2.1 <i>Pragmatic non-alignment, 1949 to 1959</i>	262
8.2.2 <i>Programmatic neutrality, 1959 to 1965/1968</i>	263
8.2.3 <i>Stand-alone and activist neutrality, 1965/1968 to 1980</i>	265
8.2.4 <i>Restriction creep, reinforced reassurance and controversy, 1981–1986</i>	268
8.2.5 <i>Assessment</i>	269
8.3 Two reinforcing mechanisms	270
8.3.1 <i>The power of neutrality as ideology and self-image</i>	271
8.3.2 <i>Political risk and the fear of leaks</i>	274
8.3.3 <i>Additional signs of a causal link</i>	279
8.4 Summing up	279
 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 285