X. Meeting of the PCC, Budapest, 17 March 1969
Editorial Note

The one-day Budapest gathering was the Warsaw Pact's landmark event. Following by half a year the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev called the PCC at a ten-days' notice, to put in effect the Soviet proposals for the institutionalization of the alliance and issue a public appeal for the convocation of a European security conference, long favored by Poland. Together with Hungary, Poland proposed that the PCC meeting be preceded immediately by a working session of deputy foreign ministers. The intention was to prepare a single document for adoption by the PCC on reorganization of the alliance and international issues, including the security conference.

The meeting of the deputies, held on 15-16 March, did not work out as planned. It happened to coincide with the Soviet-Chinese clashes along the Ussuri river that brought the two countries to the verge of war. When Soviet representative Firiubin started to inform his colleagues about what was happening, thus touching on the tricky question of whether the allies might be asked to help the Russians fight the Chinese, his Romanian counterpart Mircea Maliţa "demonstratively interrupted him," insisting that the subject was out of order.[1] Maliţa fueled more discord by attempting to reopen discussion about the military documents on strengthening the Warsaw Pact that had already been agreed upon.

Anticipating Moscow's pressure in the Chinese issue at the PCC meeting, the Romanian politburo decided the day before to insist on the letter of the Warsaw Treaty that limited its validity to Europe. On second thought, however, the Romanians decided not to obstruct the Soviet-sponsored reorganization of the alliance. As a result, the PCC approved the reorganization without further discussion, whereas disagreement on a statement against China prevailed because of Romanian opposition.

The innovations approved at the gathering included the establishment of the following:

- a strengthened unified command, with an enlarged staff at the disposal of the supreme commander,

- committee of defense ministers which, having formalized their already existing practice of meet regularly, would prepare recommendations on military policy for the PCC,

- military council, consisting of the deputy ministers of defense, the chief of unified air defense, and the head of the newly created committee on technology, who would meet at least twice a year to discuss combat and mobilization readiness, organizational structure and further development of the armed forces,

- committee on technology, composed of representatives of each members state, to supervise research and development.

Additionally, the PCC adopted a statute on the command of the unified forces in peacetime, leaving the much more controversial statute on their command in wartime to be prepared at an unspecified later date.

The draft of the appeal for a security conference prompted numerous amendments, mainly though not exclusively by Romania, and was only adopted after a marathon discussion. As usual, the Romanians objected to including gratuitous insults of Western "imperialists," whereas the East Germans, beneficiaries of the partition of Germany, took exception to including as a stated goal the overcoming of the division of Europe. In the end, the thrust of the appeal was toward preservation of the territorial, and by implication also political, status quo in Europe. Its most important innovation was the absence of any precondition for convening the conference, although many other issues, notably the participation in it of the United States and Canada, remained to be clarified before it could meet.

While the Soviet Union at last had its way in introducing in the Warsaw Pact the changes in wanted it also showed greater disposition than before to treat its allies as partners. It managed to contain Romanian dissidence without confrontation, thus preserving the viability of the alliance. The project for the security conference, if realized, promised the allies an opportunity to assert their interests, if they wanted to, with rather than against the Soviet Union. Polish deputy foreign minister Winiewicz returned home from Budapest with an impression that his country's room for maneuver had increased.[2]

Vojtech Mastny

Notes

[1] Kruczkowki to Jędrychowski, 16 March 1969, DI-Og-0-2101-1-69, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw.

[2] Information by former Polish ambassador to Finland Józef Wiejacz, Helsinki, March 1998.