

Prague, January 3, 1983

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### Regarding the Documents Prepared for the PCC Meeting in Prague

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As a result of the meeting of the PCC of the WTO states in Prague (January 4-5, 1983), two documents are to be announced: a political declaration by the WTO member-states and a communiqué from the PCC meeting. The work on these texts continued in Prague at the expert level from December 16-28, 1982, and at the level of the deputy ministers of foreign affairs from December 29, 1982, until January 3, 1983.

1. The declaration contains an assessment of the international situation, formulates an alternative for its evolution in terms of the threat of nuclear war and advances a proposal for concluding a treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations between the states of the WTO and NATO.

The assessment of the international situation contained in the text of the declaration was sharpened in comparison to Czechoslovakia's initial draft, mainly through a more concrete exposition of the sources of the policy of confrontation and the arms race (the USA, the other NATO states, the imperialist military-industrial complexes). However, at Hungary's suggestion, the references to a direct danger of an outbreak of war were reduced in order to avoid a catastrophic undertone in the document.

The idea of an alternative program for the evolution of the international situation in contrast to the policy of NATO was based on the assumption that although the world finds itself at a dangerous point, it is not yet too late to slow the arms race and the confrontational course of events by preventing the stationing of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe and, as a result, preserving the policy of détente. With regard to Romania's differing stance during the negotiations, the view prevailed that détente has not been completely liquidated and its structures may survive despite the current tensions.

The key issue in the declaration is the draft treaty on the non-use of force. It is a more concrete proposal than the ideas previously advanced within the WTO. In comparison to the initial draft of the declaration, the bloc aspect of treaty was toned down by giving it a more open character and by reiterating a readiness to dissolve the blocs, beginning first of all with their military structures. Activities aimed at realizing the treaty should become an axis for the political and diplomatic activity of the WTO states in the upcoming years.

In the ideological part of the document, the WTO's postulate for the clear demarcation of the ideological plane from the sphere of interstate relations deserves attention.

2. The draft declaration presented by the meeting's hosts includes a passage regarding Polish matters. In response to the initial version, we presented our modified text that had been accepted by our leadership. As a result of bilateral consultations, which we conducted with the aim of avoiding a plenary discussion, our proposal was accepted, and approval was also expressed for including it at the end, rather than at the beginning, of the part dealing with Europe (p. 17). Romania's delegation made an attempt to formulate a stance that the categorical rebuff of intervention in our country's internal affairs is purely a matter for Poland, not for the fraternal socialist states – something to which we did not voice our approval.

A series of new elements were added to the initial draft declaration at our initiative, including: the issue of compliance with the treaties and understandings designating the territorial and political realities of contemporary Europe; underlining our decisiveness to further strengthen the unity of the socialist states; the need for confidence-building measures in economic relations; condemnation of aggressive military doctrines that endanger peace; and the expansion of the possibility of creating nuclear-free zones to other regions of Europe outside the Balkans and Northern Europe.

We also made efforts to clearly define the responsibility of the Western European states, especially the FRG, for the consequences of their making their territories available for the stationing of new American missiles. Our proposal met with decisive opposition from the Romanian delegation. After intensive negotiations, a formulation was included in the text that indirectly lays responsibility on the Western European states for the worsening of the political atmosphere, as well as interstate relations, in this context (p. 12).

3. The greatest difficulty for approving a text arose as a result of Romania's proposal to include in the declaration a passage regarding a unilateral freeze on military budgets at the 1983 level and a proposal to NATO for initiating "immediate and direct negotiations" regarding a mutual reduction in military expenditures by 20% in comparison to 1982 by 1985. The Romanians justified their stance as an effort to enrich the WTO's political program included in the declaration. At a certain stage, they supplemented their proposal with the convocation of a "special commission of WTO

states to limit the arms race and to begin disarmament, and also to enter direct negotiations with the NATO states.”

The Romanian proposal led to an impasse in the proceedings for several days. The USSR, Poland and the other states rejected it. They argued that such a unilateral step would lead to a weakening of the WTO; there would be no chance of reciprocity, given NATO’s known resolutions to increase military expenditures; and it could even make it easier for NATO to achieve superiority over the WTO. They also reproached Romania for announcing the proposal late and unexpectedly, presenting it in the form of an ultimatum, and complicating preparations for the PCC in an unprecedented fashion. These countries were prepared to accept a general formulation in favor of a mutual freeze and reduction of military expenditures, without their unilateral application to the WTO and without specifying the amount of reduction.

For several days, the USSR’s delegation also rejected the preparation of an offer to NATO for negotiations on this matter, but agreed to it on the final day under the condition that Romania would withdraw its proposal for the convocation of a special commission of WTO states for disarmament. The Soviet comrades informed us bilaterally that acceptance of this would constitute giving Romania a right to oversee the Geneva talks between the USSR and the USA on strategic and European nuclear weapons.

As a result of intensive multilateral and bilateral talks, especially between the Soviets and the Romanians, the problem of military expenditures was resolved shortly before the delegations’ arrival from the PCC. The declaration will include a general compromise formula that contains an offer for negotiations with NATO, but does not foresee the convocation of a special WTO commission (p. 10).

The remaining problems that were discussed the longest, although important, did not have the same degree of difficulty as the aforementioned. We believe that the Romanians blocked their resolution for a long time mainly on tactical grounds, in order to create a linkage with the issue of military expenditures. This group included three questions:

First, there was the declaration that the stationing of the new U.S. missiles in Western Europe would make it necessary for the WTO states to adopt appropriate measures to insure their security. The Romanians considered this to be an adoption of NATO’s confrontational line. Hungary’s cautious stance on this matter is worthy of note. As a result, discussion of this matter was omitted from the declaration.

Second, there was the proposal to create a chemical-weapon-free zone on the territories of the FRG, Benelux, the PRP, the GDR, and the ČSSR. The Romanians proposed the withdrawal of chemical weapons from all of Europe, without handling Central Europe separately. A general formulation was accepted (p. 13).

Third, there was the quantity of armed forces of the USSR and the USA that should be withdrawn from Central Europe. The Romanians proposed 45-50 thousand and 25-30 thousand, respectively, and 20 thousand and 13 thousand for the other participants (just like at the Vienna negotiations). After a longer discussion, the Romanians withdrew the proposal.

4. The attached drafts of the political declaration and the communiqué are in keeping with the principles and goals of our foreign policy. I recommend their adoption.

[Signed] M. DMOCHOWSKI<sup>1</sup>

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*[Translation from the Polish by Douglas Selvage]*

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